Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

5-12-2012

The Role of Community Colleges in the Global Knowledge-Based
Economy: Urban and Rural Differences in Workforce Outcomes
Mike J. McGrevey

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
McGrevey, Mike J., "The Role of Community Colleges in the Global Knowledge-Based Economy: Urban and
Rural Differences in Workforce Outcomes" (2012). Theses and Dissertations. 4628.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/4628

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGEBASED ECONOMY: URBAN AND RURAL DIFFERENCES
IN WORKFORCE OUTCOMES

By
Michael Joseph McGrevey

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Community College Leadership
in the Department of Leadership and Foundations
Mississippi State, Mississippi
May 2012

Copyright 2012
By
Michael Joseph McGrevey

THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES IN THE GLOBAL KNOWLEDGEBASED ECONOMY: URBAN AND RURAL DIFFERENCES
IN WORKFORCE OUTCOMES

By
Michael Joseph McGrevey
Approved:
__________________________
Domenico Parisi
Professor and Director, National
Strategic Planning & Analysis
Research Center
(Co-Director of Dissertation)

__________________________
James E. Davis
Associate Professor and Program
Coordinator, Community College
Leadership
(Co-Director of Dissertation)

__________________________
William M. Wiseman
Professor and Director, John C.
Stennis Institute of Government
(Committee Member)

__________________________
Wayne Stonecypher
Adjunct Professor of
Community College Leadership
(Committee Member)

__________________________
William Scaggs
Adjunct Professor of
Community College Leadership
(Committee Member)

__________________________
Dwight Hare, Professor and
Graduate Coordinator,
Department of Leadership and
Foundations
__________________________
Richard Blackbourn
Dean of College of Education

Name: Michael Joseph McGrevey
Date of Degree: May 11, 2012
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Community College Leadership
Major Professors: Dr. Domenico Parisi and Dr. James E. Davis
Title of Study: THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY COLLEGES IN THE GLOBAL
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY: URBAN AND RURAL
DIFFERENCES IN WORKFORCE OUTCOMES
Pages in Study: 238
Candidate for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The aim of this study was to investigate the question of whether or not the gap
between rural and urban workforce outcomes is reduced with investment in human
capital and training conducted by community colleges. In this study, rural and urban
differences in employment rate, employment retention, and wage gain after receiving
training were examined to determine the extent to which the gap between rural and urban
workforce outcomes is reduced by investment in human capital and training conducted by
community colleges. Three research questions were examined.
1. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings equally able to secure
employment after receiving specialized and advanced training?
2. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings engaging in specialized- and
advanced-skill development equally able to retain employment over time?
3. Do Mississippians in rural and urban settings experience the same wage
increase after receiving specialized and advanced training?

The researcher hypothesized that investment in skill development would reduce
the gap between rural and urban workforce outcomes, controlling for individual and local
factors. The results of this study have several implications. First, training is a critical
component to gaining and retaining employment. On average, 80% of those who receive
training from community colleges are able to gain employment. Of those, 54% are able to
retain their jobs for the remainder of the year and training generates an annual increase of
$4,633 in wages, on average. Second, the results show that there are urban and rural
differences in workforce outcomes. Third, individual characteristics matter and, in all
cases, those who benefit the most from training are those with 2-year degrees, confirming
that community colleges play a fundamental role in providing the knowledge and skills
for our workforce. Fourth, local conditions cannot be dismissed in addressing differential
workforce outcomes.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The 21st Century ushered in a new set of challenges for maintaining and
promoting economic competitiveness. The economy will rely increasingly on knowledgebased products and services, a trend that will accelerate the demand for a workforce with
solid educational credentials along with a host of critical skills, including but not limited
to (a) undertaking broad problem-solving, (b) engaging in open-ended tasks, (c) pursuing
teamwork along with entrepreneurial opportunities, and (d) embracing intentional, lifelong learning. Unlike in the past, attracting, preparing, and retaining workers with high
levels of education and advanced skills is fundamental to maintaining economic
competitiveness in a global market.
A series of demographic, social, and economic transformations over the last
century contributed to the increased demand for a high-performance workforce. In 1900,
for example, the U.S. economy relied primarily on small communities and a large
segment of the workforce employed in a labor-intensive agriculture industry. More than
60% of Americans lived in rural areas, defined as small towns (population less than
2,500), the open countryside, and farms (U.S. Census Bureau, 1995). During 2010, more
than 80% of Americans live in urban areas within large population agglomerations and an
appreciative segment of the workforce is employed in the high-skill service industry. The
1

10 largest metropolitan areas alone account for more than 25% of the total U.S.
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).
The process of urbanization has followed the patterns of the American economic
transformation. The mechanization of agriculture and industrialization in the first half of
the 20th Century set in motion a process of migration of many unskilled workers from
rural areas to urban centers. During this time, the American economy became heavily
dependent upon the manufacturing industry, a focus requiring some technical skills.
Globalization of the economy and the introduction of computer technology in the
production process in the early 1980s resulted in two important changes to
manufacturing. First, many low-skilled, low-paid jobs moved offshore, leading to a
dramatic decline of unskilled jobs in this industry. Second, the demand for education and
skills in the production process increased.
Manufacturing is and will continue to be a key component of the U.S. economy.
The United States is home to the largest manufacturing sector in the world, and its
economy would be seriously compromised without a strong manufacturing presence.
Now more than ever, to be competitive, manufacturing must be dynamic and rapidly
evolving and rely on a high-performance workforce. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS; 2005) reported that U.S. manufacturers are constantly implementing process
improvement techniques, incorporating quality management systems, and overhauling
their production operations via technology, testament echoed by the National Association
of Manufacturers (NAM; 2005), a representative of which remarked, that modern
manufacturing requires cooperation across sectors and a diverse workforce involved in
many activities far beyond traditional production roles. Workers are more versatile than
2

they have ever been and must possess a high level of education and a combination of
technical and interpersonal and soft skills (NAM, 2005) because “U.S. manufacturing
now requires less manpower and more brainpower” (The Manufacturing Institute, as
cited in Mississippi Manufacturers Association [MMA], 2011, p. 4). Those in U.S.
manufacturing emphasize work in small-team settings where there is less emphasis on
assembly lines, rigid specialization, and following orders and more emphasis on
reasoning, logic, and the ability to make independent decisions (Handler & Healy, 2009).
A report by the BLS (as cited in MMA, 2011) included this statement about the situation:
To be sure, perceptions of manufacturing jobs being performed in dark and
dangerous environments are outdated. The current manufacturing work
environment is better described as one emphasizing high levels of knowledge,
sophistication, and technology, as “intelligent” systems become pervasive
throughout the manufacturing process. (p. 4)
Like manufacturing, a similar trend has occurred in all industrial sectors where,
more than ever, emphasis is placed on higher education and specialized skills. In 1900,
less than 5%of the workforce was required to have a bachelor’s degree. In 2010, more
than 30% of jobs required at least a bachelor’s degree (U.S. Department of Education,
2009). Today, 60% of the workforce is required to have some form of postsecondary
education, along with some form of skill development through professional training.
Despite the national trend of increased demand for higher education and
specialized skills, there are some fundamental differences between rural and urban labor
markets. Overall, in the United States, the workforce in urban centers is better educated
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than the workforce in rural areas (see Figure 1). This disparity is even wider in
Mississippi (see Figure 2).

Figure 1. Educational attainment of nation’s labor force, metropolitan versus
nonmetropolitan (ages 25+)

4

Figure 2. Educational attainment of Mississippi labor force, metropolitan versus
nonmetropolitan (ages 25+)
Urban Americans are those residing in the 366 U.S. metropolitan areas.
According to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB; Nussle, 2007), metropolitan
areas are broadly defined as core-based statistical areas (CBSA), which are areas based
on a recognized population nucleus and adjacent communities that have a high degree of
integration with that nucleus. As defined by the OMB, “Metropolitan Statistical Areas
[sic] have at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more [inhabitants]” (Nussle, 2007, p.
2).
Rural Americans are those residing in 2,305 nonmetropolitan U.S. counties,
covering 83% of the nation’s land. These counties are those that fall outside metropolitan
areas and have no cities with 50,000 or more inhabitants. Nonmetropolitan counties are
further divided into micropolitan and noncore areas (Nussle, 2007). Micropolitan areas
5

have at least one urban cluster of 10,000 or more inhabitants but less than 50,000 and
often include more than one county. Any areas that fail to meet these criteria are defined
as noncore areas, which are delineated by single county boundaries (Nussle, 2007). Of
the total U.S. population, 10% live in micropolitan areas and 7% in noncore areas.
Urban and rural populations are also economically and socially distinct. Unlike
urban populations, rural populations live in local environments where labor markets
typically offer low-wage, part-time, and temporary jobs, mostly available in the service
sector (Beaulieu, 1999, 2000; Bloomquist, Gringeri, Tomaskovic-Devey, & Truelove,
1993; Gorham, 1992; Lichter, McLaughlin, & Cornwell, 1995). Rural residents also have
limited means of transportation to labor markets with good jobs, loosely defined as those
jobs that pay well and are available all year around. Low levels of human capital in terms
of educational attainment, job experience, and job skills are other barriers faced by rural
populations in securing good jobs (Beaulieu, 1999, 2000; Haleman, Billings, Sargent, &
Zimmerman, 2000; Lichter & Jensen, 2002). Continuing out-migration of rural residents
with higher levels of education and better job skills has eroded rural America’s stock of
human capital and, therefore, its long-term economic viability (Lichter, et al., 1995).
Also, globalization has contributed substantially to shrinking the pool of good jobs in
rural America, as many manufacturers find it more cost-effective to produce abroad. The
continuing erosion of economic opportunities and underinvestment in human capital have
undermined the ability of rural populations to develop the locally based social
infrastructures necessary to forge and establish their problem-solving capacities toward
maintaining, preserving, and promoting community well-being (Flora & Flora, 1993;
Luloff & Swanson, 1995; Wilkinson, 2000).
6

To be sure, there are ecological, demographic, economic, and social differences
that clearly distinguish rural and urban populations. However, rural populations are at a
greater disadvantage than their urban counterparts for three important reasons. First,
differences between local environments with thriving economies and those with high and
persistent poverty are more pronounced in rural populations than in urban populations
(Lichter & Johnson, 2007; Weber, Jensen, Miller, Mosley, & Fisher, 2005). Second,
places with high concentrations and persistence of poverty are also those with the highest
percentages of minorities, especially African Americans (Lichter, Parisi, Taquino, &
Beaulieu, 2008). Third, rural populations are more divided across class and racial lines
than their urban counterparts (Lichter, Parisi, Grice, & Taquino, 2007a, 2007b). The
problem is clear: Public policies that fail to recognize rural disadvantages because of an
urban bias might hurt rather than help rural America.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to highlight the distinctions between rural and
urban populations’ education needs relative to good employment and quantify those
distinctions to establish justification for policies that support the needs of rural
populations in terms of education and skill development. Investment in human capital is
seen as a critical policy issue for accomplishing two main objectives. As Smith and
Tickamyer (2011) explained, first, it is to meet the demands of the growing knowledgebased economy, and second, seen as a critical policy, is to reduce the rural-urban gap.
The human capital model has been used to explain differential workforce outcomes in
terms of investment in educational attainment, work experience, and training. According
to this model, more education, work experience, and training increase one’s productivity
7

(Becker, 1962; Mincer, 1962, 1974; Shultz, 1962). Thus, the general assumption is that
investing in human capital increases one’s income and, therefore, one’s quality of life.
Also, investment in human capital is a strategy for increasing the well-being of a
community as a whole (Wilkinson, 2000).
Given the increasing importance of education and training, community colleges,
now more than ever, play a central role in preparing the workforce for the jobs of the 21st
century and in reducing the rural-urban gap in workforce outcomes. They can do so in
multiple ways. First, community colleges are the main point of entry to four-year
colleges. Second, they are the main institutions for connecting education with job skill
development through providing specialized and advanced training at all levels. Third,
they have a history of sustainable partnerships with employers in their local regions,
especially in rural settings. To be sure, community colleges have all the elements
necessary to act locally and compete globally.
Research Questions
This study examined the extent to which the gap between rural and urban
workforce outcomes is reduced by investment in human capital and training conducted by
community colleges. Specifically, the study examined three important research questions.
1. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings equally able to secure
employment after receiving specialized and advanced training?
2. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings engaging in specialized and
advanced skill development equally able to retain employment over time?
3. Do Mississippians in rural and urban settings experience the same wage
increase after receiving specialized and advanced training?
8

Hypotheses
The researcher hypothesized that investment in skill development reduces the gap
between rural and urban workforce outcomes, controlling for individual and local factors.
Specifically, it was hypothesized that there are no differences between rural and urban
workforce members in their ability to secure employment after training. A second
hypothesis was that there are no differences between rural and urban workforce members
in their ability to retain employment after training. Finally, this study hypothesized that
rural and urban workforce members experience the same level of wage gain after
training.
Significance of Topic
This study provides three contributions to the knowledge base of this subject.
First, the study highlights the role that community colleges play in the current
knowledge-based economy. There is considerable discussion in the academic and
political realms on how to overcome the gaps in education and skill requirements for the
jobs of the future. At this time, however, little is known about how educational
institutions should contribute to meeting the challenges posed by the 21st Century
economy. To be sure, community colleges are the intermediary organizations that link K12 to higher education and the intermediary organizations that link graduates to the
workforce. Most importantly, community colleges provide programs specifically tailored
to address skill development. This study demonstrates how community colleges have
adapted and evolved to address workforce challenges throughout the last century.
Specifically, the study provides a conceptual framework to examine how community
colleges can respond to the workforce needs of any given time.
9

Second, this study introduces an innovative approach in the use of administrative
data. Typically, these data are collected for accountability and reporting requirements.
This study shows how such data can be used for research purposes and therefore for
knowledge creation.
Third, this study addresses the issue of the rural-urban gap in workforce
outcomes. In the policy arena, programs are often designed with an urban bias. This study
outlines how urban-rural differences in demographic, economic, and social conditions
might result in differences in workforce outcomes. The study shows that a critical role of
a community college is to reach out to diverse populations with different needs. In doing
so, community colleges help minimize disparity in urban-rural workforce outcomes.
Limitations
Despite the scientific merit and the significant contributions of this study, it was
not without limitations. First, the study was limited to one state: Mississippi. This
limitation might reduce the overall generalizability of the findings to other states, given
that states have differences in workforce needs, community college systems, and, most
importantly, levels of rurality. Second, the study limited its focus to noncredit-hour
workforce activities. In recent years, there has been considerable discussion on how to
bridge noncredit with credit hours, especially in career technical education. Future
research should consider expanding this study to other states and including data that will
provide information about career technical programs across community colleges. To be
sure, this study is a starting point rather than a definitive answer to the questions related
to the role that community colleges should play in the growing knowledge-based
economy.
10

Definitions
The definitions for the terms used with this research are as follows:
Core-based statistical area refers to a collective term for both metropolitan and
micropolitan areas.
Human capital denotes the stock of competencies, knowledge, and personality
attributes used to perform labor that produces services or goods of economic value.
Metropolitan is a geographic entity defined by the OMB (Nussle, 2007) for use by
federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal statistics. A
metropolitan area contains a core urban area population of 50,000 or more individuals.
Each area consists of one or more counties and includes the counties containing the core
urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high degree of social and
economic integration (measured by commuting to work) with the urban core.
Micropolitan refers to a geographic entity defined by the OMB (Nussle, 2007) for
use by federal statistical agencies in collecting, tabulating, and publishing federal
statistics. A micropolitan area contains a core urban area population of at least 10,000 but
less than 50,000 individuals. Each area consists of one or more counties and includes the
counties containing the core urban area, as well as any adjacent counties that have a high
degree of social and economic integration within the urban core (Nussle, 2007).
Noncore areas are areas that fall outside of metropolitan and/or micropolitan
areas (Nussle, 2007).
Nonmetropolitan represent counties located outside the boundaries of metro areas
and are further subdivided into two types: micropolitan areas and all remaining noncore
area counties (Nussle, 2007).
11

Rural areas represent small towns (population less than 2,500), the open
countryside, and farms (Nussle, 2007).
Rural sprawl describes the residential patterns beyond urban sprawl, consisting of
large lots developed for residential and recreation, vacationing, and/or hunting purposes
(Nussle, 2007).
Skills refer to the physical, mental, or interpersonal aspects of work. They are
often measured in terms of complexity, diversity, and autonomy (Nussle, 2007).
Technology denotes the application of knowledge and skills for the achievement
of practical purposes. It includes both physical apparatus, such as tools and machines, and
the knowledge required to build and use them and to solve problems in their application
to the production of goods and services. Technology is commonly defined as having three
components: operations technology, materials, and knowledge (Nussle, 2007).
Urban sprawl refers to the growth of suburbia (Nussle, 2007).
Workforce refers to all the workers employed, working or capable of working in a
location (e.g., city, region, or nation).
Organization of the Study
After Chapter 1, the document includes four chapters. Chapter 2 presents the
literature review with an examination of the evolution of the role of community colleges
over the last century. Specifically, this section looks at the how the development of the
modern community college system, within the context of the evolving 20th Century U.S.
economy, technological advancements, and shifting demographics contributed to the
expanded delivery of increasingly complex U.S. worker skills. Furthermore, in chapter 2
how the resulting federal/state/local policy response contributed to this unique and
12

quintessential American democratic educational institution is also examined. While the
context is broad, this analysis provides a unique view of the birth and evolution of the
modern community college system nationally and locally in Mississippi. Chapter 3
presents the methods. First, a detailed description of the data used in the study is provided
then a description of the dependent and independent variables are provided. Lastly, the
analytical strategy and statistical model for the multivariate analysis are presented.
Chapter 4 presents the analysis. A detailed description of the descriptive analysis and the
multivariate analysis are provided. An initial analysis indicates that, indeed, there are
urban-rural differences in workforce outcomes. However, the analysis also shows that
when controlled for local characteristics, these differences disappear. Chapter 5 discusses
the implications of the study and provides an analysis of the role of community colleges
in the current knowledge-based economy.

13

CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
The literature review includes an examination of the evolution of the role of
community colleges over the last century. Specifically, this section looks at the
development of the modern community college system within the context of the evolving
20th Century U.S. economy, technological advancements, and shifting demographics, as
the community college system contributed to the expanded delivery of increasingly
complex U.S. worker skills. An examination of how the resulting federal/state/local
policy response contributed to this unique and quintessential American public educational
institution is also provided. While the context is broad, this analysis provides a view of
the birth and evolution of the modern community college system nationally and locally in
Mississippi.
Perhaps most telling is that a large outcome of the events leading up to and out of
the Great Depression and World War II was the maturation of the idea of industry and
workforce preparedness as part of sound economic and military preparedness to meet the
market demand. This section outlines how national leaders struggled with the best ways
to reduce barriers and improve the quality of human capital development activities for
U.S. workers and how the community college evolved as part of this structure of
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education and training delivery to help the United States shoulder this new leadership
role.
The researcher believes, that for one to envision how the modern community
college can best continue its evolution in serving its local constituencies in terms of a
socially diverse, globalized economy and digital age, one must appreciate and understand
the context from which it evolved. Beginning at the Progressive Era and working through
the end of the 20th Century, this analysis is segmented by 10- to 20-year increments. The
analysis offers a glimpse into the forces contributing to the community college evolution
much like that of a video, where the true essence of the story can only be appreciated
once all of the individual frames are assembled and run together in sequence, delivering a
fuller, more comprehensive image.
The review includes eight chronological eras and two issues: human capital and
rural issues. In the introduction to each section, an overview is provided followed by
three sections: (a) Economy, Technology, and Demographics; (b) Worker Skills,
Training, and Policy Response; and (c) Junior/Community Colleges.
1890-1920: The Progressive Era
Introduction
The Progressive Era signaled the beginning of the end for the laissez-faire
doctrine largely adhered to by political leaders for many of the previous decades. Support
for the increased regulation by farmers and others who perceived economic injustices by
industrialists concerning unfair business practices found support in the Progressive
Movement. This movement helped propel legislation such as the Interstate Commerce
15

Act (regulating railroads), and the Sherman Antitrust Act (preventing monopolies) to be
enacted, introducing new levels of federalism into the American political and economic
landscape (Behr, 2009).
From an international perspective, World War I and immigration were major
factors of this era, affecting a shift in the American experience and attitudes. First, while
immigration had always played a major role in growing the U.S. population, supplying
much-needed skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers for industry, it also began to
drive federal policy making. Second, demographically, women and minorities became an
increasingly large composition of the workforce, replacing millions of men called up to
serve in the armed forces, which vacated jobs nationwide. Finally, both factors
highlighted the need for policy makers to begin thinking about federal involvement in
worker training as a national strategy to prepare the U.S. workforce to remain
competitive while facing peacetime international competition, and as a national security
issue supporting mobilization efforts in times of war.
Economy, Technology, and Demographics
Economic growth in this era (and indeed the entire upcoming century) was driven
by three main technological advancements shaping the American experience: the internal
combustion engine, chemical production (post-World War II includes synthetics), and
electrical technologies (post-World War II includes electronics). Specific advancements
were made within this timeframe; the expansion of petroleum production, introduction of
the use of alternating current that increased electrical power distribution efficiency over
large distances (replacing steam and oil as primary sources of power), new scalable
electrical motors to power machinery, the mass production and use of the automobile,
16

and the burgeoning aircraft industry, contributed to new industries, new jobs, and new
worker-skill requirements (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
The U.S. economy continued to move from a rural and agriculturally based
economy to one that was urbanized and industrialized, a trend that would continue
through the entire next century. In 1910, 77.6% of the population was living in rural areas
but by 1920, that number had decreased to 66% (Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). In 1910, 41%
of the U.S. workforce was employed in agriculture but by 1930, that number had
decreased to 21.5% (Dimitri, Effland, & Conklin, 2005). Rural families and individuals,
both Black and White from the South, were migrating to metropolitan areas in search of
jobs and higher wages offered by industry and the increasing service sector. Many were
undereducated, unskilled, and virtually unprepared for finding work in the industrialized
metropolitan areas.
This era also represented the beginning of the end for the second wave of
immigration to the U.S. from countries across the globe. The first wave, from 1820 to the
beginning of the Civil War, carried many Western Europeans immigrating due to
displacement from industrialization that was taking root in the home countries at the time.
Many of these individuals were educated and skilled workers from the region of what is
now Germany, in addition to many Scandinavian countries. The second wave of
immigration saw nearly 25 million immigrants, predominately Southern and Eastern
European, many seen as undereducated and unskilled, enter the U.S. after the end of the
Civil War to the beginning of the 20th century (Diner, 2008).
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In 1892, Ellis Island was established in order to document and manage the huge
influx of immigrants. While immigration contributed to tensions centering on
unemployment in times of economically slow periods:
…each group [of immigrants] evinced a distinctive migration pattern in terms of
the gender balance within the migratory pool, the permanence of their migration,
their literacy rates, the balance between adults and children, and the like. They
[also] shared one overarching characteristic: They flocked to urban destinations
and made up the bulk of the U.S. industrial labor pool, making possible the
emergence of such industries as steel, coal, automobile, textile, and garment
production, and enabling the United States to leap into the front ranks of the
world’s economic giants. (Diner, 2008, para. 13)
Immigration played a major role in not only providing manpower for industrial
growth, but also, overall, it contributed to the historical, single greatest percentage
increase in the U.S. population. During the period of 1900-1910, the U.S. total population
grew by more than 16 million, from 76 million to 92 million—a 21% increase (Hobbs &
Stoops, 2002). Immigration altered the demographics of the U.S. and it also played
predominately in influencing legislation written between 1900 and the mid-1920s,
including solidifying the arguments for a coordinated federal response for worker
training.
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
While the Progressive Era may have demonstrated the beginning of a shift in
political leaders’ attitudes towards federalism in the private sector, it did not extend to
national policies concerning worker education and training. Despite business and
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educators’ support, education and training were seen by political leaders primarily as a
state responsibility and not a federal one. Apart from this philosophy and the absence of a
mechanism to fund a federal education and training system, larger, more populous state
political leaders did not yet see the broader benefits of sharing tax revenues to increase
the competitiveness of the entire nation’s human capital reserves—essentially subsidizing
the training of other smaller, poorer states’ workers. Perhaps most importantly, the
question of how best to allow local communities to determine market-driven training
requirements for their industries and businesses while receiving federal funding remained
unanswered. As new technologies, management practices, job restructuring, and
economic growth had an impact on jobs, wage structures, demographics, and skill
requirements through 1900, the inclusion of the federal government in worker training
and education was debated heavily, but never manifested into any substantial legislation.
Not until the demands of World War I were felt by industry in particular and the society
in general did the federal response begin to directly address worker education and
training from a national perspective.
Demand for skilled workers heretofore had been met through worker training
provided by private or state training schools, apprenticeships, on-the-job training, and
immigration of skilled workers, primarily Western Europeans. With the dramatic
expansion of an industrial and service economy after 1900, businesses began to rely more
upon semiskilled or unskilled employees, resulting in a dramatic impact on the nature of
work, the demographics of the workplace, and arguments for federally funded vocational
training (Dorn, 2007).
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Braverman stated that factory centralization, mass production, assembly lines,
increasingly sophisticated machinery, and the introduction of scientific management
(1974, p. 59) equipped industry management with the tools to rearrange and break down
complex tasks into simpler, semi-skilled and unskilled job activities—theoretically
effecting an overall “deskilling” (Braverman, 1974, p. xvi) of the workplace. In practice,
the desired outcome for management was to increase organizational productivity,
efficiency, and labor control.1 Skills were largely specific to the factory or industry in
which they were employed and could be learned in a short period of time; perhaps as
little as a week or two (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Increasingly, children, youth,
American migrants from rural agricultural regions, and huge waves of immigrants from
Southern and Eastern Europe filled assembly lines and other semiskilled and unskilled
urban, industrialized jobs, ostensibly because they were poorly educated and had few
skills, preventing them from commanding higher wages.2 Furthermore, due to smaller
numbers of workers requiring higher, broad-based skills (e.g., machinists, electricians,
die makers), coupled with widening use of labor-saving technologies throughout factory
floors, the apprenticeship system shrank rapidly to near nonexistence by the early 1900s
(Dorn, 2007).
Factors influencing arguments for federalism in worker training during this era
were multifaceted. The outcomes desired hinged on three main points: increased worker
1

For a comprehensive review of labor process theory, see Paul Thompson’s The Nature of Work (London,
England: Macmillan, 1989). Also, for an interesting analysis on the impact technology can have on worker
skills, see Aimee Chin et al., “Technical change and the demand for skills during the Second Industrial
Revolution: Evidence from the Merchant Marine, 1891-1912” (The Review of Economics and Statistics,
August 2006, 88: 572-578).
2

Some would also contend that these groups were easily taken advantage of, manipulated, and controlled
by unscrupulous management, extracting higher profits at the cost of fair labor practices.
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efficiency, Americanization (assimilation; Dorn, 2007, p. 3) of immigrants, and expanded
literacy and education of American citizens, particularly youth. Apprenticeship programs,
both in terms of their quantity and quality, could not meet the market demands for more
workers to learn higher order skills. Furthermore, only a very few large firms tended to
provide worker training. The vast number of small- to medium-sized firms, which
employed the greatest number of workers nationwide, could not or would not offer
worker training and therefore relied heavily on on-the-job training. These skills typically
were neither transportable nor comprehensive enough to meet the increasing efficiency
and productivity levels achieved by Western European firms. Cries from educators and
some business leaders forewarned of impending national competitive disadvantage and
crises due to an uncompetitive workforce, incapable of meeting the new economic order,
and the increasing competition from a worldwide market place.
The influx of Southern and Eastern European immigrants led to great numbers of
new employees and citizens largely unskilled, undereducated, and English-deficient
workers. Many citizens and political leaders feared these immigrants would not adapt and
conform to American culture, learn English, or otherwise become productive and
contributing citizens. Some argued that the very way of American life was threatened.
This belief led to the notion of the need to Americanize these new citizens through
increased access to vocational training to help them adjust to and become productive
American citizens (Dorn, 2007).
Dorn (2007) further explains that the steady migration of families from rural to
urban areas and the subsequent increase in idle time for youth and young adults led
increasingly to crime and other antisocial behaviors. Issues of poverty, poor health care,
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underemployment, and unemployment of young adults also were of concern. Consensus
was growing towards the need for compulsory education of youth 16 to 18 years old,
along with reshaping education to better equip them to find work, earn more, and prepare
them for citizenship through industrial and/or vocational training.
But it was not until the outbreak of the Great War, World War I, that the
arguments for federally funded worker training coalesced into a comprehensive and
actionable national legislation (Lee, as cited in Dorn, 2007). The siren song heard for
years leading up to the war concerning the lack of a national skilled workforce became a
reality as technological advances expressed their impact on work-skill requirements both
in the civilian sectors and military and opened arguments for a national approach to
human capital development. Also, rapid demographic shifts emerged stressing the
American economic and military response to the wartime effort.
Dorn (2007) further explains that World War I initiated a substantial demographic
shift in the American workplace, resulting from both a supply and demand perspective,
highlighting training needs for numerous classes of workers. Immigration from Western
Europe plummeted, lowering one source of skilled workers. Initial compulsory education
initiatives coupled with burgeoning child labor laws were decreasing the numbers of
youth available to fill unskilled jobs. Most notably, hundreds of thousands of able-bodied
men left jobs to enlist in the armed services, reducing both skilled and unskilled workers
for industry. Great gaps in overall supply of workers were occurring nationwide.
Consequently, large numbers of women moved into higher paying industrial jobs.
African Americans migrated north from rural southern regions also looking for higher
paying jobs, often in the service jobs vacated by women moving into industry jobs. On
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the demand side, the war caused industry in Western Europe to close or shift production
to military essentials. Closer to home, demand for goods increased to fill the gap in
production from Western Europe and to fulfill the needs of the wartime machine in the
United States. The need for skilled, semiskilled, and unskilled workers rose dramatically
in a very short period of time, with little in the way of a tangible solution to fill the void.
Calls for a national strategy to train huge numbers of workers in vocational and industrial
skills were abundant (Dorn, 2007).
Commercial and military technological advances, namely with the automobile,
airplane, radio communications, steamship propulsion, and mechanized weapon systems
also contributed to the cause of support for federal funding of vocational training. Skills
in these new industries were more specialized, often requiring ongoing and continuous
retraining to keep workers current. Not only was the nature of work and skills changing,
but also the methods, techniques, and delivery of training needed to be updated and
modernized as well. Government support for all sectors of the economy supporting
commercial and military demands for skill upgrades was needed to meet the worker
demand.
How could political leaders justify the use of taxpayer funds from large populous
states to effectively fund other, less populous states? A central tenet of the human capital
development theory is the notion of migration or mobility of the workforce to gain
education and training, then to migrate in order to find work. Because worker mobility
was increasing due to improved transportation, most notably by railroad and the new
automobile, the notion of national government funding of worker training became
increasingly palatable to political leaders. Workers were capable of commuting longer
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distances and permanent relocations were easier. Political leaders began to see how
shared national resources could make the whole workforce better prepared for future
requirements, either due to wartime demands or global economic changes.
By 1917, the free market mechanisms that had traditionally trained workers were
incapable of meeting the demand in the timeframe required for wartime industries or by
the military and the arguments for a national approach to human capital development
were coalescing around a shared sense of responsibility by a majority of political leaders.
After many years of stalling, negotiation, and political bickering, business, education, and
political leadership finally reached the tipping point, successfully reintroducing and
passing the Smith-Hughes Act (National Vocational Education Act, 1917). This act
became the first federal effort to develop workers for industry, agriculture, and the
home3. The act was designed to deliver vocational programming below the baccalaureate
level to students over 14 years of age to prepare them to go to work.
Initially, training and financial resources funded by the new legislation were
focused on agricultural and home economic skills for high-school-aged teens and young
working adults. In time, more schools offered industry preparation skills training as
training resources for this type of instruction became more available. The largest
constraint in meeting the legislative requirements was finding qualified teachers who
demonstrated the necessary technical skills along with pedagogical experience.
Programmatically, the act served high school and young adults, separating students
interested in vocational training from academic training in high schools and provided

3

Interestingly, the act did not provide funding support for training in the fastest growing occupational
fields in business and commerce (bookkeeping, stenography, typing, and related courses).
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focused funding for vocational teachers. Effectively, the program forced physical
separation of vocational students from academic students, an undesirable side effect that
would remain in schools for years.
The National Vocational Education Act (1917) required the formation of boards
of vocational education in each state in cooperation with existing public school boards to
maintain local control and to respond to local labor market needs. Also, the act set the
precedent for the remainder of the century for states and local communities to match
federal funding with equal or larger amounts of their own money to fund the program.
While the effects of the Smith-Hughes Act (National Vocational Education Act, 1917) on
the nation’s two-year college system would not be fully realized for several years, it
nonetheless set the stage for the involvement of the two-year junior college system to
deliver worker training, vocational education, and adult education in addition to
adjunctive academic education.
Junior/Community Colleges
As the Progressive Era signaled the end of laissez-faire doctrine and open,
unlimited immigration, it also signaled the beginning of America’s two-year college
system. The history of the birth and maturation of the contemporary community college
can be thought of in two phases: the first phase, which occurred prior to three primary
federal legislative actions in the middle of the 20th Century (a) the G. I. Bill
(Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, 1944), (b) the Truman Commission Report of
1947 (President’s Commission on Higher Education, 1947), and (c) the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963 (Johnson, 1963); and the second phase, which occurred after
passage of these pieces of legislation. Prior to the Truman Report, community colleges
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were actually called two-year or junior colleges, reflecting their original purpose of
providing expanded access to postsecondary academic opportunities for those desiring a
baccalaureate degree but who might not otherwise be able to gain entrance to universities
due to their ethnicity, income, gender, proximity, or educational performance.
Conceptually, the first phase of the formation of junior colleges, both public and
private, was seeded primarily out of two pieces of federal legislation affecting
institutional development from two directions: downward from the land-grant university
and upward from secondary education. First, the Morrill Acts (1862) expanded access to
public higher education by providing funds and grants for land towards the formation of
colleges, “where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and
classical studies and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are
related to agriculture and the mechanic arts” (Morrill Act, 1962, para. 1). These early
institutions pioneered and popularized the notion of service to the broader community
through agriculture and general extension divisions, increasing access to a wider variety
of training programs for larger populations, later popularized by the national community
college systems. Second, the Kalamazoo Decision of 1874 (as cited in Cubberley, 1920)
provided national precedence for the formation and maintenance of comprehensive
taxpayer-funded public high schools nationwide. The concept that local taxpayers could
form and run their own school systems to better meet their needs was affirmed, setting
the stage for the initial mechanism for setting up junior colleges in local communities.
The initial mechanism by which many public junior colleges were formed,
especially in the early years, is what Dougherty (2001) called circumscribed initiation.
Dougherty’s phrase circumscribed initiation refers to the expansion of curriculums from
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public high schools to providing two-year postsecondary education in preparation for
articulation to four-year institutions. Dougherty (2001) also attributed public two-year
college formation to another path referred to as popular mobilization. Popular
mobilization referred to the effort to control proliferation of junior colleges and limit state
financial obligations, state governments required the founding of two-year colleges to be
approved in advance by a state agency coupled with a community referendum eliciting
local community support. Still other junior colleges were also formed through the demise
and restructuring of unsuccessful four-year colleges. According to Cohen and Brawer
(2008), of the 203 four-year colleges in 1900 with enrollments of 150 or fewer, 15% had
become junior colleges.
Thus, in 1901, 27 years after the Kalamazoo Decision, the United States’ first
junior college, Joliet Junior College (Illinois), was formed from the expansive Joliet High
School. The second college formed was in Fresno, California, in 1910. Thereafter, junior
colleges began proliferating substantially. By 1915-1916, there were 74 public and
private two-year colleges.4 Within seven years (1915 through 1922) this number had
increased by 133 colleges nationwide to 201 – a 179% increase (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
There are many reasons for this expansion, but Cohen and Brawer (2008) perhaps
illuminated the point best by explaining:
…that since its founding, the United States has been more dedicated to the belief
that all individuals should have the opportunity to rise to their greatest potential.
Accordingly, all barriers to individual development should be broken down.
4

Brint and Karabel (The Diverted Dream, 1989) showed only 46 junior colleges in 1917-1918 and 52 in
1919-1920. Cohen and Brawer cited the American Association of Community and Junior College, as well
as the U.S. Office of Education as their primary sources of historical data.
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Institutions that enhance human growth should be created and supported. Talent is
potentially to be found in every social stratum and at any age. People who fail to
achieve in their youth should be given successive chances. And perhaps most
crucial – absent a national ministry of education or even, until recently, much
state control or oversight – the local school districts could act on their own.
(Cohen & Brawer, 2008, p. 11)
While the quantity of junior colleges grew, junior colleges nonetheless numbered
too few to contribute measurably to the overall workforce development demands of the
country, thus limiting worker access to needed training. In 1918, total enrollment for all
junior colleges was just 4,504 (Brint & Karabel, 1989); in comparison, four-year colleges
enrolled well over 400,000 students (U.S. Census Bureau, 1975). Mississippi for
instance, would not have its first junior college until 1922. It would be decades before
junior colleges would be ubiquitous enough nationwide to guarantee workers access to
desired training and education on demand.
1920-1928: The Roaring ’20s
Introduction
The Roaring ’20s were described as such due to impressive economic growth and
social liberalism bordering on excess. Major domestic and international forces that made
an impact on the nation were postwar reconstruction efforts, agricultural sector distress in
the late 1920s, shifting patterns of international debts and lending, and the cessation of
open immigration policies. Technological advances, both imported from Western Europe
and those developed domestically, stemming primarily from the general purpose
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technologies (GPTs) of combustion engines, chemical engineering, and electrical
innovations, increasingly contributed to economic growth and sector diversification.
Consumer and durable goods never before available in large, affordable quantities began
to be available to the mainstream populous. Critical infrastructure consisting of electrical
power grids, petroleum pipelines, railroads, and roads spawned interstate commerce,
tourism, and leisure activities. The trend towards increased skill complexity in industries
accelerated and workers, correspondingly, pursued education and worker training to keep
up with the ever-changing workplace.
The new educational phenomenon of two-year colleges continued to grow and
institutional leaders searched for their role within the increasingly complex educational
strata of publically funded secondary education, colleges, and universities. In Mississippi,
the first junior colleges emerged, growing from the abundant agricultural high schools
that dotted the rural landscape, and Mississippi became the first state in the union to
legislate a formal two-year college system. The Roaring ’20s was a decade that set the
United States apart from the rest of the world, setting the stage for U.S. dominance as a
world economic and social power for the remainder of the 20th Century.
Economy, Technology, and Demographics
Immigration resumed quickly after the war despite European postwar
reconstruction efforts, with an estimated 2.9 million immigrants entering the United
States. This force became a major political issue due to its perceived impact on
unemployment rates. Despite passage of the Immigration Act of 1924 (as cited in Dorn,
2007), which was intended to severely restrict the inbound flow of immigrants, the
overall contribution of immigration to the growth of the U.S. population remained
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significant and its impact to the U.S. economy pervasive. Easterlin (2000) surmised that
“by 1920, nineteenth-century immigrants and their descendents had doubled the size of
the American population compared with that which would have resulted from the
colonial stock of 1790 alone” (p. 535). Even with the new immigration restrictions, the
U.S. population continued to grow from 105.7 million in 1920 to 122.8 million in 1930, a
16.1% increase.
Migration from rural to urban areas continued as well, with metropolitan areas
growing from 35.9 million in 1920 to 54.8 million in 1930 (Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). The
agricultural boom during the war, fed by huge demands nationally and internationally,
boosted prices and led to speculative land purchases. With the end of the war, demand for
commodities decreased significantly, depressing prices. Many farmers were squeezed
between lower commodity prices and loan payments to banks for land purchases made at
the height of the agricultural boom. Consequently, smaller farmers sold off and moved,
contributing to the migration patterns from rural to urban areas.
Technological advances, industrialization, and mass production continued to grow
in use. Additionally, according to Mowery and Rosenberg (2000), the integration of
technologies across all spectrums of the U.S. economy will fuel twentieth-century growth
and prosperity. Moreover:
Inventions, when they are first introduced or patented, are typically very far from
the form that they embody when they eventually achieve widespread diffusion; or,
to put it differently, it is the improvements that they undergo that finally lead to
widespread diffusion. (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 804)
Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) elaborated further and remarked:
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…many intermediate steps must be completed before the commercialization of
such innovations. In many cases, ancillary inventions or improvements, frequently
from other industries, are needed; new products must be redesigned for greater
convenience and cost-reducing changes are necessary to render them more
affordable; further adaptations are necessary as consumers discover new
unanticipated uses; production facilities need to be reorganized to adapt to the
idiosyncratic production requirements of the new product. The time required for
all these complementary developments to emerge typically is measured in years
and not infrequently, in decades. (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 804)
The 1920s also brought about a major shift in corporate structuring, characterized
by vertical integration. Large firms sought to acquire strategic advantages through the
control of the entire process of inputs and outputs, from the supply of raw materials and
component construction to final assembly (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). This incorporation
evolution, the buying up of smaller competitors, gave rise to the oligopolies and brought
on many challenges to the leaders, managers, and workers in these companies,
restructuring work and thus worker skills. Concerns centering on antitrust violations,
along with the loss of labor-worker control of work, began to arise during this era,
leading to political and labor unrest in the late 1920s and 1930s. Steel companies led the
way in vertical integration, but so too did petroleum, pharmaceutical, electrical, and
automobile manufacturers seeking to gain dominance through vertical integration.
The classic example of vertical integration coupled with technological
advancements on work skills is Henry Ford and automobile manufacturing. Ford
achieved market dominance initially by being the first to move into large scale
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automotive production. His company gained further advantage in market penetration by
effectively utilizing continuous process flow technologies. However, this dominance was
relatively short lived. Within a few years, while Ford maintained a focus on productivity
efficiency and his general lack of appreciation for the impact of the rising technological
revolution occurring around him, allowed other domestic companies to catch and for a
time surpassed his achievements. Ford eventually responded by vertically integrating and
collocating nearly all the processes necessary to make components and assemble an
automobile in one location, the River Rouge site. Furthermore, Ford sought to gain
strategic advantages in continuous process flow by lowering material and training costs
and increasing worker productivity. “Fordism” (Galambos, 2000, p. 938) integrated steel
manufacturing and subassembly manufacturing (e.g., engines, frames) with final
assembly that further experimented, then perfected, the use of an automated line moving
the products from one location to another. Each assembly location was specifically
designed to accomplish predetermined tasks. This enabled unskilled or low-skilled
workers to be trained quickly to that specific location and limited tasks. The net effect on
worker skills was to increase skill requirements in fewer, high-skilled positions and
reduce skill requirements in more semiskilled and/or unskilled positions (Galambos,
2000). Worker skill enrichment and development suffered and they lost production
autonomy. To counter potential worker unrest, Ford paid his workers comparatively well,
essentially trying to buy their acquiescence to this new structure.
Overall, Ford’s plants achieved immense production efficiencies through these
innovations and economies of scale, making the process very profitable (Galambos,
2000). His focus on production of a single product line, however, nearly caused his
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demise, when General Motors and other automobile manufacturers incorporated
additional technological advances in product design. These competitors introduced
numerous car models assembled in continuous flow systems, managing to capture huge,
heretofore untapped segments of the market. Ford’s first mover market share penetration
and domination due to strategic advantages in continuous process flow technologies was
lost in just a few short years due to his short-sighted focus on productivity efficiency and
a general lack of appreciation for the impact of the rising technological revolution
occurring around him (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Technological advances in other sectors during this era were also occurring.
Automatic arc welding and the frozen food process (discovered and introduced by
Clarence Birdseye) are two examples of how ubiquitous electrical power and electronic
equipment facilitated the diffusion of other new technologies, products, and services, as
outlined by Mowery and Rosenberg (2000). In fact, another innovation, electrical
refrigeration, made commercialization of frozen food products possible. Nagangast (as
cited in Krasner-Khait, 2000) explained:
The household refrigerator is one of the greatest unsung inventions. Engineering
technology perfected it, made it reliable, and inexpensive enough for widespread
ownership...The household refrigerator changed the way people ate and socially
affected the household. They were no longer dependent on ice delivery and they
didn’t have to make provisions for it like leaving a key or leaving the door open.
Ice wagons became a thing of the past. By the 1920s, the household refrigerator
was an essential piece of kitchen furniture. In 1921, 5,000 mechanical
refrigerators were manufactured in the U.S. Ten years later that number grew past
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one million and just six years later, nearly six million. Mass production of modern
refrigerators began in earnest after WWII. By 1950, more than 80 percent of
American farms and more than 90 percent of urban homes had one. (para. 29)
Likewise, other technologies were making an impact on the U.S. economy; for
example, radio use was expanding and the first televisions were beginning to appear. A
good example of chemical technology contributing to new products was Kodak and its
introduction of color film. On the farm, a new product was taking advantage of the
technology of internal combustion engines—tractors. Despite continued use of old
technologies such as threshers, overall productivity for farming was increasing; Reinhardt
(n.d.) documented the history of her family’s farm and wrote:
The U.S. Department of Agriculture reports that it took 40-50 labor hours to
produce 100 bushels of wheat on five acres with a gang plow, seeder, harrow,
binder, thresher, wagons, and horses in the 1890s. By 1930, it took 15-20 labor
hours to produce 100 bushels of wheat on 5 acres with a three-bottom gang plow,
tractor, 10-foot tandem disk, harrow, 12-foot combine, and trucks.
For corn, it took 35-40 labor hours in 1890 to produce 100 bushels on 2.5 acres
with a two-bottom gang plow, disk and peg-tooth harrow, and 2-row planter. By
the end of the 1920’s, it took 15-20 labor hours to produce 100 bushels of corn on
2.5 acres with a 2-bottom gang plow, seven-foot tandem disk, four-section
harrow, two-row planters, cultivators, and pickers. (Reinhardt, n.d., paras. 4-5)
Farm productivity increases contributed to migration of many Americans from
rural places to metropolitan locations. The service industry sector continued to grow,
offering new jobs and requiring new skills such as business professionals and health care
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services; penicillin, for instance, was discovered in 1928, but like most all other
inventions, it took many years for the invention to gain mainstream use. It was not until
pressures of the loss of human life on the battlefield during World War II caused by
infections that antibiotic treatment of wounds became a staple of the health industry.
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
Forces contributing to the need for access to worker training in the 1920s were
numerous. Demographically, soldiers returning from the war brought back their
knowledge, enhanced by skills learned while in the military. However, skills unused for
years often needed supplementing and technological improvements introduced, even in
the few years during the war, required new skills. Large numbers of women displaced by
returning warriors shifted from heavy industry to burgeoning service, transportation, light
manufacturing, and business administration jobs, all requiring new skills. Minorities, too,
continued to search for access to better opportunity through higher paying, more skillful
jobs.
Technological improvements introduced new products and services and
consequently drove a shift in employment opportunities, as evidenced by the change in
distribution of workers throughout industry sectors. For instance, between 1920 and
1930, the number of workers decreased in agriculture from 27.6% to 22.9% and
manufacturing from 26.4% to 24.4%. Percentages of workers increased, however, for
transportation, utilities, trade, finance, education, professional services, and government
as the economy became increasingly diverse and international trade forces arose (Hodson
& Sullivan, 2008).
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As demographic shifts and technology innovation drove changes in sectoral
employment, worker training became more important; greater diversity in products,
services, materials, and processes demanded much more industry-specific knowledge and
skill. The demand for higher skilled employees began to grow. Electric technology
proliferation, for example, had an impact on industry sectors; specifically, electrical
machinery became more sophisticated and more abundant, and the automation and use of
specialized, interchangeable parts (interestingly, initially perfected by bicycle
manufacturers) increased. Consequently, skill requirements for workers making, running,
and maintaining more sophisticated equipment increased and changed (Behr, 2009).
Furthermore, particularly with regard to employment opportunities for women:
…a new occupational structure, reflecting the introduction of new technologies
during the war, evolved in a way that made more jobs in light industries available.
Scientific discoveries also led to new technical innovations in communications,
transportation, and new product lines such as office machines and dictaphones
that made clerical work more productive. In addition, technical innovation
rejuvenated older products such as paper, rubber goods, and tobacco products,
which created jobs that pulled women into the labor force. For example, in 1919
women filled nearly 60 percent of the cigar making jobs and 55 percent of
cigarette manufacturing jobs. Women also qualified for watch making and the
assembly of small machines such as typewriters, telephones, radios, calculating
machines, sewing machines, glass finishing and optical instruments, the
production of china, ceramics and tableware...Service occupations such as
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telephone operators suited women because those jobs required less physical
strength and did not compete with men. (Dorn, 2007, pp. 144-145)
Despite availability of a large workforce, the availability of skilled and
semiskilled labor capable of meeting industry needs remained insufficient to meet the
demands of an expanding and diversified economy. Immigration restrictions limited
access to an important pool of heretofore skilled and semiskilled labor (Dorn, 2007), and
much of the domestic workforce, men and women, young and old, struggled to maintain
relevant skill sets with the shifting industry sector skill demands. How, then, was industry
to fill the gap? How were workers to find access and invest financial resources to educate
themselves increasing their marketability? In the absence of a broad federal strategic
response for a continuum of worker training, there was an ad-hoc arrangement of public
and private sources of training for workers to gain increased education. Much of this
education and training required self-investment of time and money, incurring both direct
and opportunity costs generally associated with human capital development.
Congress enacted several pieces of legislation to help workers, albeit in a limited
way. The George-Reed Act of 1929 extended and amended the Smith-Hughes Act
(National Vocational Education Act, 1917). The act provided additional funding to
secondary and, in some cases, postsecondary two-year colleges to offer vocational
training. Combined federal, state, and local funding of vocational education programs
increased from $7.97 million in fiscal year 1920-1921 to $29.9 million by 1930. Student
enrollment in these programs increased from 168,000 in 1918 to 981,000 students in
1930 (Dorn, 2007). Also, the federal Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1918 (1917) was
enacted to train disabled veterans of World War I, helping them gain skills, find work,
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and become independent, contributing citizens. Soon after, the Civilian Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1920 was enacted to aid those civilian workers injured in the
workplace.
Besides vocational training, public schools and businesses also learned to work
together to provide cooperative training. In fact, according to Dorn (2007), “educators in
the 1920s emerged as the key link between public and private sector training” (p. 135).
Local committees composed of business leaders, chambers of commerce representatives,
training associations, and school administrators would meet to research, forecast, and
report on the types and quantities of jobs, their skills, and other workforce development
requirements. Schools would then develop various vocational educational classes (often
held in the evenings) based on recommendations made from these committees for
prospective employees. Next, firms trained new hires in specialized skills (Dorn, 2007).
Demand for educational development during the 1920s was substantial. For
example, fall enrollment for postsecondary education between 1920 and 1930 increased
by more than 85% (Snyder, 1993). Business and commercial training similarly saw
increases. Between 1918 and 1924, attendance in public school commercial courses
increased by more than 55% (Dorn, 2007). To meet training demands, various
nontraditional training avenues for instruction opened through adult education, various
forms of distance learning, and evening classes at public schools.
While adult education became popular in the 1920s, undoubtedly, forms of adult
education had been in place for years. By 1924 the term “adult education became vogue”
(Dorn, 2007, p. 161) when the Carnegie Corporation sponsored the first conference on
adult education. Initially, adult education formed as a response to reduce high illiteracy
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rates among migrants, urban uneducated poor, and immigrants. In the case of immigrants,
it also served as a way to Americanize foreigners, reducing illiteracy, teaching English,
and providing citizenship development courses. By the late 1920s, adult education had
evolved and changed to focus more upon adult literacy, teaching skills, and crafts for
filling leisure time (Dorn, 2007).
Distance learning through national university extension offices, correspondence
courses (public and private), radio programming, and military training were also popular
avenues to receive training. Correspondence courses in particular were quite popular. In
fact, many university extension programs used correspondence delivery. In 1921,
approximately 15,000 students took university-sponsored correspondence courses at
institutions in 39 states. Private correspondence courses were also popular. International
correspondence schools claimed to have enrolled more than 1,750,000 students by 1915
(Dorn, 2007).
Evening class enrollment delivered through the growing public school system was
seen by some to be the principle method from which adults could gain access to desired
training. From 1921-1922, more than 842,000 adults enrolled in classes offered through
evening schools. During this era, worker training was in high demand, but industry and
workers were, for the most part, still on their own to determine the best approach to
conduct training. Since the Vocational Act only focused on preparing high school teens
and working young adults for employment, a comprehensive workforce strategy helping
unemployed older adults, incumbent workers, women, and minorities remained absent
from the national landscape.
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Junior/Community Colleges
Nationwide, junior colleges continued to grow in number, composition, and
scope. By 1922, 37 of the nation’s 48 states contained junior colleges and, of the 207
institutions operating in 1922, 137 were privately supported (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
Besides academic education, junior colleges were offering adult and continuing education
curricula and, by the end of the decade, some offered vocational education courses,
mainly in California (Dorn, 2007). Along with the physical expansion of junior colleges,
organizational development strategies were also fermenting. Nationwide, access to
education was increasingly valued and seen as a pathway to prosperity—what Andrew
Carnegie referred to as “ladders of ascent” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 5).
Accordingly, the nation’s educational system was solidifying into an orderly and
highly stratified system. At the lower strata of the system were state funded public
schools, where compulsory attendance requiring 12 years of education had been enacted.
At the high end of the strata were universities and four-year colleges offering general
education, baccalaureate degrees, and access to esteemed positions of scholarship and
research. In the middle, junior college leaders struggled to identify their place and role in
the strata. Leaders of these institutions attempted to carve out their education-market
niche, attract students, and differentiate themselves from four-year colleges while gaining
acceptance and legitimacy. Their goal was to solidify themselves as a vital component of
the U.S. educational system. Junior college leaders were caught, trying to balance “both
the egalitarian promise of the world’s first modern democracy and the constraints of
(America’s) dynamic capitalist economy” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 6).
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Initially, junior college leadership, supported by many four-year college leaders,
thought their roles might evolve into the sole provider of the first two years of general
college education, transferring students to universities to finish baccalaureate degrees.
Institutions of higher learning leadership in favor of such an arrangement were Nicholas
Murray Butler at Columbia, David Starr Jordan at Stanford, and William Rainey Harper
at Chicago (Brint & Karabel, 1989). Each of these leaders shared the notion that the first
two years of college were an unnecessary part of university-level instruction and “their
general desire was to reconstitute universities as research and training centers for an
intellectual elite” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 24). In essence, this was an attempt by
institutions of higher leadership to use the junior colleges as a filter; the hope was,
according to Harper, that the associate’s degree awarded by junior colleges would
encourage some students to opt out of further education, allowing only the brightest and
most persistent students to transfer (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
This vision never really became a reality. Four-year private colleges saw junior
colleges as a direct threat and therefore did not want to give them any unnecessary
advantages. Additionally, all four-year colleges and universities eventually succumbed to
the reality of the pocketbook—while the first two years of college were difficult to
manage, the sheer numbers of students provided a steady income stream that four-year
institutions could not ignore or readily give up to other institutions (Brint & Karabel,
1989). Junior college leaders would have to look elsewhere for a large, sustainable source
of revenues to grow their institutions.
Besides academic transfer, the other educational strategy that some junior college
leaders began to pursue aggressively was in the idea of offering terminal (Eells, as cited
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in Brint & Karabels, 1989) vocational education. Guided by notions of social engineering
and influenced by university leaders, Brint and Karabel (1989) stated:
…general education courses should be a part even of the vocational tracks and
that preparatory (or transfer) curricula should be an option in all colleges. The
reforms they urged were designed to bring about a change in emphasis, not a
complete reconstitution. But this change in emphasis was to be far-reaching . . .
that between two-thirds and three-quarters of junior college students should
properly be enrolled in terminal occupational training programs. (p. 36)
Despite these efforts, students and parents remained faithful to academic
curricula, declining to be diverted (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 10) from their goals of
gaining access to four-year institutions and the resulting baccalaureate degree. Surveys
conducted during this time clearly indicated that the majority of students favored junior
colleges because these colleges saved money and prepared students for the university.
Small classes, low costs, personalized instruction, and the opportunity to live at home
were other advantages cited (Brint & Karabel, 1989). The goals set forth by national twoyear leadership to increase student interest and demand for terminal vocational training
failed to gain traction until well into the 1940s and 1950s.
Mississippi’s community college story not only exemplifies the national narrative,
but also adds its own stamp of originality. The passage of Mississippi Senate Bill No. 251
in 1922 permitted the offering of first year college courses through Mississippi
agricultural high schools—“circumscribed initiation” (Young & Ewing, 1978, p. 3). In
the 1922-1923 school year, Pearl River County Agricultural High School and Hinds
County Agricultural High School were the first to offer college courses (Pearl River had
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already offered courses to students without legislative authority the year before, giving
them the honor of being Mississippi’s oldest community college; Young & Ewing, 1978).
The law resulting from Mississippi Senate Bill No. 251 required each agricultural
high school to have a farm, a dairy, a garden, and other facilities in land animals and
equipment, effectively providing hands-on experience in agricultural skills, access to
financial assistance, and supplying fresh vegetables, dairy, and meat for subsistence
(Young & Ewing, 1978). Despite the seemingly agricultural and vocational bent, students
attended junior colleges primarily to gain quality academic training, affording them a
gateway to a four-year degree. The access these junior colleges provided both in terms of
geography and financial affordability, set students on a pathway to a degree that
otherwise would not be attainable to them.
In 1928, a new law5 guiding Mississippi two-year colleges was passed, instituting
the Commission of Junior Colleges—the nation’s first state-level system of junior
colleges. Membership on this commission, not surprisingly, reflected institutions of
higher learning involvement in junior college development similar to trends elsewhere in
the nation. Members were the chancellor of the University of Mississippi, the president of
the Agricultural and Mechanical College (Mississippi State University), and the president
of the Mississippi State College for Women, the heads of three public junior colleges, and
the state superintendent of public education as chairman. Additionally, the law went
further to specify course work at the colleges. Much like the narrative on the national
5

Author of both pieces of legislation was Dr. Julius Christian Zeller, who had served as superintendent of
Bolivar County Agricultural High School and had “come under the influence” (Young & Ewing, 1978, p.
5) of President William Rainey Harper of the University of Chicago. Harper saw the junior college as a
way to take over the first two years of the university, purifying the university from the contaminant of
general education (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
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stage of junior college leadership and institutional development, the law required a focus
on vocational skill development but also allowed academic preparation for transfer to
four-year institutions. Ultimately, Mississippi junior colleges were not able to implement
vocational training as intended. As Young and Ewing (1978) explained:
Institutions never deliberately violated this law. The simple fact was that money,
manpower, knowhow, and facilities were not available for vocational aspects of
the law. The early organizers had made a faithful attempt to accomplish the
vocational training in their agricultural high schools and had largely failed. Dr.
E.R. Jobe...suggested three reasons for the decline of agricultural schools: first,
the people expected too much; second, consolidation; and third, the policy of the
vocational education department in the state department of education.
The superintendents knew they could not succeed in the diverse vocational
curriculum. Consequently, they never attempted it and avoided failure. They had
no doubt that students could be provided two years of regular collegiate
education, transfer to senior institutions, and make acceptable records. They were
convinced that good transfer records would gain for the new college’s academic
respectability and acceptance by local officials and the legislature. This
prognostication proved imminently correct. (p. 14)
By 1932, 11 institutions had been established and accredited by the Mississippi
Junior College Accreditation Commission, and 4 were accredited by the Southern
Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Enrollment was growing and every
region of the state except northeast Mississippi had a two-year institution operating.
While virtually no vocational training was being conducted, colleges and universities of
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the state and throughout the nation accepted Mississippi junior college graduates without
reservation. The Mississippi junior college system was firmly established, and prepared
to meet the challenges of the economic turmoil of the 1930s.
1929-1940: The Great Depression and War Mobilization
Introduction
During the 1930s, several major domestic and international forces challenged the
U.S. economy. Abrupt commodity price declines coupled with agricultural sector
contraction were leading factors that contributed to the Great Depression and the
subsequent recessions experienced throughout the decade. Perhaps most significant was
the unprecedented federal response to the economic challenges followed by mobilization
efforts leading up to the United States entry into World War II. Despite the economic
turmoil, slowdown in economic growth, and perpetual high unemployment, labor markets
experienced vast changes during this time. Industries and technologies introduced over
the past decades continued to evolve, expanding opportunities for semiskilled and skilled
workers. Even so, unskilled workers had difficulty finding work, and in many cases,
unskilled wages lagged behind those of semiskilled and skilled workers, contributing to a
substantial wage differential (Goldin, 2000).
Technological innovations introduced new businesses and industries, new jobs,
new work, and new skills, further diversifying the economy and enhancing the demand
for skilled labor. Paradoxically, despite federal work policies limiting working hours for
some industries and reductions in consumer demand for products due to the depressed
economy, national productivity increased during this era. This situation proved even in
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times of economic turmoil, “human capital accumulation and technological change were
to the twentieth century what physical capital accumulation was to nineteenth century—
the engine of growth” (Goldin, as cited in Bills, 2004, p. 93).
Economy, Technology, and Demographics
Peter Temin (2000) described the Great Depression as “an economic event of
unprecedented dimensions. There had been no downturn of its magnitude or duration
before, and there has been none since. It stands as a unique failure of the industrial
economy” (Temin, 2000, p. 301). But, based on modern research and contrary to popular
opinion, the Great Depression was more a result of international crises acting upon the
U.S. economy rather than inherent domestic economic instability (Temin, 2000).
While the Great Depression overshadowed the entire decade (and beyond), the
period of the 1930s actually experienced a series of economic recoveries and declines,
including a second recession in 1937, nearly as dreadful as the Great Depression. Many
of the economic ups and downs of the era, though, can be attributed to a vast array of
confusing leadership priorities, conflicting federal policy making, and consistent but
misguided monetary practices.
The Great Depression began in the middle of 1929 and lasted through the first
quarter of 1933. Industrial production fell 37%, prices decreased 33%, and real gross
national product (GNP) declined 30% (Temin, 2000). Many reasons have been given for
the drastic economic downturn. Severe and abrupt agricultural sector contraction due to
falling commodity prices and speculative land purchases contributed somewhat to the
large gaps in income distribution nationwide. Consequently low demand for consumable
and durable goods slowed the economy. Constrictive Federal Reserve Bank monetary
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policies in 1928 and 1929 negatively affected the stock market, leading to the October
1929 Great Crash (Eichengreen, 2000) due to over speculation. Consumer confidence
bottomed out, leading to huge depositor runs on banks and greatly depleting bank
reserves. Finally, the Smoot-Hawley tariff, theoretically leading to international trading
partners imposing similar tariffs on imports, had a negative impact on trade balances and
demands for U.S. goods overseas (Temin, 2000).
According to Temin (2000), international monetary forces, adhering to the
principals of the gold standard, and the resulting Federal Reserve Bank’s actions in 1931
provided the impetus that pushed the U.S. economy over the edge into the depths of the
Great Depression. Modern research indicates the U.S. economy was well within
normative levels of historical economic downturns despite the many factors tearing at the
economy. The ensuing recession was deep. The Federal Reserve’s response to protect the
value of the U.S. dollar against devaluation forces due to bank collapses in Austria,
Germany, and England pushed the economy into the Great Depression. The Federal
Reserve raised interest rates sharply in the fourth quarter of 1931, severely constricting
the monetary supply and drying up credit available for industry. Industrial expansion
activities declined sharply, further contributing to unemployment, making the downward
economic cycle even worse. Business and consumer confidence in the entire financial
system collapsed due to persistent and chronic deflationary expectations.
Subsequently, in 1932, the Federal Reserve, under pressure to expand the
economy, began open market purchases of gold to lower interest rates and enable
industry to borrow and expand again. As interest rates fell, banks, already in a precarious
position due to low reserves, began to experience lower profits. For the banks,
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particularly those with the lowest gold reserves, the drop in profitability propelled the
banking system towards the probability of even more bank closures. Compounding the
situation, Federal Reserve Banks refused to pool financial resources to help the most
troubled banking institutions—system liquidity all but dried up. Finally, French and
British banks, fearing severe devaluation policies proposed by U.S. leaders, began to
withdraw dollar balances in New York. Subsequently, the Federal Reserve abandoned
expansionary policies in order to help preserve the international monetary system,
effectively halting further broad economic expansion again. Contemporary monetary
philosophies of the day that were focused primarily on preserving international credit
markets rather than growing the domestic economy directly, along with passive Federal
Reserve intervention, severely handicapped the broad leveraging of economic forces
capable of elevating the U.S. out of the depression (Temin, 2000). Therefore, U.S. leaders
were forced to consider relying on the addition of drastic federal policy intervention and
control to restore confidence in the economic system, reversing the downward trends
upward towards long-term recovery.
The federal response, principally to restore faith in and reconstitution of the
American economy, was first led by President Herbert Hoover, then later by President
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In both cases, the responses were inconsistent and sometimes
chaotic, often leaving business interests confused, uncertain, and certainly unwilling to
invest in expansion efforts of capital improvements, hiring, or even worker training. In
the first case, President Hoover developed several initiatives. Described as “an activist in
the manipulation of tax rates and levels of federal spending to stimulate investment and
reduce unemployment...Hoover extended the scope of corporate liberalism to include
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fiscal activism” (Brownlee, 2000, p. 1037). He first cut taxes payable in 1930 and
increased capital outlays. Public works projects, like the beginning of the huge dam in
Nevada later named in his honor, were a start. He also instructed the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to invest in public works projects that would theoretically provide
jobs and thus grow consumer demand. However, these investments proved to be
ineffective due to its limited scope. President Hoover also signed the Glass-Steagall Act
of 1932, enacted in an effort to stop deflation. This act expanded the Federal Reserve’s
ability to offer rediscounts on more types of assets, such as government bonds as well as
commercial paper. The Glass-Steagall Act was ineffective in reversing the deflationary
expectations of business leaders and consumers (Brownlee, 2000). Then paradoxically, in
1932, to reign in federal debt spending and following on the heels of the Federal Reserve
contraction of monetary policy in 1931, Hover signed the Revenue Act of 1932, the
single largest peacetime tax increase in U.S. history. This action had a negative impact on
public sentiments, further delaying economic recovery (Brownlee, 2000).
The second wave of federal interventions was led by President Roosevelt after he
was inaugurated in 1933. These federal interventions signaled a clear departure from
federal policy making of the past. According to Brownlee (2000), “the Democratic
administration of Franklin Roosevelt (1933-1945) quickly moved beyond the corporate
liberalism of Herbert Hoover to apply the coercive power of government to the tasks of
relief and economic recovery” (Brownlee, 2000, p. 1038). President Roosevelt
immediately took two steps. First, Roosevelt devalued the dollar on April 18, 1933,
through the signing of the Farm Mortgage Act of 1933, allowing him to set the price of
gold. This action, coupled with a new Federal Reserve Board chairman who shared
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Roosevelt’s vision of devaluation, freed domestic macroeconomic policy to expand the
economy (essentially ignoring the potential international monetary implications). Second,
Roosevelt launched a series of programs under The New Deal. These two actions altered
the trajectory of business and consumer deflationary expectations, albeit through
centralized command and control, signaling a major change in U.S. leadership’s approach
to solving the economic challenges, nudging the economy from the downward spiral
upward, toward a much-needed recovery (Temin, 2000).
The New Deal was important and precedent-setting. Never before had the federal
government demonstrated such activism in intervention and control of the U.S. economy
in a peacetime environment. Brownlee (2000) stated:
…took the federal government for the first time into the direct provision of
welfare services...large scale public construction...and a greater degree of
planning and a concomitant departure from competition, sponsored and enforced
by the federal government. (p. 1038)
Titled The New Deal (I & II), Roosevelt’s new programs and policies came in three
principal forms; relief, recovery, and reform (Brownlee, 2000). Under relief, President
Roosevelt’s administration created the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), Public Works
Administration (PWA), and the Works Progress Administration (WPA). Instituted in
1933, the CCC provided employment to approximately 2.5 million men working on
conservation projects through 1941. The PWA, launched in 1933, provided federal funds
for construction projects to create jobs through 1939. The WPA, instituted in 1935, ran
through 1943, and was another government work-sponsored program which provided
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expanded work opportunities for construction jobs and public works to musicians,
writers, and artists (Brownlee, 2000).
Under recovery, the Federal Housing Administration was formed, insuring
mortgages at 10% interest for 20 or 30 years. The administration also created the
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933 to provide jobs, regulate electricity, and
protect low-lying areas from flooding through large publically funded projects. Finally,
the Agricultural Acts were implemented to control agriculture production, thus indirectly
controlling commodity pricing, an attempt to support the depressed agricultural sector.
Under reform, the Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, guaranteeing deposits up to $5,000 and implementing
rules for banks to separate financial roles, bolstering depositor confidence. In 1934, the
Securities Exchange Act was passed, creating the Securities and Exchange Commission
which regulated stock exchanges and investment advisors, theoretically limiting stock
speculation. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in 1935, the Social Security Act was
enacted which provided unemployment insurance, Supplemental Security Income (for the
elderly, blind, and disabled), and Aid to Families of Dependent Children. The Social
Security Act helped those citizens with the highest level of exposure to the depressed
economy (Goldin, 2000).
Despite The New Deal programs, unemployment remained high throughout the
decade, never getting below 9-10% from 1930-1940; in 1935, it was as high as
approximately 22-25% (Goldin, 2000). While much of the unemployment was due to
macro- and microeconomic forces and even federal policy making, there remained
acknowledgement that some unemployment resulted from a fundamental structural
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change of the economy due to technological advancements (Dorn, 2007). According to
Hodson and Sullivan (2008), this structural change, or “net displacement of jobs and
increased job insecurity resulting from the introduction of new technologies” (p. 211)
gave rise to the term “technological unemployment” (p. 215) or “technological
displacement” (p. 212).
High unemployment was part of what Temin (2000) characterized as the “dual
aspect” (p. 325) of the recovery. One aspect, as measured by unemployment, was easily
described as “an anemic recovery” (Temin, 2000, p. 325). The other aspect, defined by
productivity, demonstrated impressive growth despite the severe economic challenges
(Temin, 2000). Technological advances contributed to increases in worker productivity,
expanded existing industries and the introduction of new products and services. These
improvements further diversified the overall U.S. economy, driving up demands for more
semiskilled and skilled workers, and further exposing those with few skills to continued
unemployment.
For instance, as a classic example of the pattern of the technological innovation
process described earlier by Mowery and Rosenberg (2000), particularly within the
chemical technologies, was the introduction of polymer engineering, specifically, a new
product called neoprene. Nicholas (2008) explained the importance of this discovery as
follows:
Neoprene, which Du Pont publicly announced in November 1931 and introduced
commercially in 1937, quickly became one of the 20th century’s major
innovations. By 1939, every automobile and airplane manufactured in the United
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States had neoprene components...Similarly, Du Pont discovered nylon in 1934
and introduced it in 1938 after intensive R&D and product development. (p. 2)
Business leaders, engineers, and managers further expanded existing industries
such as automobile manufacturing (Volkswagen Beetle), ship-building technologies, and
aircraft manufacturing. New products and inventions such as prefabricated housing
(camper trailers), radar, 3M Scotch® tape, and relatively high-definition television all
contributed to major shifts in industry employment and, subsequently, worker skill
requirements. Another example was the chemists and metallurgists designing and
producing new and lighter materials, including steels, mixing nickel, chromium, tungsten,
and other metals, improving the quality and durability of tools and machinery (Mayer,
2005). These advances in steel manufacturing meant stronger and cheaper steel,
contributing to, for instance, more farm implements completely made of steel instead of
steel/wood combinations. These changes increased productivity and expanded the need
for new skills in basic welding and metal fabrication for farmers.
Bigger and better tractors with rubber wheels, the introduction of combines,
hybrid seeds, pesticides, electricity, and indoor plumbing all contributed to expansive
worker knowledge and skills on the farm. However:
…the Depression did have an effect (on farming). During the early 30s, sales of
farm machinery dropped dramatically. In 1930, there were about 200,000 tractors
produced. By 1932, only 19,000 tractors sold. Some manufacturers went out of
business or were sold to other companies, but those that remained continued to
invent new machines or better parts. By 1935, over 160,000 tractors were being
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produced again. In some cases, farmers got their first government checks and
bought machinery. (Ganzel, 2003c, para. 5)
Despite the agricultural challenges of the 1920s and subsequent national
economic downturn of the 1930s, and because of the technological improvements, “not
all farmers were in trouble...Large-scale farming began to change the face of the plains.
Many wheat farmers consequently could prosper despite low prices” (Temin, 2000, p.
303). However, small farmers who could not capitalize their operations, particularly
cotton tenant farmers in the South, did not deal well with the depressed prices and the
efficiencies gained by farmers who were deploying technology. Consequently, many of
these farmers, particularly Blacks, left their farms and migrated towards industrialized
areas to find employment (Temin, 2000).
These trends contributed to the migration patterns from rural to metropolitan
areas, as well as from east to west across the United States. Between 1930 and 1940, total
population in rural areas remained virtually unchanged from 68.0 to 68.7 million, but
metropolitan areas grew from 54.8 million to 63 million (Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). During
this time, the agricultural industry sector composition also shifted. Between 1930 and
1940, the volume of the workforce employed in agriculture decreased from 22.9% to
19.2% (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Overall, the U.S. population grew from 122.8 million
in 1930 to 131.7 million in 1940 and the labor force composition continued to change.
More women were entering the workforce, filling the gaps left from fewer children
(lower fertility rates and compulsory education) and fewer older workers (retiring) in the
workforce (Goldin, 2000).
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In light of the economic challenges of the 1930s, technological innovations were
still prevalent, resulting in changes in the U.S. economy, the nature of work, and
consequently, worker skills. Demand from the U.S. workforce to upgrade skills in order
to find jobs and increase wages was also substantial. Even though federal investments in
The New Deal were huge, very little in the form of human capital investment was
realized. Vocational education focused primarily on youth continued but, for older
incumbent, dislocated, and unemployed workers, federal investments in adult education
or worker training were virtually nonexistent, except in limited cases within the CCC,
PWA, and WPA. U.S. citizens, however, still pursued education and found ways to pay
for and gain access to the desired worker training that would help them find work and
income.
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
The dual aspect of the economic recovery, severe and persistent unemployment
along with substantial increases in worker productivity, was also demonstrated within the
labor market itself. Unskilled workers—laborers, seasonal workers, farm workers, rural
Blacks, the foreign born, women, and younger workers between 16 and 24 years of age
specifically—remained unemployed disproportionately to semiskilled and skilled
laborers. While the demand for unskilled workers lagged nationwide, in some sectors and
geographic locations, industries needed workers with higher levels of general education
and specific industry skills.
In 1935, the National Industrial Conference Board:
…raised concerns over the paradox of high unemployment yet demands by some
industries for skilled and semiskilled workers, especially those in the metal trades,
55

which included machinists, tool and die makers, sheet metal workers, screw
machine operators, pattern makers, molders, grinders, and electric welders was
persistent. (Dorn, 2007, p. 203)
In a survey conducted by the National Industrial Conference Board of 287
manufacturers, which employed more than 115,260 workers in the northeast industrial
core, 100 firms expressed shortages in certain classes of workers. Other new industries
were expanding as well. Between 1931 and 1937, employment in plastic molding
increased 200%. Commercial aviation likewise demonstrated growth. While aircraft
manufactured for export remained around 500 units per year prior to 1936, manufacturing
increased to more than 2,000 units per year by 1939. Employment increased to more than
100,000 by 1939 and anticipated a threefold increase in the near term (Dorn, 2007).
The diversifying economy also caused shifts in demand between sectors.
Percentages of workers employed in agriculture, manufacturing, mining, construction,
transportation, and utilities all decreased between 1930 and 1940. During this same time
period, percentages in workers in trade, finance, real estate, domestic services, personal
services, education, government, and professional services all increased, some
substantially. An interesting example of the expansion of white-collar, professional
services jobs is the number of scientists and engineers employed in industrial research
laboratories within major manufacturing firms in the United States. Employment here
increased from 10,918 in 1933 to 27,777 in 1940; a 154% increase (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000).
In general, though, for most nonprofessionals, not only were there few jobs
available, but for some sectors of the economy, there was a disconnect between available
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jobs and trained workers. Jobs were available but unskilled workers did not have the
requisite skills and/or they were not in the area where industries were hiring. There also
existed a cultural lag time. Nascent industries such as aircraft production, chemical
production, electronics, radio broadcasting, and health care were all on the rise, but the
timing of this growth and the availability of resources for training—facilities, instructors,
training materials, publications, and so on for skills needed by these industries, did not
align smoothly. Time was necessary for workers, industry, and educational institutions to
synchronize and adjust to the changing diversity of the market place.
While political leaders focused on how to broadly raise the economic
performance and thereby lower the persistent high unemployment figures, specific
strategies of how to train and relocate workers to find jobs that did exist, or would soon
exist, remained a challenge and was largely ignored. Flagging federal, state, and local tax
revenues limited government investments in worker training, retraining, and adult
education. Accordingly, The New Deal “offered few opportunities for vocational
education or actual job training, but by the middle of the 1930s some administration
officials and educators implemented job training and retraining programs” (Dorn, 2007,
p. 244).
The New Deal projects and programs consisting of the TVA, CCC, National
Youth Administration (NYA), and the WPA all offered some training of participants, but
largely this training was limited in scale and outcomes. Possibly the largest contribution
of these programs, though, would not become apparent until the need for mobilization for
war became apparent. The TVA offered training largely in the construction trades that
supported the erecting of dams and electrical grids, and the maintenance and operations
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of these projects once they were completed, but its scope was limited. After reviewing
47,000 applications, the TVA initially only hired about 2,200 employees in the early
1930s, expanding to 14,000 by 1937 (Dorn, 2007).
The CCC was created by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt to support
conservation, recreation, and historical preservation projects. It also was designed to
increase “the morale, improve the health, and guide the morals of young men aged 18 to
25, young men having no job and no hope, yet at risk for crime, delinquency,
demoralization and radical indoctrination” (Dorn, 2007, p. 251). President Roosevelt took
personal interest in the CCC, actually outlining the entire structure on a note pad, and to
ensure its success, he used the War Department to lend reserve officers to the initiative,
in part to supervise the young men (and women) enrolled the CCC. This strategy
eventually proved problematic during wartime mobilization, when many of these reserve
officers were called up to service, greatly depleting CCC project oversight, perhaps
contributing to its eventual demise. As Dorn (2007) remarked, despite the military
regimens, coupled with some training and education opportunities afforded enrollees, the
CCC “forest army” (p. 253) of youth left ill equipped and only moderately prepared for
occupations, trades, or professions.
The NYA, in terms of training and education, was more successful than the CCC
(Dorn, 2007). The NYA was established to provide unemployed youth from low-income
families with direct relief efforts, part-time employment, work experience, and training.
Furthermore, the NYA used work-study and industry-supported cooperative programs
and granted student financial aid to improve access to training. Some of these practices
were precursor strategies of later federal programs of the 1950s and beyond. A focus on
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citizenship was also a key element. However, accusations that the NYA was part of a
larger political agenda permeating The New Deal and furthering the president’s agenda
contributed to the passage of the Hatch Act of 1939 forbidding donations from and
political campaigning by officers and employees of the executive branch. The NYA
boasted nearly 500,000 members and placed 219,000 in private employment in its first
three years of existence (Dorn, 2007).
Support for unemployed adults came in the form of the WPA. It was clearly the
largest New Deal work-relief program and was formed, due in large part, to the absence
of unemployment insurance programs offered by state and local governments. The WPA
offered “made work (emphasis added) to preserve the work routines of unemployed heads
of households” (Dorn, 2007, p. 239) while exchanging government-sponsored project and
service work for financial assistance to marginalized6 or unemployed workers until they
could return to previous or better jobs.
Funding for WPA projects could not be used for military war machines or
munitions and were thus largely focused on infrastructure development such as roads,
bridges, and waterways, as well as civilian and military airports. As wartime mobilization
efforts increased, WPA projects also included the renovation of installations and military
infrastructure such as military hospitals, barracks, roads, shipyards, coastal defenses, and
airfields (Dorn, 2007).
While the WPA initially focused on made work, it eventually included training
marginalized workers as well. According to Dorn, (2007) “while the original mission of
6

“Marginal workers” tended to be women, minorities, youth, and disabled who were subject to
discrimination and largely unskilled. Marginal jobs are characterized as “undesirable because they were
boring, low-paid, intermittent, dead-end and they lack autonomy” (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008, p. 327).
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the WPA meant to preserve (italics original) the skills of blue-collar and white-collar
workers, marginalized workers in need of skills dominated remaining WPA rolls after
1940” (p. 375).
Building on the trends already under way in educational institutions nationwide,
the WPA training programming included vocational training, adult education,
rehabilitation, literacy instruction, and general education. As labor shortages began to
grow in 1940, the WPA joined forces with labor and industry to actively recruit and train
these workers, plugging them into jobs. As Dorn (2007) explained:
Adults who enrolled in WPA schools favored vocational education and literacy
courses. The WPA eventually offered courses in trade, industrial, commercial,
and business subjects, and classes in agriculture, subjects in household and
domestic service, nursery assistance, and arts and crafts. (Dorn, 2007, p. 272)
One of the major drawbacks of the WPA was that it was legally limited to only
assist unemployed workers certified by local relief agencies, greatly restricting labor
mobility and perhaps contributing to the prevention of workers upgrading skills or the
acquisition of new ones. Nonetheless, by March 1937, the WPA had enrolled nearly two
million men and women in more than 139,000 classes. By the WPA’s termination in
1942, it had helped approximately 1.3 million foreign-born residents and illiterates
achieve basic literacy and taught language skills to 4.5 million adults. Furthermore, more
than 200,000 adults took occupational classes related to parenting, homemaking, health,
and leisure-time activities (Dorn, 2007).
Aside from The New Deal programs, other training avenues available for
American citizens included high schools, large-firm sponsored schools, correspondence
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and extension schools, and education by radio. Large firms continued to train some of
their own workers in-house, but increasingly, they partnered with local school systems to
reduce costs. Supervisor training and internships were also available as larger companies
sought to bring in college-trained workers.
By the mid 1930s, adult education steadily became more mainstream despite
underfunding, and:
…evening vocational education schools attracted adults: home economic classes
enrolled over 152,000 in 1932, and industrial classes enrolled 118,000; the latter
increased to 146,000 students in 1935. Part-time trade extension courses enrolled
97,800 in 1936. The unemployed began to recognize that their future prosperity
required retraining or learning new skills adapted to changing technologies.
(Land, as cited in Dorn, 2007, pp. 224-225)
Apprenticeship opportunities began to increase. In 1937, the National Apprenticeship Act
was implemented, promoting apprenticeship programs by giving technical assistance to
unions and employers. Leaders recognized the need to meet the increased demand for
skilled workers nationwide.
Despite all the billions spent on work-relief programs and their training initiatives,
the U.S. workforce was unprepared for the sea change that was about to occur. In 1939,
Germany invaded Poland, prompting President Roosevelt to declare a limited national
emergency. Soon there was a large demand internationally and domestically for
manufactured goods and agricultural products produced in the U.S. Just like during
World War I, demand for skilled workers to fill expanding industrial capacities emerged.
For instance, during the 1920s through the 1930s, composition of the U.S. workforce was
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composed of approximately 20% to 25% skilled workers but by 1941, due to new
technological advancements throughout numerous sectors, particularly defense-related
industries, the composition of the skilled and semiskilled workers in the workforce
surged to 35% and 40%, respectively (Dorn, 2007). In just a few months, America
lurched from chronically high unemployment to a veritable worker shortage. Between the
increased production demands and the call-up of hundreds of thousands of military
personnel, labor shortages began to occur nearly overnight. As was the case in earlier
eras, the capacity to train and retrain workers who stood idle for many years during the
Great Depression, unwilling or unable to accrue increased skills, was extremely limited.
In June 1940, with U.S. involvement in the war in the balance, President
Roosevelt declared a state of unlimited national emergency. Acting under the advice of
the National Defense Advisory Commission to launch a national training program to
immediately train 1.5 million workers, the president signed the Defense Education Act,
authorizing the Vocational Training for Defense Workers program, also called the
Vocational Education for National Defense (VE-ND) Act (Dorn, 2007). This act was a
crucial turning point: it freed U.S. mobilization for defense and war in the near term, as
well as set the precedent for future federally funded worker training, the hallmark of the
national U.S. workforce training system instituted during the second half of the century.
The Defense Education Act allocated $15 million in June 1940 and an additional
$26 million in October 1940 to the Office of Education to fund and coordinate training
programs. The United States Employment Service was responsible for the recruitment,
classification, and placement of workers in training programs or factories. The WPA
Bureau of Training, located within the Office of Education, determined training needs,
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planned programs, offered technical assistance, and coordinated services. The existing
work relief agencies of the CCC, NYA, and WPA, along with public vocational schools,
provided the training because these organizations already had established infrastructure
and capacity in place. The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) also increased
apprenticeship training in defense industries (Dorn, 2007).
Two types of training were permitted under the VE-ND Act: preemployment and
supplementary training. Preemployment training was intended to renew worker skills and
discipline. Supplementary training paid for workers to upgrade their skills while earning
wages from existing employment. During the mobilization and war, more than 330,000
workers received a stipend while attending classes in skilled trades, machine shop
operations, and mechanical pursuits, preparing these workers for work in aircraft
construction, armament production, radio repair, electronics repair, and shipbuilding. By
March 31, 1945, the VE-ND Act had spent nearly $327 million, training 2.6 million in
preemployment training and over 4.7 million workers in supplementary courses (Dorn,
2007).
One additional and unique training program that emerged during the war
mobilization effort and functioned through the war was the Training-Within-Industry
program (TWI; Huntzinger, n.d.). Established in 1940 by the National Defense Advisory
Commission and later run by the Federal Security Agency as part of the War Manpower
Commission, it was one of the first emergency services responding to the crises of
limited production capacities U.S. industries faced during mobilization and wartime
(Huntzinger, n.d.).
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TWI was led by the “Four Horsemen” (Huntzinger, n.d., p. 5): Channing Rice
Dooley, Walter Dietz, Mike Kane, and William Conover. The training program was
focused on training workers and supervisors, assisting them to become more productive,
deliver higher quality products, and increase safety. Training consisted of adhering to a
four-step process: job instruction, job methods, job relations, and program development.
The magnitude and scope of TWI was immense. Hundreds of manufacturing facilities
located nationwide employing tens of thousands of workers and hiring many new ones
every day, all needed assistance in increasing manufacturing capacity and product
quality. To meet these needs, TWI developed a network of industrial professionals to
teach these training methods directly to production supervisors, who then taught their
workers. The effectiveness of the program is credited with the dramatic increase in U.S.
production capacities nationwide, and its effects were long-lasting. TWI ultimately
served to help Japan rebuild after the war, eventually become an integral part of what is
known today as Japanese management or “lean manufacturing” (Huntzinger, n.d. p. 4).
The dual aspect of the economic recovery of the 1930s and the war mobilization
efforts leading up to World War II revealed another dual aspect: truism of economic and
human capital development. Human capital development by itself was not enough to
grow the economy, nor was simply focusing on creating jobs, particularly when
technological innovations and advancements contribute to the continuous diversity of
sectors, industries, work, and skills. For an economy to grow, jobs created must be filled
with workers capable of delivering the required skills and migrating to the geographic
location where the jobs are located. Workers tend to pursue skill and education upgrades
when and where they believe investments in those skills will have sufficient returns for
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the time, energy, and financial resources required. The two are inextricably linked to
deliver economic success.
Junior/Community Colleges
During the Great Depression, the number of two-year colleges and total
enrollment rose rapidly, nearly doubling by the end of the decade. As Cohen and Brawer
(2008) remarked, “By 1930, there were 440 junior colleges, found in all but five states.
Total enrollment was around 70,000, an average of about 160 students per institution. By
1940, there were 610 colleges, still small, averaging about 400 students each” (p. 39)
with enrollment effectively doubling in size. Unlike their four-year counterparts, twoyear college enrollment flourished despite the bad economy; the reasons for their success
are many. University and four-year college tuitions proved too costly for many students
and families suffering from financial pressures at home due to the depressed economy.
Graduation rates from high school were higher than in years past, up more than 50% from
a decade earlier. Also, youth unemployment was high due to the poor economy, reaching
nearly 25% in 1937, encouraging students to stay in school (Brint & Karabel, 1989). In
contrast, two-year colleges were perceived as affordable, geographically advantageous,
more accessible than universities, and provided parents reassurance that their children
were on the path to success, while still being closer to home for two more years.
The national movement to vocationalize two-year colleges continued through the
1930s and many college presidents took specific actions to begin steering students in this
direction. Expanded use of skill assessments on students at enrollment to help determine
their capabilities was increasingly common, as well as the use of guidance counselors to
help students find their best educational path, even if it meant steering them away from
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academics toward trades and work-related training. Colleges were also finding ways to
tap into federal funding to help pay for vocational training. According to Cohen and
Brawer (2008), “the 1939 Commission on Junior College Terminal Education had noted
that at least 62 junior colleges in 14 states were receiving federal funds that had been
appropriated under the 1917 Smith-Hughes Act and the 1937 George-Deen Act” (p. 254).
Despite the focused attention towards growing vocational educational
opportunities, students demurred. There have been several reasons postulated, as noted by
Cohen and Brawer (2008). First, the terminal nature of vocational education simply did
not appeal to the thousands of students flocking to junior colleges; they wanted options
going forward and terminal programming did not meet their needs. Second, vocational
programs were expensive and colleges simply could not afford to offer all of the most
relevant or popular programs. Third, because many of the early colleges were joint
ventures with high schools, terminal education did not match the educational
philosophies of the administration or instructors running the colleges. Many in the local
communities who were supporting the college through taxes preferred the prestige of a
“real college” (Cohen & Brawer, 2008), even if it was simply one that offered access to
four-year degrees—certainly though, not an institution focused simply on terminal
vocational training. Finally, business and industry demands for postsecondary vocational
training simply did not exist; duplication of the programs already offered by secondary
schools was not appealing to some college administrators (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
Enrollment in Mississippi’s two-year colleges followed the national trend of
increasing in number of institutions and enrollments. Student attendance increased from
2,761 in 1932 to 4,074 during the 1939-1940 sessions. Junior college locations were also
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expanding; Meridian Community College was established, making the total count 12.
Five additional schools also achieved regional accreditation: Holmes Junior College, East
Central Junior College, Jones County Junior College, Copiah-Lincoln Junior College, and
Meridian Community College. Nine of the 12 colleges had received regional
accreditation by 1940:
…and this accomplishment represents the purpose and philosophy of the junior
college leaders to establish and develop a collegiate academic program meeting
the standards of other junior college programs in the southern region and over the
nation, while also meeting the standards of the lower division collegiate work in
the senior colleges and universities. (Young & Ewing, 1978, p. 19)
Increasingly, Mississippi junior college presidents realized that terminal
educational initiatives were important to “provide job opportunity training for students
who did not desire college transfer and pre-professional courses” (Young & Ewing, 1978,
p. 17). Despite the general consensus that junior colleges in Mississippi were beneficial,
it was not until the 1941-1942 and 1942-1943 legislative sessions that the state
appropriated $60,000 towards vocational educational training delivered through the twoyear college system. Growing campus physical plants to meet the needs of expanding
vocational training initiatives proved problematic, given the lack of state funding
available. Consequently, in 1935, the state legislature authorized two-year colleges to
borrow money that would be matched by the federal grant funds provided through the
PWA to build and upgrade facilities. In the face of the economic challenges of the Great
Depression years, junior colleges nationwide as well in Mississippi found their services
in greater demand, and through visionary leadership, effective management practices, and
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a continued commitment to its democratic foundations, these colleges solidified their
place within the American educational hierarchy.
1941-1950: Wartime Controls and Post-War Recovery
Introduction
The United States declared war on Japan on December 11, 1941. Germany and
Italy declared war on the United States three days later—World War II had begun.
Capitalizing on the substantial command and control apparatus of The New Deal(s),
President Roosevelt successfully led the nation through wartime mobilization to a
wartime footing. U.S. industry responded by expanding operations fueled by huge
increases in federal spending on war machines and materials, along with domestic and
international market demands for numerous products and services. These same industries
entered a new era of organization and growth, far surpassing those of any other nation
and propelling the United States to a position of economic dominance called the
“American Century”(Galambos, 2000).
In the early days of World War II, technological innovations continued to
diversify the economy and, consequently, worker skills. Educational institutions initially
suffered due lagging enrollments, but by the mid-1940s, enrollments surged. Fears of a
postwar recession or even depression, coupled with a new international geopolitical
environment with the rise of Soviet power, compelled U.S. leaders to think and act
innovatively to forge increased access to education and training, which contributed to the
growth in higher education enrollments. In 1946, President Truman established the
President’s Commission on Higher Education and, by December 1947, the Commission
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published its seminal report entitled “Higher Education for American Democracy”
(President’s Commission on Higher Education, 1947) that elevated the role of the twoyear college in America’s educational system. By June 1950, the United States found
itself embroiled again in another war on the Korean peninsula, largely due to America’s
new role as the international leader of freedom and human rights.
Economy, Technology, and Demographics
During this era, the U.S. economy demonstrated large expansion, initially due to
huge increases in federal spending for the war effort, but later, due to expanding domestic
and international markets. Real gross domestic product (GDP) increased 46.8% and real
GDP/capita likewise increased 29.1%. The deflationary policies of the Great Recession
were reversed, due in large part to wartime controls over economic inputs and outputs,
and inflation averaged 5.61% for the decade. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
from January 1, 1941, to December 31, 1950, grew 6.22% (Williamson & Johnston,
2010). Unemployment in 1941 was 9.9%, however by 1944, unemployment had declined
to 1.2%. In 1945, unemployment rose nominally to 1.9% and, by 1950, unemployment
had risen to 5.3%. The average unemployment rate for the decade was 4.53% (BLS,
2011).
The stabilization and recovery of the economy after the Great Depression was due
in large part to the beginning of World War II, and not necessarily on the strong
centralized controls instituted by President Roosevelt during the 1930s (Galambos, 2000).
However, building on the centralized controls established during The New Deal(s), the
Roosevelt administration was able to help organize, prepare, and execute national
resources for World War II much more effectively than the similar attempts of leaders
69

leading up to and during World War I. This superior performance was accomplished, in
part, because of the extent of the controls Roosevelt’s administration implemented. To
wit, “during the war about half of American industry was owned by the government.
Indeed, the United States came as close in the 1940s as it ever has to having a socialized
economy” (Galambos, 2000, p. 948).
In 1940, to bring the nation’s labor, industry, and military establishments under
control and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the mobilization effort, President
Roosevelt reconstituted the National Defense Advisory Commission. The commission
planned and coordinated industrial production, employment, housing, transportation,
munitions and armaments, finances, the movement of labor, price stabilization, and
consumer protection agencies. Eventually, in 1941, the National Defense Advisory
Commission activities were absorbed by the Office of Production Management (OPM),
the War Production Board, and the War Manpower Commission (Roosevelt, 1941,
1942a, 1942b, 1942c).
The War Production Board exercised general direction over the war procurement
and production program (Roosevelt, 1942b). The War Production Board determined the
policies, plans, procedures, and methods of the various federal departments,
establishments, and agencies that supported war procurement and production, including
purchasing, contracting, specifications, and construction. The War Production Board was
also responsible for the conversion, requisitioning, plant expansion, and financing of
industry expansion. Finally, the War Production Board supervised the Office of
Production Management in the performance of its responsibilities and duties (Roosevelt,
1941).
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As part of Executive Order 8629, Roosevelt (1941) made the Office of Production
Management responsible to:
…increase, accelerate, and regulate the production and supply of materials,
articles and equipment and the provision of emergency plant facilities and
services required for the national defense, and...to insure effective coordination of
those activities of the several departments, corporations, and other agencies of the
government. (para. 4)
The OPM also surveyed, analyzed, and summarized the coordination of the stated
requirements of the war and U.S. Navy and other departments and agencies of the
government, and of foreign governments for materials, articles, and equipment needed for
defense. Under Roosevelt’s (1941) authority, the OPM was tasked to the following:
…advise with respect to the plans and schedules of the various departments and
agencies for the purchase of materials, articles, and equipment required for
defense, to coordinate the placement of major defense orders and contracts and to
keep informed of the progress of the various programs of production and supply.
(para. 6)
A good example of the effectiveness of the OPM was demonstrated in the
agricultural sector. Farm equipment manufacturers were caught between being asked to
produce military equipment and farm equipment. The OPM stepped in to help manage
what was to be produced and in what quantities by which manufacturers. Caterpillar, for
instance, was asked to reduce its output of tractors while building engines for tanks. Even
with this level of oversight and intervention to attend to matters of the war effort,
innovation in the agricultural sector continued, and:
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…in fact, it may have spurred new technologies. New challenges created
innovation. During this decade, tractors got smaller and more powerful, selfpropelled combines were introduced, hydraulic systems made it possible to
control larger implements, the Vise Grip pliers were invented and tractors
replaced horses on farms forever. (Ganzel, 2003b, para. 10)
These new agricultural technologies introduced between 1940 and 1950 helped to propel
the percentage of workforce employed in agriculture down from 19.2% to 12.7%
(Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Roosevelt (1942c) stipulated the WPC would:
…formulate plans and programs and establish basic national policies to assure the
most effective mobilization and maximum utilization of the nation’s manpower in
the prosecution of the war,...estimate the requirements of manpower for
industry,...coordinate the collection and compilation of labor market data by
federal departments and agencies...and establish policies and prescribe regulations
governing all federal programs relating to the recruitment, vocational training, and
placement of workers to meet the needs of industry and agriculture. (paras. 4-6)
Along with increased command and control of economic input and output, the
federal government also necessarily increased spending and taxes to meet its mobilization
efforts. Government spending before the war was consistently about 20% of GNP.
During the war, deficit spending increased, with federal revenues reaching nearly 50% of
GNP during the war, decreasing to about 30% afterwards (Brownlee, 2000). The U.S.
private sector lost some economic input and output controls leading up to and during the
war but it did not give up in the burgeoning “innovation system” (Galambos, 2000, p.
948) based on advanced technology, cutting-edge science, and professional expertise.
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Federal investments in innovative technology also expanded. Department of
Defense expenditures rose from $29.6 million to $423.6 million (in 1930 dollars) and
overall federal research and development spending increased from $83.2 million in 1940
to a peak of $1.3 billion in 1945 (in 1930 dollars; Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). While
these huge federal investments in national research and development substantially grew
research and weapons development and the production complex, resulting in the era of
“big science” (Hounshell, 1992, p. 56), it did not come along with tight, burdensome
controls. Investments in the Manhattan Project, which created atomic and nuclear bomb
technologies, along with other contracts to private enterprises and universities for
wartime technological innovation projects, signaled a break from the past with the thenreliance on individual inventors to “more advanced university and private-sector research
capabilities during the second global conflict” (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 819).
Western Electric, for example, received $17 million in contracts and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology gained $116 million through 75 contracts.
A classic example of this relationship between federal funding and university
research resulted in one of the most profound technological advancements of the 20th
century—the modern electronic computer. Building on the work of the electrically
powered mechanical calculator called the “differential analyzer” (Abramovitz & David,
2000, p. 64), which was used to compute firing tables for the U.S. military, the Ballistic
Research Laboratory contracted with the University of Pennsylvania to develop a general
purpose computer—the Electronic Numerical Integrator And Calculator (ENIAC;
Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). The ability of ENIAC to change programs was limited to
manual manipulation of wiring. It was not until 1950 that the first fully operational
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stored-program computer was created—the SEAC, built for use at the U.S. National
Bureau of Standards.
As Galambos (2000) explained, “in the postwar years [there] was a tremendous
expansion in federal support for professional training and research, as well as contractual
support for Research and Development (R&D) in fields associated with national security”
(Galambos, 2000, p. 948). Correspondingly, there was a growth in contractual
arrangements with the private sector that resulted in a postwar research and development
system “rely[ing] heavily on federal R&D financing of extramural research” (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000, p. 820). As Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) explained:
In 1940, the bulk of federal R&D went to support research performed within the
public sector—by federal civil servants, as in the National Bureau of Standard, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Public Health Service, or by state institutions
financed by federal grants, as in the agricultural experiment stations. In the
postwar period, by contrast, most federal R&D funds have supported the
performance of research by nongovernmental organizations. Moreover, the
dramatic growth in federal funding for research in universities contributed to the
creation of a huge basic research complex in this sector. Combined with large
federal procurement contracts, federal funding for R&D in industry had profound
consequences for the emergence of a series of new, high-technology industries in
the postwar period. (p. 820)
Proliferation of technologies was further enhanced during this era by the second
wave of corporate change that lasted well into the 1950s. The central theme of this
change centered on diversification along lines of “technologically similar product or
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production processes and resulted in the expansion of companies into related product
lines” (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008, p. 363). The result was that large multidivisional,
decentralized firms operating worldwide became the predominate structure of American
leading enterprises. These enterprises capitalized on the devastated economies in Europe
and Asia, helping:
U.S. corporations to recover completely from the effects of the Great Depression,
acquire the professional expertise needed to master high-tech forms of innovation,
and to extend their operations into foreign markets they had been unable to
penetrate before the war. Thus began the self-proclaimed “American Century,” an
era when U.S. military power and business influence would, it was assumed, reign
supreme—just as the British navy and industry had in the 1800s. (Galambos,
2000, p. 948)
Wartime investments in R&D contributed to a shift in U.S. technological
innovation from the position of a net borrower of technology from Europe, exemplified
by Germany, France, and Britain, to a net producer of new technologies and products.
Federal pressure to produce much-needed materials to further the war effort, coupled
with substantial funding, catapulted GPT advancements in the design, production, and
use of new and improved internal combustion engines, chemical production and electrical
power, and components, to name a few. “One of the most important effects of WWII,”
Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) continued, was the “result of collaborative production
projects during wartime,...technologies...were diffused widely among U.S. firms. The war
effectively reduced technology and patent-based entry barriers within...[i]ndustr[ies]” (p.
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856). Furthermore, it was the D in R&D that U.S. ingenuity, expertise, and
entrepreneurialism encouraged up to this time.
Jet propulsion technologies invented in Britain were transferred to and codified by
U.S. firms like General Electric and Pratt and Whitney, leading to their dominance in the
1950s and beyond in jet engine design and manufacturing. Domestic chemical processing
innovations, adopted from German expertise in petroleum-based chemicals from the
1930s, led to large growth rates in domestic production in polyethylene (plastics) and
synthetic rubber due to U.S. advantages in processing knowledge, expertise, and
investment by universities, Du Pont, and Union Carbide. Electronics technologies
exploded, led by Bell Telephone Laboratories’ introduction of the first transistors in
1947, and for the remainder of the century, U.S. electronics companies dominated
research and technological innovations that brought sweeping changes to how work was
accomplished and the skills needed for workers to execute jobs (Mowery & Rosenberg,
2000).
One particular example of the effect of technology transfer and subsequent
process improvements attributable to U.S. expertise was in the area of agricultural
fertilizers (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). After World War II, the manufacture of
synthetic ammonium nitrate was facilitated by numerous process improvements and
abundant electrical power. As a result:
…the great post-1945 growth in agricultural productivity in the United States, and
eventually in the entire world, owed an immense debt to the increased use of
chemical inputs, including not only synthetic nitrogenous fertilizers but also
herbicides and insecticides. The quantities of fertilizer inputs into American
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agriculture grew more than fourfold between 1940 and mid-1960s. (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000, p. 848)
Such input advancements continued to drive a shrinking of the agricultural sector and
contributed to the continued major migration patterns from rural to metropolitan areas.
Between 1940 and 1950, total population in rural areas changed slightly from 68.7
million to 66.2 million, but metropolitan areas grew from 63.0 million to 84.5 million, a
34% increase. For the first time in U.S. history, the majority of the U.S. population lived
in metropolitan areas (Hobbs & Stoops, 2002).
The war era was a time of tremendous innovation and the list of examples is
lengthy. For example, Peter Goldmark invented the color television in 1940. The Jeep
was invented by Karl Pabst. In 1941, aerosol spray cans were invented by American
inventors Lyle David Goodloe and W. N. Sullivan, and Enrico Fermi invented the
neutronic reactor. The first electronic digital computer appeared on the scene, invented in
1942 and 1943. John Atanasoff and Clifford Berry and Max Mueller designed the
turboprop engine, and Emile Gagnan and Jacques Cousteau invented the aqualung.
Through the remainder of the 1940s, other inventions included the kidney dialysis
machine, synthetic cortisone, microwave oven, mobile phones and Velcro®. Many of
these technologies, however, while invented during the 1940s, would not be
commercialized for many years, following the pattern that Mowery and Rosenberg
(2000) outlined, reflecting the process of technological change typical to the American
20th-century experience.
Demographically, the U.S. population grew from 131.7 million in 1940 to 150.7
million in 1950. By 1950, the “baby-boom” generation (1946-1964; Hobbs & Stoops,
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2002, p. 1) was well under way. The number of children under age of 5 years represented
the largest five-year age group for the first time since 1900 (Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). This
generation would eventually influence U.S. demographics and economics through the end
of the century.
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
Wartime preparation and execution had an impact on the U.S. worker. As the
nation began to turn its attention to a postwar recovery, concerns over an impending
recession, coupled with high unemployment (similar to what transpired after World War
I) began to dominate the American psyche. Determined to get ahead of investor and
depositor apprehensions, President Roosevelt (1944) unveiled his Economic Bill of
Rights which, in part, afforded every American citizen the right to a useful and
remunerative job through general economic security.
Of utmost concern was how to address reemployment of the millions of military
personnel returning from the war, as well as limit the impact of those returning on the
women, minorities, and youth already employed who backfilled the vacancies created
when servicemen and women left for war duty. Two pieces of legislation were enacted to
address these concerns and work towards the president’s vision of an Economic Bill of
Rights: the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI Bill) and the 1946
Employment Act (Santoni, 1986). The Employment Act sought to institute economic
controls (guided by Keynesian theory) through federal policy intervention limiting
business fluctuations thought to contribute to persistent unemployment experienced
during the 1930s (Santoni, 1986). While both bills reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to
full utilization of its material and human resources, the Employment Act went further to
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set the (never realized) goal of “continuous full employment and price level stability”
(Santoni, 1986, p. 6) through the new theory of “compensatory finance” (Santoni, 1986,
p. 10) as a guiding mark for federal fiscal, monetary, and employment policies of the
postwar era until the 1970s.
Of the two pieces of legislation, the GI Bill had a more direct effect on workers
and their ability to increase educational and skill attainment. Perhaps more importantly,
the GI Bill established a new precedent for federal financing of human capital
development. The act provided returning veterans subsidized housing and direct
monetary support for education and job training. The idea of providing federal financing
directly to a large cadre of recipients, instead of simply relying on funding institutional
training capacities, represented a shift in policy that would eventually expand U.S. citizen
access to higher education and endure through the remainder of the century.
One additional policy driver was the report, Higher Education for American
Democracy, prepared by President Truman’s President’s Commission on Higher
Education (1947). This report reflected a growing concern that America’s postsecondary
educational capacity—its resources, equipment, and curriculum—was inadequate to meet
the needs of the future. The commission recognized four main forces driving higher
levels of demand and subsequently the need for an improved higher education system in
the United States.
First, the science and technological advancements that had radically altered work
(and play) over the previous half century showed no signs of slowing. The United States’
dependence on borrowed technology from European countries was rapidly changing
towards domestic ownership of basic research, patents and technological innovation, and
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integration. American universities expanded research capabilities, industrial investment
in R&D increased, and military R&D infrastructure developed from the war persisted and
even demonstrated a strong inclination to growth over the long term. Overall, the highly
integrated U.S. R&D infrastructure, characterized by an efficient, legally supported
patent process, strong antitrust regulations, and rapid technology transfer systems
emerging from the strong federal government wartime controls, catapulted the United
States into a position of dominance in new innovative products and processes,
particularly in the electronics industry. Consequently, the demand for new and more
complex skills and greater maturity on the part of adults seeking higher education was
seen to be prolific and enduring.
Second, U.S. leaders understood that the demographic and geographic diversity of
the United States contributed to the potential for disunity. The President’s Commission
on Higher Education (1947) recognized this threat. So the Commission concluded that an
educated populous was less likely to adopt the radicalized political and social movements
emerging in the communist countries (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
Third, after World War II, geopolitically, the United States found itself as the sole
counterbalance to the forces of communism and remaining dictatorships worldwide, and
it bore a new sense of responsibility for leadership in world affairs. After two hot wars,
and on the front end of an escalating cold war, U.S. leaders recognized the criticality of
expanded human capital development as a strategic national advantage, propelling
economic and military dominance. This realization enabled the United States to fulfill its
new role as leader of the free world. Finally, the emergence of the big sciences led by the
atomic and nuclear technologies harnessed under the Manhattan Project demonstrated the
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need for deeper and broader responsibilities of higher education to anticipate and prepare
for the social, environmental, military, and economic challenges that come with the
application of science for the good of economic and social benefits.
President Truman realized that on the aggregate, more U.S. citizens had to receive
higher levels of education and training delivered through postsecondary education to
meet these challenges (Brint & Karabel, 1989). To that end, his Commission on Higher
Education called for the removal of the many barriers to higher education, expanding
access through more schools, improving curriculums, and the provisioning of financial
aid to those who would not otherwise be able to afford the costs associated with higher
education. Most interestingly, central (but not exclusive) to the commission’s proposal to
remove barriers and increase access was the expansion of two-year college system. Four
main factors drove this opinion.
First, members of the commission recognized that while many more citizens
needed to receive postsecondary education to meet the increased skill demands of the
technological advanced economy, not all of those citizens desired, nor were necessarily
capable of fulfilling the requirements of a bachelor’s degree. Not everyone was inclined,
either through personal capacity or preference, to become a professional. Second, the
university system simply did not have the capacity to handle the impending large influx
of students. Third, leaders (particularly university presidents) did not want to over-award
the number of four-year and advanced degrees, diluting their value. Finally, the cost of
increasing postsecondary education entirely through expansion of institutions of higher
learning was too costly, even for the emerging, robust U.S. economy (Brint & Karabel,
1989).
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The two-year college system was seen as the most viable option for increasing
access at an affordable price for academic transfer, terminal education options, and semiprofessional training. Expansion of the two-year college system was seen as a logical
shock absorber strategy for the upper tiers of the higher education system during this time
of growth (Brint & Karabel, 1989). For cynics, this strategy was little more than a
diversion or cooling-off period for students pursing the dreams of higher education, but
instead, ending up with a terminal degree.
Included in this new direction was the redefining and renaming of the two-year
colleges from junior colleges to community colleges. No longer was the community
college to be simply the junior higher education institution. Instead, this recommendation,
it was reasoned, better reflected the vision that the community college deliver
comprehensive services to the communities and the people they serve through academic
transfer, terminal vocational training, adult education, community service, and leadership.
The dawn of the contemporary community college concept was emerging, yet it would
not be until the 1970s that the use of the term community college became ubiquitous.
Meanwhile, with the war over, industry rapidly switched back to peacetime
production. Contrary to earlier predictions, the U.S. economy did not stall but instead
prospered, and after mild recessions in 1945 and 1949, economic expansion
predominated the American experience for nearly two decades. Because the United States
was virtually the only major economy left intact after the war, markets for new
consumable and durable goods domestically and internationally expanded rapidly
(Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Demand for skilled workers, semiprofessionals, and
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professional workers likewise expanded, reflecting the impact of technology on products,
services, and processes.
These improvements led to the affordability of durable goods such as washing
machines, dryers, electric irons, and vacuum cleaners, which freed women from domestic
chores and allowed them to continue work outside the home, increase leisure activities, or
to pursue educational opportunities (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Jobs within the
transportation, construction, utilities, finance, real estate, education, professional services,
and government sectors all continued to grow and expand, while those in manufacturing,
mining, domestic services, and agriculture declined (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
Consequently, thousands of veterans and nonveterans, both men and women,
recognized this shifting of skills and flocked to colleges to upgrade their skills and
thereby get on the path to higher levels of social status and economic well-being (Synder,
1993). Despite an initial drop in enrollment across all colleges at the beginning of the
war, by the fall of 1949, impressive gains in the numbers of students enrolled and
bachelor’s degrees awarded were evident. The total number of two- and four-year
colleges rose to 1,851 institutions by the fall of 1949, up from 1,706 in 1939. Four-year
colleges rose from a total of 1,252 in 1939 to 1,327 in 1949. Total enrollment likewise
increased to 2,444,900 in 1949, up from 1,494,203 in 1939—a 64% increase. Bachelor’s
degrees conferred to men likewise increased 200% and female recipients increased 34%
(Snyder, 1993).
Junior/Community Colleges
The big story and main theme concerning two-year colleges during this era was
growth. The number of colleges increased, enrollment rose, and curriculum offerings
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became more diversified. But while the idea of the comprehensive community college
began to become more of a reality, students nonetheless continued to prioritize academic
transfer over terminal certification. The number of two-year colleges increased from 456
in 1939 to 524 in 1949. Enrollment in two-year colleges also increased from 150,000 in
1939 to 229,000 in 1949, or approximately 10% of all higher education enrollments
nationwide (Snyder, 1993). Brint and Karabel (1989) attributed these increases to several
factors: market conditions, meritocracy, curriculum development, and the psychological
impact of the Cold War.
Optimism pervaded the United States during this period as the economy expanded
rapidly. Demand for college graduates was rising and citizens responded accordingly,
particularly for those in the lower middle class and working-class strata. Those
responding saw the merits in receiving higher education and combining the long-held
American ideal of being “self-made” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 3) with becoming
educated—the ticket to moving up the social ladder involved not just hard work, but also
higher education. Curriculums at community colleges adjusted to reflect a temporary
movement away from the narrow skills training of terminal education “inimical to
democratic principles” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 75) towards transferrable liberal arts,
where it was thought that general education was a way to promote national unity and
combat the communist ideals espoused by the rising power of the Soviet Union.
Growth in the Mississippi higher educational system mirrored national trends.
Enrollment initially declined during the war but then increased for both two- and fouryear colleges, from 14,019 to 19,695 between 1939 and 1949 (Snyder, 1993). Enrollment
in Mississippi two-year colleges was 4,074 in 1939, fell to a low of 1,375 students for the
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year 1943-1944 but increased to 7,047 by 1951 (Young & Ewing, 1978). Two new
multicounty junior colleges were established in 1948: Itawamba Junior College and
Northeast Junior College, completing the statewide system that had been proposed by the
original legislation years earlier (Young & Ewing, 1978).
Students’ pursuit of educational opportunities in Mississippi reflected the national
trends of continued focus on academic transfer programs leading to professional careers
(Young & Ewing, 1978). Increased demand for terminal general education and
vocational-technical programs was evident, as well as the blending of vocational
programming with liberal arts studies leading to a breadth of knowledge and interest. To
meet the large and growing demand for services, junior college presidents proved
resourceful and unified. For instance, as the war drew to a close and demobilization
efforts freed up excess military equipment, the junior colleges presidents were able to
outmaneuver their four-year institutional counterparts and secure 102 temporary housing
units transferred from armed service installations made available by the Federal Public
Housing Act. Junior college presidents used these temporary units for a variety of
purposes, including classrooms, shops, and dormitory housing. The presidents then used
the Junior College Association to negotiate an agreement with the State Building
Commission to allocate $62,000 to each college to install these portable buildings
(Young & Ewing, 1978). Further demonstrating their increasingly potent lobby, the
junior college presidents asked for and were awarded $450,000 in state funds designated
specifically for vocational-technical education in junior colleges in 1950 (Young &
Ewing, 1978). Additionally, the legislature provided $750,000 towards physical plant
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expansions, namely building expansions, to help the junior colleges migrate out of the
temporary housing units acquired earlier.
In 1950, the Mississippi legislature submitted and the governor signed the Public
Junior College Law. This bill accomplished several important objectives. First, it began
the official separation of agricultural high schools from the junior colleges, a move that
enabled the second major change, local revenue support. This new law provided county
supervisors the authority to levy local taxes in direct support of junior colleges serving
their districts. The law also broadened and strengthened the role and authority of the
college president, effectively increasing its status as a professional position. Shaped by
the economic, technological, and educational turmoil and resulting innovative leadership
of the previous 50 years, the United States was poised for its impending global leadership
role for the next 50 years of the 20th Century.
1951-1970: Postwar Prosperity, International
Introduction
Despite being embroiled in the Korean War, the U.S. economy surged ahead with
nearly all of its international competitors still trying to rebuild after World War II.
American companies enjoyed substantial growth across the 1950s and 1960s, capitalizing
on a large, increasingly wealthy domestic market as well as benefiting from their
dominance in many international markets. U.S. labor experienced huge changes as
technological advancements carried aircraft and automobile manufacturing to greater
heights, ignited the electronics industry, and substantially altered the agricultural sector,
shifting large numbers of workers off the farms into other sectors of the economy. For
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many, employment was plentiful and wages were growing. For others, particularly those
with few or no skills, or those who could not migrate to the industrialized urban centers,
high unemployment rates persisted and wages stagnated or even fell. Voices of concern
about technology and automation causing structural changes in the economy leading to
persistent unemployment were once again rising.
Overshadowing the economic developments, however, was the growing Cold War
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Fears of a nuclear holocaust were never
far from the thoughts of many citizens in both domains. In 1957, the Soviets successfully
launched their Sputnik rocket into space, expanding the superpower conflict even more,
and contributed to the perception for some in the United States that the nation was falling
further behind in education, technology, and innovation. Compounding these fears, by the
mid-1960s, the United States was embroiled in yet another hot war in Vietnam—another
extension of the Cold War.
To address the perception that the United States was losing its dominant position
as a world leader, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson signed into law many new pieces of
legislation that finally delivered federally supported, comprehensive worker education
and training programs. Building on many of the theories and programs first introduced
during The New Deal(s) and the World War II postwar demobilization effort, these
programs would shape U.S. policy for secondary and postsecondary education, as well as
workforce development for the remainder of the century, and help solidify the role of
community colleges as the comprehensive education and workforce provider its
institutional leaders had envisioned.
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Economy, Technology, and Demographics
The U.S. economy in general and its industry sectors in particular enjoyed several
comparative advantages over most other nations in the postwar era. Heavy investments in
capital-using and scale-dependent technologies during the preceding 50 years, coupled
with all of the U.S. industries remaining untouched and intact after the war, propelled
U.S. productivity ahead of nearly all international competitors. U.S. corporations, having
built beachheads during the war internationally, were uniquely positioned to dominate
international markets at all levels of input and output. The dominant position
internationally led to sustained economic growth through increases in productivity and
transfers of wealth (Williamson & Johnston, 2010).
There were four recessions during this timeframe. The first was in 1953 and lasted
three years. The 1953 recession resulted from the demobilization effort after the Korean
War conflict, coupled with the Federal Reserve reasserting its independence from the
U.S. Treasury, constricting monetary supply based on inflationary fears. In 1958, another
recession started and lasted three years. Two more minor recessions were experienced in
1960 and 1969.
Domestically, U.S. firms enjoyed relatively large, rich, and homogeneous
markets, connected with a unified and growing transportation system, filled with
consumers comfortable with “unpretentious and functional design” of products, forgoing
the “differentiated, elaborate, and custom-finished look of the old European luxury
crafts” (Abramovitz & David, 2000, p. 77). These tastes “fostered the entrepreneurial
strategy of catering to and actively creating large markets for the standardized products
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and large-scale production” (2000, p. 77) that characterized much of the growing U.S.
economy.
The United States’ international comparative advantage and leadership in skillintensive products such as aircraft, automotive, and steel industries peaked in the 1950s
and thereafter declined until the 1980s (Lindert, 2000). This decline is evidenced by
forces affecting the GPTs of internal combustion engines, chemical production, and
electronics and associated industries. The two largest and most influential industries that
used the internal combustion engine were those of automobile and aircraft production.
In stark contrast to the early years of automobile manufacturing, the automobile
industry during the 1950s and 1960s experienced little in the way of product design
innovations (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). However, it did manage to continue to
improve production technologies, as indicated by its above-average labor productivity.
Automobile manufacturers enjoyed large, homogeneous, increasingly wealthy domestic
markets, with virtually little in the way of international competition. By 1970, this
situation began to change as the convergence of overseas competitors, namely Japanese
automobile manufacturers, began to infiltrate U.S. markets and overtake domestic
manufacturers (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
The U.S. commercial aircraft industry was greatly boosted by research and
development of jet propulsion and its diffusion from military to commercial use during
these eras. General Electric and Pratt and Whitney overcame all domestic competitors
and, by the 1960s, dominated the commercial jet engine manufacturing industry. Douglas
and Lockheed continued dominance in airframe manufacturing and led the world in
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designing and manufacturing aircraft for military and commercial use (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000).
Innovations in aircraft and component design were also prolific. New metals and
alloys for both jet engine manufacturing and airframe designs were being introduced
regularly to meet the higher operating temperatures and increased stresses of ever-faster
flying speeds (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). Electronics were successfully integrated
into aircraft designs; semiconductors enabled miniaturization of circuits and, eventually,
the addition of minicomputers in aircraft provided increased safety, accuracy, and
reliability with navigation, performance monitoring, communications, and on-board
safety devices (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Skill sets required to design, manufacture, operate, and maintain aircraft were
becoming more specialized and complex. Higher grade alloys used in jet propulsion
systems required much greater knowledge of metallurgy and specialized machining
practices (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). Electronics sophistication within the cockpit and
throughout the aircraft required new skills and knowledge for troubleshooting,
replacement, and repair, particularly for aircraft mechanics and maintenance personnel.
The image of the aircraft maintenance personnel simply being grease monkeys or wrench
turners was changing rapidly as aircraft systems became more complicated and varied.
Important developments in the GPT of electricity occurred both in electrical
power generation and electronics. The diffusion of electrical power grid systems and
increases in energy transmission nationwide led to less expensive electricity that
benefited industry and consumers alike. As Schnapp (2001) explained:
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From 1950 to 1960, generation grew by an average of more than 8.5% a year, led
by strong increases in residential electricity demand and near completion of rural
electrification. Capacity grew slightly more rapidly than generation, averaging
almost 9.5% annually. With generating efficiencies still improving, electricity
prices continued to decline, as evidenced by drops in residential electricity prices
averaging about 1% a year. (Schnapp, 2001, para 21)
In the 1960s, demand grew nearly 7.5% a year, helped by annual declines of more
than 1.5% in residential and commercial electricity prices. (Schnapp, 2001, para.
25)
As electricity became more available at cheaper prices, consumer demand increased,
particularly at the household level, as more consumer electrical products became
available to the market. Consumer adoption of new and improved technological
innovations such as dishwashers, refrigerators, ranges, washers, dryers, televisions,
radios, and vacuum cleaners led to profound changes in American lifestyles.
Particularly interesting during this time was the lack of adoption and integration
of an important electrical innovation by U.S. steel manufacturers during the postwar era,
the electric furnace (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). The electric furnace eliminated the
need for numerous inputs, (i.e., coke, for example), freeing steel plants from the
confinement of having to be located near coal fields. Electric furnaces also decreased
processing costs compared to traditional steel-making methods. The U.S. steel industry
was dominated by huge corporations like U.S. Steel and resisted the new technology,
instead relying on the continued use of traditional steel-making technologies. Practically
the only new innovation they did try to use in the 1950s was the oxygen converter
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(Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000), but diffusion of this innovation failed, setting the stage for
a severe competitive disadvantage for the entire industry that would result in their
substantial loss of markets in the 1970s and the eventual industry downfall in the 1980s.
The introduction of the postwar use of the electrical furnace was restricted to
sophisticated alloys and stainless steels (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). Eventually,
though, the electric furnace would lead to the development of minimills in the late 20th
century and help save the U.S. steel manufacturing from complete demise.
Technological innovation reshaped the U.S. economy in two other major
industries during the 1950s and 1960s: electronics and agriculture. These forces would
forever alter the employment structure and the nature of work throughout the United
States and even the world (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). The more important in terms of
economy and jobs was the birth and growth of the electronics industry. The growth of
this industry consisted generally of three main areas of development: electronic
computers, semiconductor components, and computer software. Innovative maturation of
these industries reflected the general pattern of innovation in the United States throughout
the 20th Century, exemplified by the GTPs of internal combustion engines and chemical
production.
The electronics industry experienced many interim and intermediate steps of
scientific discovery, processing technology innovation, and product commercialization,
all of which had to be assimilated at various times and stages for the entire industry to
move forward to the next “bottleneck” (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 890). Solutions
to bottlenecks in pure research and processing were often discovered by government
entities, firms, or companies at different times, enabling other important discoveries and
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inventions to be put to use. The growth of this industry, though, exhibited distinctions
from and commonalities to other GPTs.
One of the major differences the electronics industry experienced was accelerated
diffusion and adoption of the technologies, which occurred faster than the other GPTs,
the result of the aggressive use of federal antitrust policies and contract requirements by
defense agencies working exclusively with private firms. These contracts often required
that patents be shared with other companies within and outside of the electronics
industry. This diffusion of knowledge increased overall system efficiency, increased
competition, and lowered costs, leading to a much higher rate of innovation adoption
throughout government, business, and consumers than was earlier experienced by the
other GPTs of chemicals and internal combustion engines (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
As Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) explained:
By facilitating entry and supporting high levels of technology spillovers among
firms, public policy and other influences increased the diversity and number of
technological alternative explored by individuals and firms within the U.S.
semiconductor industry during a period of significant uncertainty about the
direction of future development of this technology. Extensive entry and rapid
interfirm technology diffusion also fed intense competition among the U.S. firms.
The intensely competitive industry structure and conduct enforced a rigorous
selection environment, ruthlessly weeding out less effective firms and technical
solutions. For a nation that was pioneering in the semiconductor industry, this
combination of technological diversity ad strong selection pressures proved to be
highly effective. (2000, p. 885)
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Another major difference was that much of the initial innovation in the electronics
industry occurred in firms unfamiliar with defense contracting, which was one of the
largest early investors in the industry. The U.S. military showed a propensity to purchase
from new and untried suppliers “accompanied by conditions that effectively mandated
substantial technology transfer and exchange among the U.S. semiconductor firms”
(Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000, p. 884). This strategy led to further high levels of
competition among firms of all sizes.
Defense-related investments in R&D were also indispensable to the growth and
diffusion of electronic innovation for all firms, but it was particularly so for start-up,
entrepreneurial enterprises. These enterprises demonstrated the quintessential
entrepreneurial, risk-management spirit by capitalizing on the federally directed diffusion
of scientific discoveries by universities and large corporations and rapidly
commercializing these discoveries into marketable products and services to meet U.S.
and world consumer appetites.
Finally, university research tended to play a more tangential role in the growth of
the electronics sector, particularly within the semiconductor industries. As Mowery and
Rosenberg (2000) explained:
In some contrast to their prominence in the development of the chemicals industry
or the later development of the U.S. computer software industry, U.S. universities
played a minor role as direct sources of the technologies applied in the emergent
semiconductor industry. (p. 885)
Colleges were quick to develop curriculum and programs to train engineers and scientists
heavily sought after by industry. The U.S. technological development infrastructure of
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military, university research, corporate R&D, and federally directed patent-sharing
requirements contributed heavily to the diffusion of technologies and the rapid
introduction of numerous new products and services, greatly increasing the rate of
adoption of electronic technologies by private and public entities in the postwar era. Even
so, it was collaborative research and investment between government agencies and the
major corporations of the time such as Bell Laboratories, IBM, and Texas Instruments
that initiated the early breakthroughs (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
The first large breakthrough in the electronics sector, specifically within the
computer industry, was in 1944. Army ordnance contracted with developers from the
University of Pennsylvania to develop an automatic computation device for calculating
ballistic firing tables. This machine was called the ENIAC (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Despite its technological advances, this machine required changes in wiring schemes to
change programs and lacked the capacity to be incorporated in diverse applications. It
was not until 1950 that the first operational stored-program device, SEAC, was created
by the National Bureau of Standards. Stored-program devices allowed operators to
upload programs without having to make hard-wired adjustments. This technological
distinguisher enabled these devices to be used in much more diverse applications
(Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
By 1953, the first commercially available stored-program device called the
UNIVAC, developed by Remington Rand was sold to the U.S. Census Bureau and some
private firms (Craiger, 1997). IBM entered the market in 1953, selling the IBM 701 to the
Department of Defense. The introduction of a commercially viable computer may
represent the first major electronics, technology-driven paradigm shift that profoundly
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affected organizations during the 20th century; the evolution of the computer from a
“military tool to a business machine” (Craiger, 1997, p. 89) was complete.
During the 1960s, segmentation of the computer industry increased as
minicomputers were introduced. Minicomputers were smaller, more affordable versions
of huge mainframe devices and many of these initial designs were sold to academic and
scientific researchers who did not require software or product support (Craiger, 1997).
Minicomputer proliferation was greatly enhanced by many innovations within the
semiconductor industries that enabled miniaturization, high processing speeds, and lower
costs to customers. By 1970, the cost of minicomputers was approximately one-tenth that
of mainframes in the 1960s, with comparable computing power.
Another critical and far-reaching development in computing started in October
1957 with a totally unrelated event (Napier, Judd, Rivers, & Adams, 2003). In the midst
of the Cold War, the Soviet Union successfully launched the first satellite—Sputnik—
into space. The predominant thought for most U.S. leaders and citizens was that the
Soviets having been the first to reach orbit and beyond was intolerable; the U.S. would
not be second to anyone. Determined to catch up to perceived and real deficits in
technological innovation, President Eisenhower promptly, within months of the Sputnik
launch, created the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) that sponsored research
at universities and corporations in strategic areas, including communications and
computer technologies (Napier et al., 2003).
Almost immediately, the need for additional computing power to meet the needs
of the increased research demands became evident. Instead of acquiescing to the calls for
the procurement of more computers, ARPA Director Robert Taylor instead proposed the
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creation of a system of electronic links, or a network, that would link together existing
computers at participating universities and corporations to increase computing power and
to more rapidly share information (Napier et al., 2003). In 1968, the Department of
Defense, operating as the ARPA sponsor, released requests for proposals to more than
100 businesses in the United States, such as IBM, Control Data Corporation, and
Raytheon Company. In the end, a consulting firm by the name of Bolt, Beranek, and
Newman won the contract. In the fall of 1969, the world’s first electronic network,
ARPANET, was in operation and consisted of four nodes. By 1971, the network had 15
nodes and, by 1972, the first international connection was made to the University of
London. This network would eventually be renamed DARPANET because of its
connection to the Department of Defense. The foundational roots of what would later
radically reshape business, cultures, and society worldwide was born—the Internet
(Napier et al., 2003).
The first major breakthrough in the semiconductor industry occurred in 1954,
when Texas Instruments produced the first commercially successful transistor after Bell
Labs was forced to share the technology through antitrust policies and regulation.
Transistors replaced tube technology, making electronic circuits smaller and more
reliable. By 1958, the next leap in technological advancement took place when the
integrated circuit (IC) became available for commercial use. ICs further contributed to
the miniaturization of circuit design and made computing power available in even smaller
packages, resulting in further proliferation of product innovation. Not until 1966 did ICs
overtake the production and use of transistors, further transforming the structure of the
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U.S. semiconductor industry when most of the top producers shifted their focus and
became suppliers rather than users of the product (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Software development, as a separate industry, did not really begin until computers
had proliferated in sufficient numbers and a standard platform was evident. COBOL and
FORTRAN, two initial programming languages, were typically bundled within the sales
contract by the computer manufacturer (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). It was not until the
late 1950s and 1960s that independent software firms entered the market, providing
custom programming for government and businesses.
Another business sector that experienced growth during the 1950s and 1960s was
U.S. agriculture. This timeframe represented unprecedented changes in U.S. agricultural
practices, affecting hundreds of farms, thousands of workers, and millions of people
worldwide. By many estimates, there was excess U.S. agricultural capacity during the
postwar era due to the price support practices reminiscent of The New Deal policies and
World War II production controls. Consequently, the 1950s and 1960s represented a
rebalancing of production inputs, namely the shifting of farm labor to other sectors. This
shift of labor helped U.S. productivity gains overall (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers,
1975). As with many other sectors within the U.S. economy, innovative technologies
contributed to this aggregate shift of labor input.
Agricultural innovation during this time was driven by the development of ever
more diverse and powerful equipment, improved pesticides associated with complex
application processes, increased use of fertilizers, plant and livestock specialization, and
irrigation systems. These new technologies were led, in part, by heavy federal
investments in research, development, and human capital development. Real expenditures
98

of public dollars from both federal and state sources indicate slow growth through the
first half of the 20th century. Ganzel (2007b) explained the following:
Then, about 1950, spending shot up. Research grants doubled from under $500
billion in 1950 to over $1 trillion in 1963. Research spending reached $1.5 trillion
in 1972, and over $2.5 trillion by 1990. . . . [These figures do not include] money
spent by hybrid seed corn companies or food processors or fertilizer companies or
pesticide companies—all were making similar investments. (paras. 2-3)
Agricultural scientists and university extension service agents, many based at land-grant
universities evolving from the Morrill Acts, bridged the gap between research,
development, and the farm (Ganzel, 2007b). Human capital development was a critical
piece to the successful adaptation and diffusion of the new technologies to farming
regions across the nation, which resulted in increased farm productivity despite the
outmigration of labor to other sectors.
New and sophisticated farming practices required farmers to increase their
knowledge, skills, and performance to remain competitive and actually lead to increases
in specialization. Ganzel (2007b) explained this need as follows:
As the knowledge base for agriculture became more specialized, farmers were
rewarded if they specialized. For instance, in the 19th century, farmers needed a
generalized knowledge of how best to prepare a seedbed, how to apply manure for
nutrients, how to cultivate weeds and how to harvest. He or she needed to know
how to feed animals, collect their products (like eggs or cream), butcher them and
preserve meat. Most of this knowledge applied to a variety of crops and livestock.
But in the last half of the 20th century, researchers were showing which specific
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nutrients, applied at certain times and in certain ways would make a big difference
in one crop but not another. Equipment manufacturers were developing
specialized machines for specific crops and specific planting and tillage practices.
Farmers were rewarded with better yields and more money if they understood in
depth the crops they were raising and the livestock they were raising. So, in real
ways, research changed cropping patterns as farmers began to specialize in a few
or even only one species of crop. Animal and processing research encouraged
farmers to specialize in one type of livestock, changing livestock patterns. (para.
6)
This trend towards specialization drove increased demand for improved farming
equipment. After the war, there was a great pent-up demand for tractors and, by the
1950s, tractors finally outnumbered horses and mules on farms (Bellis, n.d.). “Tractor
production reached its highest level in 1951 when there were 564,000 tractors
manufactured in the U.S.” [sic] (Ganzel, 2006, para. 1) alone. When the pent-up demand
was satisfied, production dropped back to about half of the peak (Ganzel, 2006).
Advancements in pest control represented another agricultural improvement,
leading to increased farmer specialization and sophistication. Led by the successful
introduction and use of the powerful pesticide named DDT into agriculture during the
1940s, the pursuit and use of new and improved pesticides increased.7 Ganzel (2007a)
explained the impact of pesticides on the agricultural industry as follows:

7

DDT’s potential danger to the environment was highlighted in the book Silent Spring by American
biologist Rachel Carson. Carson’s work underscored the dangers to humans and wildlife, namely birds, of
widespread use of chemicals, particularly in the agriculture sector. This work is considered by many to be
the beginning of the national environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The U.S. Environmental
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Analysis of data right after the war indicated that every additional dollar spent on
fertilizer or pesticides generated increased output of between $3 to $5 on average.
According to the USDA in 1945, the average annual loss in farm income from
pests and crop diseases was about $360 million (over $4 billion in today’s
dollars8). (paras. 8-9)
Finally, farm land-use policies of the 1950s and 1960s often limited the number of acres
farmers could plant. Farmers responded strategically by planting only on the most
productive land and used technology to help them increase yields and still turn a profit
(Ganzel, 2007a).
User demand for pesticides exploded based on the research and in response to
federal farm policies. Between the years of 1945 and 1972, the total expenditures for
pesticides rose tenfold (Ganzel, 2007a). Pesticide use increased from below 100 million
pounds in 1945 to about 300 million pounds by 1950 and again to more than 600 million
pounds by 1960: “[i]n 1952, 11% of corn and 5% of cotton acres were treated with
herbicides. By 1982, these percentages had risen to 95% of corn and 93% of cotton
acres” (Ganzel, 2007a, para 6.). Between 1947 and 1952, nearly 10,000 new pesticide
products were registered with the U.S. Department of Agriculture (Ganzel, 2007a).
Likewise, farm use of fertilizers increased during this period. Postwar synthetic
ammonium nitrate production, facilitated by numerous process improvements and
abundant electrical power, made huge quantities of fertilizer available at lower prices.
Protection Agency was created in 1970 and DDT was banned from use in the United States in 1972 (Behr,
2009).
8

Conversion calculation to over $4.3 billion in 2011 dollars based on the consumer price index
methodology.
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Average annual use of commercial fertilizers by U.S. farmers increased from 22.3 million
tons during the 1950s to 32.4 million tons during the 1960s (Bellis, n.d.), a 44.9%
increase.
Droughts also affected many regions of the country during the 1950s. Although
not as severe as the droughts of the 1930s, farmers were nonetheless challenged by this
environmental factor. In response, large irrigation systems were found to be an effective
but costly option. Farmers with sufficient equity in their property were able to invest in
these systems, stabilizing and increasing crop yields even in the face of decreased rainfall
conditions (Ganzel, 2007c). Farming as a way of life was changing drastically:
Farming was no longer only a natural process, it became a scientific, industrial
process. The farmers who survived and thrived—no matter where they
were...were forced to become efficient managers and engineers, applying basic
scientific research results to the practical problems of growing food, fiber, and
even energy. (Ganzel, 2007b, para. 7)
Those who lacked the ability to purchase the new equipment, invest in new agriculture
technologies, or who simply balked at the increased burdens of managing large, complex
farming systems left farming to find alternate sources of income (Ganzel, 2007b).
Inevitably, farm consolidation resulted and more farms being merged or sold
during this period than in any other period in American history. Between 1950 and 1970,
the number of farms declined by half and the average size of farms increased from 205
acres in 1950 to almost 400 acres by 1969 (Ganzel, 2007d). As Ganzel (2007d)
explained, “The number of people on farms dropped from more than 20 million in 1950
to less than 10 million in 1970” (para. 3). This decrease translated to a dramatic reduction
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in the percentage of workers in the agricultural sector, from 12.7% to 3.7%, an
astounding shift in workforce migration from a single industry sector (Hodson &
Sullivan, 2008).
Migration patterns reflected events on the farm and U.S. citizens continued to
move from rural surroundings to the concentrated industrialized centers of metropolitan
areas. Between 1950 and 1970, total population in rural areas decreased from 63 to 66.2
million, and metropolitan areas grew from 84.5 million to 140.2 million (Hobbs &
Stoops, 2002). The migration of Blacks from agricultural areas of the South that began in
the late 1920s resumed again in earnest in the 1950s as they pursued higher wages and
more opportunities in the concentrated urban centers of the North (Goldin, 2000; Heim,
2000.
Labor force participation rates shifted dramatically for women during the period
of the 1950s and 1960s. During the 1950s, for White married women 45 to 54 years old,
labor participation rates soared from 20% to nearly 50%. In that same decade, labor
participation rates for women 25 to 34 years old only increased about a third the amount
of the older group; these younger women were predominantly staying at home producing
and raising the baby-boom generation (Goldin, 2000). During the 1960s and 1970s, labor
force participation for this younger cohort would increase, catching up to the older cohort
by 1979. Increased labor participation for women is generally attributed to higher
education rates, increased demand for women to fill white-collar and clerical positions,
and for the older cohort, decreased fertility rates (Goldin, 2000). Other factors
contributed to higher worker participation rates for women. Increased family purchasing
power and a greater availability of market substitutes for home-produced goods meant
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women did not have to spend as much time preparing meals at home. Increasingly
sophisticated and affordable labor-saving domestic technologies such as washers, dryers,
vacuum cleaners, and electric irons all contributed to women spending less time on
domestic chores and allowing them more time for work or leisure activities outside of the
home (Goldin, 2000).
Wage structure differential between races and genders remained flat in the 1950s
but started to rise slightly through the 1960s. Contrary to popular opinion at the time, this
rise indicated that demand for unskilled labor remained strong in the postwar period
Plotnick, Smolensky, Evenhouse, & Reilly, 2000). This increase in the need for unskilled
labor was due in part to foreign demand for U.S. goods (Plotnick et al., 2000). Wage
differentials would begin to increase in the 1970s; earnings differences between Blacks
and Whites began to close after 1965, characterized by episodic—not steady—increases.
While earning gaps based on racial lines began to close, there is little evidence of
narrowing of the wage gap between genders during this time (Goldin, 2000).
The U.S. population grew from 150.7 million in 1950 to 203.2 million by 1970
(Hobbs & Stoops, 2002). Immigration contributed minimally and increases were due
mainly to increased birth rates and decreased morbidity rates brought on by improved
health care and higher standards of living. As Hobbs and Stoops (2002) remarked, “The
1950s represented the second highest decade of population increase during the century in
both numerical (28.6 million) and percentage (19.0%) terms” (p. 12). By 1965, half the
population was under 25 years of age and the labor force got bigger and younger.
Between 1950 and 1970, sector employment saw large shifts away from bluecollar industries towards white-collar industries, with the largest increases being realized
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within service and public sectors (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Traditional U.S.
employment sectors of agriculture, extraction, and manufacturing all decreased in
percentage terms: 12.7% to 3.7%, 1.7% to 0.8%, and 26.3% to 25.9%, respectively. Other
sectors experienced increases in employment: trade, from 15.8% to 16.9%; finance and
real estate, from 3.5% to 5.4%; education, from 3.8% to 8.6%; professional services,
from 5.4% to 8.0%; and government, from 4.5% to 5.2% (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
Concentration of workers into ever larger workgroups continued until the 1960s so that
by 1967, approximately 45% of workers were working for firms employing more than 22
workers. Self-employment, both in farm and nonfarm settings, also continued to decrease
as more workers sought employment opportunities within established firms (Goldin,
2000).
In sum, the United States experienced extensive changes during the 1950s and
1960s. Employment shifted from traditional sectors such as agriculture to service and
public sectors, coupled with increasingly sophisticated technological innovations from
GPTs, particularly the electronics industry, having an impact on all sectors of the U.S.
economy. Demand for workers capable of designing, building, and using new and
powerful process technologies increased. Workforce demands for white-collar workers
increased and those for blue-collar workers decreased. Employment opportunities for
unskilled and semiskilled workers likewise decreased as technology and automation were
deployed and thus contributed to the unemployment rates indicating structural shifts in
the economy. Female workers increasingly shifted from domestic to clerical work
opportunities and workers tended to migrate to the concentrated industrial urban areas for
higher paying jobs. As a consequence of these changes, political leaders, business
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interests, and educational institutional heads increasingly responded to the commonly
held belief that structural changes in the economy required leadership in the form of
federal and state intervention to remedy underemployment, unemployment, and to
increase worker productivity. By the 1960s, these calls resulted in a flourish of federal
legislative actions that would forever change the national structure of workforce
development.
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
The recessions in 1953 and 1958 highlighted what many leaders thought were
structural weaknesses in the U.S. economy. Despite several indicators that showed
economic growth and thus recovery from the recessions, unemployment remained high
and persistent enough to cause concerns, particularly in regions of the country that were
experiencing above-average unemployment. The general belief during this time was that
structural unemployment was caused by the increased use of technology and automation
in nearly all sectors of the economy. Similar to the situation in the 1920s and 1930s,
many leaders believed that technology was increasing the gap of employment opportunity
between those workers with relevant skills and those without.
During the 1950s, debates ensued as to the level of federal intervention in
remedying structural shifts in the economy that led to unemployment. New Deal
influences were still quite strong, but for some, particularly those in the Eisenhower
administration, including President Eisenhower himself, the traditionally held views that
education and training was best left to the states to manage remained predominant.
Increasingly, however, policy solutions to this structural unemployment were thought to
be best solved through workforce strategies instead of policies targeting aggregate
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demand forces. Political attention centering on the building of national workforce
development programs gained momentum during the Eisenhower administration but not
until the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were in place did concrete action take
place in addressing the needs of workers through comprehensive federal and state policy
making and the resulting necessary funding streams. When the arguments for
comprehensive federal involvement in workforce training solidified into bipartisan
support in Congress, coupled with strong leadership from the White House, legislative
action came in a flourish (Kerman, 1974).
President Kennedy was inaugurated in 1961 and his domestic agenda included
plans for increased funding for education and worker training. In 1961, President
Kennedy signed into law the Area Development Act. Under this act, Congress was
allowed to set aside funds to invest in depressed areas of the country for job creation and
retraining of the unemployed, who had been displaced by automation in industry. Despite
the belief of members of Congress that the government had some responsibility to
address the structural changes within the economy, coupled with new visionary
leadership in the executive branch, the act remained focused on providing financial
assistance to distressed communities, instead of to individual workers. The program
followed typical economic development strategies that included incentives to attract
industries, improve institutional facilities, and provide much-needed infrastructure in
these struggling communities. Because the act was limited in scope, it failed to reach vast
numbers of the unemployed, who totaled nearly 5 million (6.3% unemployment rate) by
February 1961 (Kremen, 1974).
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By 1962, Congress presented the new president with the Manpower Development
and Training Act (MDTA), which finally signaled success in redefining federal
involvement in direct federal assistance to experienced workers and their needs to
upgrade skills and migrate to find new and better jobs. This act introduced programs that
provided funding for the retraining of dislocated workers and the unemployed as a result
of structural changes brought about by automation. In his speech detailing the new act,
President Kennedy acknowledged the new role that federal policies can have with regard
to manpower training and the impact they should have on the U.S. economy:
The Manpower Development and Training bill, which passed the Congress on
Tuesday, is perhaps the most significant legislation in the area of employment
since the historic Employment Act of 1946. . . . The new training program will
give real meaning to the Act by making possible the training of the hundreds of
thousands of workers who are denied employment because they do not possess
the skills required by our constantly changing economy. Their training is
important both to them as individuals and to the economic health of the entire
Nation.
Thorough guidance and assistance from the United States Employment Service in
helping them to choose the kind of work for which they are best suited and a
concerted effort to help assure that a suitable job rewards their initiative.
This far-reaching bill not only addresses itself to the problems of the present, but
requires us to anticipate future needs as employment conditions change.
(Kennedy, 1962, paras. 2-6)
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This act empowered the DOL, for the first time, to take direct action in
developing a national workforce development system (Kremen, 1974). This action
included the imperative to study the nation’s manpower supply and report to Congress
annually through a manpower report. The act solidified DOL control of on-the-jobtraining (OJT) but kept vocational training responsibilities within the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (Kremen, 1974).
Underpinning the basic tenets of the MDTA was the Employment Act of 1946
and the goal of 100% employment. As Kremen (1974) explained, the bill authorized the
secretary of labor:
…to plan, encourage, and coordinate OJT and other related training programs.
The DOL’s jurisdiction also included the selection of participants in the training
programs and the determination of those skills and occupations in which to train
them..The bill granted federal training allowance to trainees for up to 52 weeks.
(Kremen, 1974, para. 76)
Participation was open to anyone who met the specific criteria of the allowance. The act
further directed the secretary to provide training through any appropriate and expeditious
agency—public or private. Finally, the act outlined the role of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in the provision of vocational education (Kremen, 1974).
In 1963, following President Kennedy’s assassination, Lyndon Johnson was
sworn into office and, not long afterwards, signed into law the Higher Education
Facilities Act with a great flourish. Education was an important priority to President
Johnson and, in light of the national and international challenges, he recognized
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education as an imperative to not only a strong economy, but a strong democracy. Upon
signing this new legislation, President Johnson shared with the nation that:
…a great former President of the Republic of my State said, “The educated mind
is the guardian genius of democracy. It is the only dictator that free men recognize
and the only ruler that free men desire.” So this new law is the most significant
education bill passed by the Congress in the history of the Republic. In fact, this
session of the Congress will go down in history as the Education Congress of
1963. (L. B. Johnson, 1963, para. 2)
This act provided aid for the construction of academic facilities. Twenty-two
percent of the funding under Title I, which provided grants for undergraduate facilities,
was earmarked for community colleges and public technical institutes. In fact, the law
specifically called for 25-30 new community colleges to be constructed every year.
President Johnson went on to say:
This legislation is dramatic, and it is concrete evidence of a renewed and
continuing national commitment to education as the key to our Nation's social and
technological and economic and moral progress. It will help meet the demands of
our economy for more skilled personnel; it will enable many more of our young
people to cope with the explosion of new knowledge and to contribute effectively
in a world of intellectual, political, and economic complexity. (L. B. Johnson,
1963, para. 16)
President Johnson later signed into law the Vocational Education Act in 1963 that
further reflected a reprioritization and expansion of federal financial assistance to
vocational education (Wolfe, 1978). As Wolfe (1978) explained:
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The Act redirected vocational education programs from that of training specific
categories such as agriculture, home economics, practical nursing, and fisheries to
that of preparing all groups in the community regardless of their vocational
emphasis or attachment to the labor force. The Act was also designed to assist
those persons who had difficulty in succeeding in regular vocational education
programs because of socioeconomic or academic reasons. (Wolfe, 1978, p. 4)
This legislation provided $630 million (in 1963 dollars) to be distributed through
four vocational education programs to be deployed at the state and local levels (Wolfe,
1978). States were authorized to use the funds for numerous activities at the secondary,
postsecondary, and adult educational levels to include vocational education and training,
cooperative vocational education, construction of area vocational schools, stipends for
applicants with acute economic needs, industrial arts, work study, and support services
for women who desired to enter occupations predominated by men (Wolfe, 1978).
In 1964, President Johnson campaigned on his domestic agenda (building on
President Roosevelt’s New Deal programs), entitled the Great Society (Wolfe, 1978), and
won the 1964 presidential election. This agenda proposed, among other things, an intense
focus on federal involvement and support of secondary and postsecondary education.
Federalism in education, training, and worker training continued to expand under
Johnson’s leadership (Wolfe, 1978).
To address concerns of rising costs of college when higher educational
opportunities for young adults were clearly needed to meet the rapidly changing structure
of the U.S. economy and demands for higher skilled workers, President Johnson, in 1965,
signed the Higher Education Act. Building on earlier pieces of legislation such as the
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Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 and Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,
this Act was designed to assist students, particularly those from lower socioeconomic
strata, by providing scholarships, loans with reduced interest rates, and work-study
programs (Landsberg, 2006). Other priorities within the act included funding for
extension and continuing education programs, library collections, expanding the number
of librarians, strengthening developing institutions to meet minimum standards of
accreditation, increasing postsecondary teacher quality, and resources and materials to
improve undergraduate quality of instruction (Landsberg, 2006).
During the mid-1960s, adult literacy and basic education (“adult basic education”
[ABE]; Imel, p. 1) initiatives gained popularity. ABE programming gained distinction in
1966 with the passage of the Adult Education Act, the purpose of which was helping
disadvantaged adults increase their education levels and literacy skills (Imel, 2005).
Federal funds were distributed to states, which then used these funds for ABE delivery in
a variety of training institutions and settings, from education agencies and communitybased organizations to community colleges and correctional institutions (Imel, 2005). The
Economic Opportunity Act provided special work and training programs for
disadvantaged and unemployed, particularly long-term unemployed, older workers,
youth, minorities, and other low-income persons. A variety of specialized programs
funded under the act were implemented through government and nongovernment
organizations (NGOs).
One of the last workforce development programs during this decade was
introduced in 1968: the Work Incentive Training (WIN). WIN was established to help
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients gain full-time employment
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(Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Many of these recipients often demonstrated deficits in
employability factors. Training programs were developed to facilitate movement of ablebodied recipients off welfare rolls and onto payrolls by providing training, work
experience, and resources to find permanent jobs. As Cohen and Brawer (2008)
remarked, “On this surge of funding, occupational education swept into the colleges in a
fashion dreamed of and pleaded for but never previously realized by its advocates” (p.
245).
Junior/Community Colleges
The new economic realities of the 1950s and 1960s reflected the increased use of
technology and innovation, and were echoed in the number of postsecondary institutions
and enrollments on the rise. The total number of postsecondary institutions rose from
1,852 in 1950 to 2,525 in 1970 (Synder, 1993). Interestingly, the single largest percentage
increase in two-year colleges occurred between 1960 and 1970. Two-year colleges
(public and private) also rose in number from 540 in 1950 to 582 in 1960, a 7% increase,
and increased again to 886 in 1970, a 52% increase in just 10 years (Snyder, 1993). As
the number of institutions available for students to attend increased, so did enrollments.
Enrollments in four-year programs increased 203% between 1950 and 1970, but the
number of bachelor’s degrees awarded between 1950 and 1963 decreased by 9% overall,
with degrees awarded to men decreasing 34% and degrees awarded to women increasing
by 34% (Snyder, 1993).
Enrollments in two-year programs grew substantially through the 1950s and
1960s, with the largest growth towards the beginning of the 1960s as the leading edge of
the baby boomer generation reached college age. Between 1950 and 1963, there was a
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292% increase in enrollment in two-year programs, followed by a 173% increase
between 1963 and 1970 (Snyder, 1993). Acceptance of two-year colleges as a viable
option for continued education, both for academic transfer and technical training was
increasing, too. The volume of students enrolling in two-year colleges and then
transferring to four-year colleges increased from 17% in 1946 to 40% in 1970 (Brint &
Karabel, 1989). Correspondingly, between 1960 and 1968 the proportion of students
enrolled in occupational programs increased nationally from less than one-quarter to
nearly one-third (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
Despite increases in the number of students attending community colleges, these
institutions were not experiencing the expected or desired increases in occupational
training. Leaders of these colleges expected that fully a third to half of community
college enrollments should be in occupational education and vocational training, a
rationalization based on estimates that the new economy would need considerably more
semiprofessional and technical trained operators to meet the demands of industry and
research (Brint & Karabel, 1989). In 1947, the Truman Commission had estimated that
for every one job requiring four years of education, there would probably be at least five
jobs requiring two years of education (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
The use of the community college programming by students had begun to change
from earlier years of selecting academic transfer or terminal programs; vocational
training was attracting increased attention. Careful analysis of enrollments during the
1950s and 1960s indicates that increasing numbers of students were blending vocational
and collegiate educational courses (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Many of these students
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would then opt for transfer to four-year colleges rather than terminate at the end of two
years (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
The increased federal support from numerous legislative acts during the 1960s
helped postsecondary institutions meet the burgeoning enrollments but many of the bills
introduced did not directly benefit community colleges. Project administrators tended to
award funding to noncollegiate postsecondary institutions instead (Brint & Karabel,
1989). Even without directed financial support, funding for community colleges did start
to increase; for instance, federal funding specifically for community colleges increased
from $7.4 million in 1964 to $31.4 million in 1966 (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
During the 1950s and 1960s, the junior college system in Mississippi continued to
mature. By 1961, most of the agricultural high schools that initially launched the twoyear college system had closed, but all the colleges remained open (Young & Ewing,
1978). There were a total of 16 junior colleges actively enrolling students; this number
included the two new colleges for Black students, Coahoma Junior College and Utica
Junior College. All Mississippi junior colleges except the two newest ones were
regionally accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools by 1962, and
all “had firmly established themselves as leaders in higher education on the state and
regional levels and were participating in all areas of development of the junior college
movement on a national basis” (Young & Ewing, 1978, p. 35). In fact, J. M. Ewing,
president of Copiah-Lincoln Junior College, served as the national president of the
American Association of Junior Colleges (Young & Ewing, 1978).
Junior colleges in Mississippi were providing an answer to both the system of
higher education and the students attending and the Mississippi junior college system
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offered much-needed additional capacity to handle the increased enrollment rates.
Between the 1951-1952 sessions and the 1971-1972 session, enrollments had increased
from 7,047 to 60,869 students. By 1968, 34.7% of total undergraduate enrollments were
associated with junior colleges (Brint & Karabel, 1989) and by 1972, seven out of every
10 high school graduates who attended college programs started their postsecondary
education at a junior college (Young & Ewing, 1978).
Accessibility was a key asset of the junior college system and the associated
increases in enrollment (Young & Ewing, 1978). Aside from strategically located main
campuses within districts throughout the 82 counties, many colleges were also opening
branch attendance centers in smaller communities within their district. Another strategy
that enhanced the attraction of junior colleges was the development of bus transportation
systems. In 1953, the first but route was established in Wayne County and, by 1971, 15
junior colleges operated at least one bus route. Bus routes helped unify district citizenship
support of the junior colleges and encouraged many from rural communities to enroll and
attend college (Young & Ewing, 1978). Finally, enrollment costs in postsecondary
education were rising and junior college provided many with a far more affordable option
than attending a four-year college straight out of high school.
Programmatically, the junior college system had firmly established itself as a fully
comprehensive educational system (Young & Ewing, 1978). The junior colleges were
providing IHL-recognized and accepted academic curriculums articulating to four-year
degrees. Vocational, technical, and short-term industrial training offered by the junior
colleges helped meet the needs of a wide variety of students. Junior college leaders
during this period also began to appreciate their critical role in community and economic
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development. Colleges expanded their training options to accommodate not just
traditional students, but also nontraditional, older workers, and offered their facilities, day
or night, for start-up and preemployment training for new and expanding industries
(Young & Ewing, 1978).
Three pieces of legislation were passed in Mississippi during the 1960s that made
a positive impact on the junior college system. The first was House Bill 215 in 1964 that
established junior college districts as individual and separate jurisdictional entities and
bodies politic and corporate (Young & Ewing, 1978). House Bill 215 established 13
multicounty district junior colleges and approved three additional junior colleges within
these districts. The second bill in 1966 was referred to as the 307 law; it allowed counties
to withhold up to $2 million of state ad valorem tax. This law, along with another similar
act in 1968 authorizing boards of trustees of public junior colleges to borrow money for
15 years, gave college leadership confidence in the availability of future funding to begin
long-range building programs (Young & Ewing, 1978).
The third important act was the Junior College Vocational and Technical Training
Act of 1964 (Young & Ewing, 1978). This act recognized the need for the training of a
skilled and semiskilled labor force to advance economic development activities. Funding
from these acts, plus state and federal funding, allowed the construction and equipping of
25 area vocational-technical training centers throughout Mississippi. By 1972, the state
had appropriated more than $4 million and the colleges spent more than $32 million
(1972 dollars) on construction of buildings and equipment procurement for the purpose of
vocational curriculum delivery (Young & Ewing, 1978).
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1971-1980: Inflation, Regulation, and Stagflation—Economic Instability
Introduction
The decade of the 1970s heralded the beginning of the end of the U.S. economic
domination worldwide. Although the U.S. economy would remain nearly twice as large
as that of its nearest competitor for the next 20 years, several nations and business
industries would forge assaults on the U.S. position as the global leader. The rise of new
global competitors in manufacturing, particularly Japanese and German automobile and
steel industries, led to higher unemployment and wage rate stagnation domestically.
Thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs were displaced, with many workers moving
permanently to service-oriented jobs. Complicating the reality of this new global
economic were overall flat GNP, high inflation, recessions, and skyrocketing energy
costs. Federal response to these economic and social challenges were new programs,
agencies, and regulations, exacerbating an already challenging competitive environment
for companies and industries.
Other aspects of the U.S economy were brighter. New sectors and industries
began to grow, offering new opportunities for work and wages elsewhere. The shift of
computer technologies from mainframes to mini and personal computers spawned a
revolution in computer-driven technologies that bolstered some areas of the sagging
manufacturing sectors. Related technologies and industries to support computer
manufacturing introduced many new industries and sectors, helping the U.S. economy to
expand and grow in areas never before seen.
The 1970s also signaled the coming of age for community colleges. International
competition and technology altered the fundamental composition of the U.S. economy,
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business and industry strategies, and even the nature of employment. Citizens of the
United States soon recognized that postsecondary education and higher order skills were
needed to be competitive, find jobs, and achieve prosperity. Postsecondary institutions
helped the U.S. economy move forward, and the community college system expanded
access and affordability to those seeking more skills, employment, and increased wages.
Economy, Technology, and Demographics
Inflation in the 1970s concerned policy makers. The average rate of inflation from
1971 to 1980 was approximately 8.21% (Williamson & Johnston, 2010). The U.S.
economy endured a major shock—rising oil prices. There were three main causes. First,
OPEC members moved the pricing of oil to gold, increasing the cost of oil. Second, the
1973 Yom Kippur War, when Syria and Egypt attacked Israel, triggered another spike in
oil prices. The third force was OPEC’s oil embargo in response to the U.S. backing of
Israel during the Yom Kippur War. This embargo increased prices and cut supplies of oil.
For U.S. citizens, the net effect was increased gas prices, long waits in lines at the pumps,
and continued inflation throughout the economy.
Wall Street reflected these challenging economic conditions (Williamson &
Johnston, 2010). The DJIA annualized growth rate grew only 1.4% from January 1, 1971,
to December 31, 1980. The S&P500 fared little better, achieving only a 3.95% growth
rate for this same period. Advanced technological firms performed better than traditional
industries and sectors, and investor interests in these new and growing industries was
demonstrated as equity investments left traditional sectors in favor of new technology
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stocks . The NASDAQ outperformed both the DJIA and S&P500 by growing 7.38%
from February 5, 1971,9 to December 31, 1980 (Williamson & Johnston, 2010).
By 1975, inflation began to subside and the economy began to recover;
unemployment peaked at 8.5%, the highest rate of unemployment since the Great
Depression. Stagflation continued to drag on the U.S. economy despite the recovery, and
by the late 1970s, inflation began a rapid increase. In 1980, Paul Volcker, the new
chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, abruptly decreased the money supply, triggering a
steep interest rate increase. This move effectively slowed consumer spending and
business production, cooling the economy, and successfully broke American expectations
of continued inflation. As the economy slowed, unemployment began to rise rapidly
again, leading to even higher unemployment rates during the early 1980s (BLS, 2011).
Succeeding the social regulations begun during President Roosevelt’s New Deal
and continued by Kennedy’s New Frontier and Johnson’s Great Society, government
regulation of business continued in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Vietor, 2000). Health
and safety and environmental protection movements gained political power to address the
social costs of industrialization. By early 1970, more than 23 new legislative acts were
promulgated, placing a crimp in the operations of business and industry. These new acts
required management and oversight and, in 1970, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were
established. In 1972, the Consumer Product Safety Commission began its work (Vietor,
2000). By the mid-1970s, amid seemingly endless domestic challenges, international
threats, and leadership malfeasance, Americans’ faith in the government establishment
9

First date for data for the NASDAQ composite recorded.
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faded. More bluntly, “the intellectual and political legitimacy of government economic
intervention, established during the Great Depression and embodied in New Deal policies
had been thoroughly eroded” (Vietor, 2000, p. 996).
By the late 1970s, as inflation and unemployment continued its drag on the U.S
economy, Americans’ outlook on the future was grim (Vietor, 2000). U.S. industries and
corporations were experiencing lower profits due to losses of markets from foreign
imports. Inflation raged and unemployment was a constant threat to many. The social
upheavals of the 1960s had given way to increased activism in environmental and safety
protectionism, which only exacerbated an already dire situation for U.S. companies.
Threats to U.S. leadership and dominance were seemingly everywhere. A general malaise
plagued the country and President Carter, sensing the country’s need for vision and
leadership, called upon Americans to respond accordingly (Vietor, 2000).
Government and political leaders failed to innovate and successfully lead the U.S.
economy out of its doldrums, but corporate leaders did not have the luxury of waiting for
macroeconomic improvements to occur. Early in the 1970s, business leaders were forced
to innovate to keep firms competitive and began experimenting with what would become
the third major corporate transformation: conglomeration (Galambos, 2000).
Conglomeration involved the diversification of a business into fields (products, services,
and markets) that were not related to their business’s core competencies by either
technology or markets. Conglomeration theoretically promised steady growth and
increased profits because the corporation would be less vulnerable to single-industry
business cycles (Galambos, 2000).
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Pressures on U.S. competitive edge and the need to adapt through
conglomerations was such that, by the early 1970s:
…large foreign companies in consumer electronics, steel, machine tools, metals,
tires, and automobiles made deep inroads into markets long controlled by U.S.
corporations. Japanese and German firms led the way, armed with superior
products offered at prices U.S. corporations could not match. When the first wave
of global competition hit the American economy, neither the country’s business
leaders nor its politicians could offer satisfactory solutions to the problems
business faced. (Galambos, 2000, p. 958)
The new era of global competition was under way and many U.S. business sectors were
not prepared for the onslaught (Lindert, 2000). Two industries in particular, automobile
and steel manufactures, paid the price for poor management and restrictive labor
practices of the previous two decades. The auto industry quickly conceded
competitiveness and substantial market share to foreign firms, suffering from its failure to
innovate either in design or processing during the 1950s and 1960s (Lindert, 2000). There
were many reasons postulated for the loss of American competitive advantage and
leadership in the auto industry. According to Lindert (2000), a lack of focus on quality
and productivity that allowed foreign firms, particularly Japanese companies, to overtake
U.S. automakers.
By the 1970s, the U.S. steel industry was in big trouble. Japanese steel firms had
secured long-term coal contracts with Australia and Brazil, allowing them to purchase
iron ore at costs 43% cheaper than what U.S. firms could pay for it. Japanese companies
also negotiated long-term contracts with Australia for coal. The combined cost savings on
122

iron ore and coal contributed to a 15% difference in average steelmaking costs in favor of
the Japanese (Lindert, 2000). Wage rates disparities between the United States and Japan
also supported Japanese advantages. Productivity differences of 13-17% in favor of the
Japanese firms further exacerbated the situation.
Failure of the U.S. steel firms, both at the management and labor levels, to
willingly adopt improved productivity enhancements such as oxygen furnaces,
continuous casting mills, or the use of specialized minimill production facilities all
contributed to the industry’s downfall (Lindert, 2000). U.S. steel makers claimed strict
pollution controls, government subsidies, and price controls undermined U.S. steel
manufacturing competitiveness, but these reasons explain less than 8% percent of the cost
gap. The bottom line was that, by 1976, Japanese steel firms were able to produce steel
44% cheaper than U.S. firms (Lindert, 2000).
Consequently, during the late 1970s and well into the 1980s, U.S. steel
manufacturers lost domestic and international markets (Lindert, 2000). Claims that the
Japanese were dumping low-priced steel in the United States led to government
intervention. Several tariff measures were put in place to protect the industry, but to little
avail. As a strategic move to circumvent tariffs, foreign steel firms built minimills
throughout the United States (Lindert, 2000). Eventually, failing U.S. steel companies
closed or consolidated with other more profitable firms. These structural changes in the
U.S. economy led thousands of steel employees to be laid off, further contributing to the
already high unemployment rates caused by an overall weak economy.
Where the automobile and steel manufacturers failed to innovate, the electronics
industries continued to capitalize on technological advancements, making strides in new
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products that would contribute to fundamentally changing the way organizations and
workers delivered products and services (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). Throughout the
1970s, computers and computer systems got faster, cheaper, and smaller. Technologies
became ubiquitous, increasing computing efficiencies and demand for new
infrastructures. Shipments of minicomputers, for example, which were smaller, cheaper,
and in some cases, more powerful than several of the larger mainframe systems, gained
supremacy on mainframe computers, eventually eclipsing their sales in 1983 (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000).
Despite the popularity of minicomputers, computer systems during this era
remained centralized, complicated, and not user-friendly (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Workers who used or worked on these machines were highly trained and had special
technical skills and knowledge. Access to the benefits of using computers was limited
within organizations and the computer work was so specialized that management
information systems departments, given responsibility for computers and programming,
were often isolated from most other organizational departments. This separation
contributed to the notion promoted by management that, while computers systems were
important, they were not vital to the day-to-day operations of the business (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000).
The evolution of computing systems and the subsequent revolution in bringing
computing power out of isolation and into ubiquity during the 1980s began in 1973
(Computer History Museum, n.d.). In this environment the Xerox Corporation, through
its recently created world-class research facility, Palo Alto Research Center (PARC),
created the world’s first recognizable personal computer—the Alto. The Alto was the
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first workstation to boast another new in invention, the mouse, and had the ability to store
files simultaneously in windows, used menus and icons for navigation, and could link
into a network. Xerox failed to commercialize the Alto, but did give several devices to
universities (Computer History Museum, n.d.).
PARC capitalized on the computer’s ability to network and devised a method to
link the Alto computers together to form a local area network (LAN). The LAN used
coaxial cable, allowing numerous computers, printers, and other peripherals to be
networked or linked together (Computer History Museum, n.d.). This network would be
called the Ethernet. Xerox also failed to commercialize the Ethernet and not surprisingly,
Ethernet inventor Robert Metcalfe, in an entrepreneurial fashion typical of the electronics
industry, left Xerox and created his own company—3Com Corporation. 3Com was one
of the first successful companies in computer networking and thus capitalized on its early
dominance to revolutionize the computer networking industry in the 1980s (Napier et al.,
2003).
While Xerox experimented with networking computers locally, other computer
scientists were developing new ways to link computers globally. For example, MILNET
was established as a private military network in addition to DARPANET (Napier et a.,
2003). As networks proliferated, it became clear that standardization of protocols was
essential to their continued expansion. To satisfy that requirement, the transmission
control protocol was created by Vinton Cerf at Stanford Research Institute and Robert
Kahn at DARPA. Eventually, the National Science Foundation absorbed the costs of
supporting many of these networks through the creation of higher speed interconnections
that eventually became the foundation of the modern Internet network (Napier et al.,
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2003). The U.S. technological R&D system that evolved out of World War II combined
the efforts of government, university, and privately funded research in large and small
corporations. These collaborations contributed to the proliferation of technology
development and acceptance through shared costs, knowledge, information, and
expertise. Internationally, there was no equal to this highly integrated and efficient
system (Napier et al., 2003).
One of the most important achievements of the computer industry in general and
within the semiconductor industry in particular was the introduction in 1971 of the Intel
4004 microprocessor (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). The microprocessor expanded
computing and processing power to the masses. This technology opened huge new
product and market opportunities for a plethora of new products and industries. This
innovation changed the shape of the entire computer industry for the next 25 years. The
microprocessor eliminated the need for the design of customized chip sets for each
individual application designed by a computer manufacturer. Instead, the microprocessor
made it possible to produce a powerful, general-purpose solution for diverse utilization.
This technology also economized the scarce resource of engineering design talent.
The microprocessor “broke a bottleneck that [had] limited technological progress
and slowed the diffusion of computer technologies” (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000, p.
896). This technology opened large markets for new computers and producers of
standardized or packaged computer software for desktop computers and workstations.
This new technology paved the way for the sale of standardized computer software in the
general marketplace instead of just for internal, centralized use, making the personal
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computing workstation and personal computing ubiquitous (Mowery & Rosenberg,
2000).
Subsequent to the introduction of the microprocessor, the Altair 8800 computer
kit, manufactured by MITS, was released commercially. The Altair 8800, based on the
Intel 8080 microprocessor, was marketed as a personal computer through Popular
Electronics magazine (Computer History Museum, n.d.). Orders for the new device
exploded as hobbyists flocked to the new technology. Two hobbyists in particular, Steve
Wozniak and Steve Jobs, began experimenting with the Altair and eventually designed
their own personal computer. In 1976, Wozniak and Jobs released the Apple I personal
computer and, by 1977, they introduced the popular Apple II. The Apple II boasted a
printed motherboard, switching power supply, keyboard, case assembly, manual, game
paddles, A/C power cord, and cassette tape with the computer game Breakout. The Apple
II could be hooked up to a color television set, producing brilliant color graphics
(Computer History Museum, n.d.). The stage was set for the personal computer
revolution of the 1980s.
The introduction of the microprocessor, in addition to changing the market for
computer systems, revolutionized the software industry (Iyer, 2010). Independent
software development companies popped up, grew, and prospered as customer demands
for custom and standard software increased. The word processor, created by Micropro
International and the introduction of computerized spreadsheets by Dan Bricklin and Bob
Frankston (designed and released for public use on Apple II systems) revolutionized
standard off-the-shelf software (Iyer, 2010). These software packages decreased reliance
of business leaders, managers, and clerks on MIS departments and increased the ability of
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end users to take advantage of computing power to increase individual productivity and
efficiency. These new innovations contributed to proliferation of new, diverse, and in
some cases, higher order worker skills and knowledge.
Major inventions of this decade would revolutionize industries and economies in
the coming years (Computer History Museum, n.d.; Iyer, 2010). Among them were
computer-related items included the dynamic random access memory, created by Intel;
the floppy disk, created by David Noble at IBM; video games, created by Nolan
Bushnell; the laser printer, created by Gary Starkweather at Xerox; and the ink-jet printer,
created by Siemens. Personal entertainment devices developed during this decade
included pocket calculators, created by Sharp Corporation; digital cameras, created by
Steve Sasson at Kodak; cell phones, created by Bell Laboratories; the personal stereo,
created by Andreas Pavel, that led to the Sony Walkman; and the VCS game console,
created by Atari. Among the devices that revolutionalized the scientific world was the
world’s first supercomputer, the eponymous Cray I (Computer History Museum, n.d.;
Iyer, 2010).
The technological innovations evolving out of the electronics industry during the
1950s and 1960s perpetuated and further propelled and accelerated the long shift of jobs
and skills away from blue-collar industries to white-collar sectors in the 1970s. By 1980,
52% of employees worked in white-collar jobs, compared to just 31% in 1940 (Office of
Technology Assessment, 1985). Likewise the shift from agriculture and manufacturing to
service industries continued, reaching approximately 63% of the workforce in service in
1980, up from 57% in 1960 (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
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With the availability of computing systems and white-collar jobs, previous trends
of migration from rural to urban reversed during the 1970s; net migration increased 7.4%
to nonmetropolitan areas (Johnson, 2003). Of particular note was the growth of
populations in polycentric urban centers, suburban areas, and a totally new pattern of
high growth in rural counties not adjacent to metropolitan areas. Improvements in
transportation networks and growth in incomes, coupled with changing household
location decisions, seemed to contribute to this trend (2003). Rural areas seemed to
provide better locations for childrearing, amenities, recreational opportunities, and safety
(2003). Technological improvements in television entertainment and the introduction of
the VCR also contributed to the move away from cities as earlier perceived advantages of
urban areas for entertainment dissipated with the advent of these new, home-based
services and products (Easterlin, 2000).
The U.S. population increased from 203.2 million in 1970 to 226.5 million in
1980. Immigration contributed somewhat but would contribute even more in the 1980s
and beyond. Birth rates were beginning to decline, but decreased morbidity rates through
increased health care contributed greatly to the increase in population.
The U.S. economy in the 1970s experienced meaningful and permanent structural
changes, fundamentally altering the economic structure. Business strategies and worker
skill requirements were more clearly defined. Business and political leadership were
challenged to address the colossal changes affecting all aspects of the business and
worker environment, and some might argue leadership at all levels was wanting. Many of
the forces having positive and negative impacts on the U.S. both had not fully manifested
themselves in ways that allowed leaders to recognize what lay ahead and what actions
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should be taken next. Despite the uncertainty of what would happen next, the need for
continued federal intervention in human capital development to help the U.S. remain
competitive was clear. Political leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches,
helped federal investments in education and training remain a priority.
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
Within the backdrop of a distressed economy during the early 1970s, Presidents
Nixon and Carter faced many staggering challenges. President Nixon was able to enact
two pieces of legislation designed to further the human capital development of U.S.
citizens. The first law was the 1972 Amendment to Higher Education Act of 1965. This
legislation expanded student assistance programs to include students at proprietary
institutions. The 1972 amendment also introduced Pell grants to provide direct assistance
to students who met certain qualifying criteria. Pell grants were designed to help
economically challenged students receive financial aid in place of, or in addition to,
student loans. The second piece of legislation, the Comprehensive Employment and
Training Act (CETA) of 1973 focused on human capital development.
The Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 represents a
significant shift in intergovernmental responsibilities. The first legislation to
incorporate the essential principles of special revenue sharing, this bill represents
an important companion piece to the general revenue sharing legislation I signed
last year. It also marks the culmination of almost 5 years of manpower reform
efforts which began with my proposal for a new Manpower Training Act of 1969.
(Nixon, 1973, para. 3)
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“CETA [was] to provide training, employment, and other services to
economically disadvantaged, unemployed, underemployed persons, leading to selfsufficient, unsubsidized employment” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1975, p. 1). The act
was different from its predecessor, the MDTA, in that the MDTA targeted experienced
workers affected by structural unemployment and CETA was focused on the
economically disadvantaged and long-term unemployed. Much of what was implemented
and learned during the previous era through the MDTA, EOA, and WIN was rolled
together into CETA, decentralizing, decategorizing, and consolidating many of the
existing manpower programs (U.S. Department of Labor, 1975). CETA programming
was varied. CETA offered classroom training, OJT, work experience, transitional public
service employment, and manpower supportive services including counseling, coaching,
child care, and transportation.
President Nixon like his predecessors recognized the importance of human capital
development whatever the form, whether supporting higher education or occupational
training:
The federal manpower program is a vital part of our national effort to conserve
and develop our human resources and to help individuals adjust productively to
changing economic conditions—including whatever temporary dislocations may
ensue from the current energy shortage. (Nixon, 1973, para. 4)
The continued focus of business and political leaders on the need for federal intervention
to support workforce development, postsecondary education, and human capital
development stemmed from the enormous economic challenges brought about by
fundamental structural changes in the economy due to growing international competition
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and the revolutionary technological advancements of the day (Hudson & Sullivan, 2008).
Some experts, researchers, and leaders began to signal that the United States was
becoming a “post-industrial” (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008, p. 186) society, implying that
the U.S. economy was no longer based simply on industrial outputs, but rather, on the
rapidly expanding service economy fueled by knowledge and information. More
accurately however, the U.S. economy during the 1970s was transitioning to an
“advanced industrial society” where “a small but highly productive extractive sector, a
larger and also highly productive manufacturing sector, [is coupled with] a growing
labor-intensive service sector” (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008, p. 240). The rise of the service
sector in the U.S. economy is clear, present, and enduring. In 1950, approximately 52%
of the U.S. labor force was employed in the service sector. By 1980, that number had
risen to about 67% and, by 2000, just under 80% (Hudson & Sullivan, 2008).
Service jobs are defined as acts provided in return for payment, as opposed to the
production of goods from agriculture or manufacturing (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
Services traditionally have three characteristics: They are bound by time and place, and
the patterns of consumption by consumers often define when and where a service is
rendered; they typically have low productivity in comparison to manufacturing; and there
may have an insatiable demand, that is, customers can generally consume more services
or more expensive services than they can producible goods (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
The rise of service industries often comes from the introduction of newly manufactured
products, shifts of unpaid production to paid production of services, and increases of
disposable incomes of consumers (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
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There are six general types of service industries: professional, business, producer,
distributive, social, and personal (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Each type of service
includes various levels and numbers of professional, semiprofessional, management,
administrative, and clerical roles. Each role shares many common worker skills and
personal attributes and each requires specific skills ranging from the highly specialized,
such as doctors, to the unskilled, such as laborers (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
Working conditions and compensation throughout service industries vary greatly
(Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). High-paying industries include transportation,
communication, public utilities, wholesale trade, finance, insurance, real estate,
professional and related services, and public administration. Low-paying industries
include retail trade, repair services, personal services, entertainment, and recreational
services. A variety of factors affect compensation variations in service industries but
those that result in higher productivity for customers tend to demand higher pay (Hodson
& Sullivan, 2008).
The evolution of high technology has an impact on service industries in various
ways. Technology can drive demand for new services and, in the case of new technology
being introduced, service industries can demand high prices for the higher skills and
knowledge required for information transfer, providing workers with higher wages and
benefits. On the other hand, new technologies can automate transactions, commoditizing
a service, thus reducing worker skill requirements, and depressing wages (Hodson &
Sullivan, 2008). The 1970s signaled a transition point between the old and new
economies from an industrial society towards an emerging advanced industrial society.
International competitive forces, coupled with burgeoning electronics technologies of
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computers, networking and programming, created new demands on federal, state, and
local institutions and resources to assist business and workers with accommodating the
new economic realities. One of the main institutions that assisted with this transition was
America’s community college system.
Junior/Community Colleges
The 1970s represented a coming of age for community colleges. As international
competition and technology fundamentally altered the composition of the U.S economy,
business and industry strategies, and even the nature of work, many U.S. citizens
recognized that postsecondary education and the acquisition of higher order skills were a
requirement to be competitive, find jobs, and capture the American dream of higher
prosperity. As a result, citizens and workers of all types, young and old, rich and poor,
Black and White, turned to postsecondary institutions for assistance. The U.S.
community college system found itself, finally, in the forefront to help meet these
increased demands (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
As enrollments in colleges across the nation continued to rise, the number of
postsecondary institutions increased, and the types of programming offered by these
institutions adjusted to the increased demands for the training of new knowledge and
skills reflective of the advancing technological economy. The biggest story of the decade
was the increase in federal funding to support changes in the patterns of student use of
college programming. These pattern changes finally began to reflect the vision long held
by leaders of America’s college systems. Integration of the community college as a vital
component of the U.S. educational system, as a shock absorber, conduit, and buffer
between secondary schools and institutions of higher learning, was finally being fulfilled.
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By 1980, more than 41% of all undergraduates were enrolled in a community college, up
from 24% in 1970. By 1978, the volume of all college freshmen enrolled in two-year
colleges exceeded 50%, up from 40% in 1968 (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
Funding of community colleges expanded but the composition of contributions to
the funds shifted (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). State funding continued to be strong,
increasing from 34% in 1965 to 60% by 1980. Federal funding likewise increased from
4% in 1965 to 8% in 1975, representing the highest level in history (Cohen & Brawer,
2008). Amendments to the Higher Education Act contributed $707 million in 1972 and
$981 million in 1974, with each contribution to be distributed over three years (Brint &
Karabel, 1989). Local funding for community colleges, however, dropped to 24% from a
high of 44% in 1959. This drop was attributed to financial stress at the local level due to
the weak economy. Tuition contribution grew from 11% in 1959 to approximately 15%
by 1980 and reflected the increased use of student loans and Pell grants as financial
resources (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
The number of postsecondary two-year and four-year institutions continued to
increase as federal, state, and local investments materialized (Snyder, 1993). Between
1970 and 1980, the number of postsecondary institutions increased from 2,525 to 3,152.
Four-year institutions grew from 1,639 to 1,957. Two-year colleges increased from 886
to 1,195, a 35% increase (Snyder, 1993). While the aggregate number of institutions
increased, the rate of growth slowed. The reduction in growth rate of two-year colleges
reflected two realities. First, federal and state funding was tight during the recession in
the mid-1970s. Second, research in the 1970s indicated that the relationship between a
state’s population density and the number of community colleges probably had a
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maximum (M. J. Cohen, as cited in Cohen & Brawer, 2008). M. J. Cohen (as cited in
Cohen & Brawer, 2008) observed that community colleges tended to be built where 9095% of a state’s population lived within approximately 25 miles of a campus. Based on
this observation, M. J. Cohen postulated that there should be approximately 1,074
community colleges to effectively serve the nation. This research proved to be accurate,
and by 2001, there were 1,076 community colleges operating within the United States
(Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
As the numbers of colleges increased, the aggregate enrollments for
postsecondary education continued to rise as well. Total enrollment in postsecondary
education increased from 8.5 million in 1970 to 12 million in 1980 (Synder, 1993). Most
interestingly, by 1979, enrollments by female students (5,877,000) exceeded male
students (5,863,000) for the first time in history (Snyder, 1993). Additionally, community
college enrollments grew, but at only half the rate experienced in the 1960s. Enrollment
increased by approximately 95% during the 1970s, compared to the 203% increase over
the period from 1950 to 1970 (Snyder, 1993).
With community colleges enjoying increased attendance, colleges also celebrated
shifts in programming use by students. Vocational enrollments increased significantly
(Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Associate of arts degrees conferred in occupational fields rose
from 43% in 1970-71 to 63% in 1979-80 (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Overall, between
1970 and 1977, the proportion of full- and part-time students enrolled in occupational
programs rose from less than one third to over half (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
One reason for the increase in associate of arts degrees was that technological
advancements throughout the economy were shifting and changing existing work-skill
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requirements (Brint & Karabel, 1989). Another reason was the introduction of new
industry sectors accompanied by evolving occupations with drastically changing skill
requirements. Two-year colleges responded by offering expansive curriculums and
course work better reflecting the changing market demands for work skills, knowledge,
and information (1989).
Another reason attributed to the increased occupational program attendance was
the growing perception that the return on investment for bachelor’s degrees was
decreasing (Brint &Karabel, 1989). This perception was a matter of supply and demand.
In the early 1970s, the weak economy decreased demand for those with college degrees
in both the private and public sectors. Also, students who had enrolled in four-year
colleges in the late 1960s began to graduate and enter the job market during the economic
downturn. The net result was that many new college graduates were forced into positions
not aligned with their degrees. In 1972, approximately 30% of men and 25% of women
who graduated with a four-year degree took nonprofessional and nonmanagerial jobs
(Brint & Karabel, 1989). Media coverage exacerbated the situation that “good”
professional jobs were unavailable and, by the mid 1970s, many students graduating from
high school turned to vocational and occupational education as an alternative to the
expense of a four-year degree (Brint & Karabel).
Another reason given for the increase in interest in occupational programming
was a new marketing strategy introduced by community colleges during the 1970s. The
use of the term “career education” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 110) came into vogue. The
trends in educational circles and at two-year colleges signified a subtle shift in the way
vocational education was marketed to students. “The term vocational education carried
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with it connotations of dead-end jobs, then career education suggested orderly, upward
movement” (Brint & Karabel, 1989, p. 111).
Increased enrollments in occupational programming not only reflected the
economic realities for traditional students, but also indicated demographic shifts as other
nontraditional students began to seek postsecondary education (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
More minorities, low-ability students, women, older, part-time, and disadvantaged
students turned to postsecondary education in community colleges as a way to achieve
their piece of the American dream. Increased attendance by nontraditional students
reflected improved marketing and new outreach strategies such as expansion of satellite
campuses and the offering of weekend and evening classes. Better access was coupled
with higher availability of federal student aid and funding sources, enabling more
students to afford tuition and fees. Loan and grant funding rose from $120 million in
1974 to almost $450 million in 1978 (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
Accompanying the changes in student demographics were important
administrative, structural, and programming adaptations that community colleges
implemented to better accommodate these new types of students. Demand for liberal arts
classes decreased as more part-time students dropped in and out at their convenience,
taking courses more out of interest than within a planned program. Colleges were forced
to become more flexible through innovative course scheduling and personnel
management. Many of the new students, too, presented with decreased academic
achievement and required remedial courses. Developmental education departments at
community colleges sprang up and expanded to meet the demands where, increasingly,
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more students were enrolled in basic reading and writing than were enrolled in traditional
liberal arts classes (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
Community colleges also broadened their roles into community development
activities as the economic challenges of the 1970s, stressed state budgets, and state and
local political leaders increased their focus on the economic development strategy of
industry recruitment to boost sagging state tax revenues. Competition between regions,
cities, towns, and localities throughout the U.S. became fierce and the use of recruitment
packages to entice industries to build or relocate became increasingly popular. Workforce
training through community colleges began to be included in these packages and college
leaders responded accordingly. Community college leaders arrange programs designed to
effectively play their role in the recruitment strategy (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
The increased activities of two-year colleges within and throughout communities
led to another linguistic change during the 1970s. That change was the near-universal
acceptance and adoption of the term community college recommended nearly 25 years
earlier by the Truman Commission (President’s Commission on Higher Education, 1947).
This new terminology more fully reflected and better conveyed the comprehensive nature
and distinct service area within which community colleges operated. The use of term
community college eliminated the old reference to junior college and its inference as a
subordinate position to four-year colleges, improving its perception of and marketability
to the citizens and students of its service area (Brint & Karabel, 1989).
During the 1970s, America’s community college system found its role in
postsecondary education. Community colleges had secured access to relatively reliable
markets and funding streams. Community colleges solidified their reputation within the
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minds of its customers as open and accessible institutions capable of delivering quality
and relevant education and training. The community college system provided a pathway,
for those willing to invest themselves, to achieve the American dream.
1981-2000: Deregulation, Reaganomics, and the Flattening of the World
Introduction
The two decades immediately preceding the close of the 20th century involved
nearly incomprehensible economic, technological and geopolitical changes, and evolution
on all fronts. In the United States, three presidents oversaw these remarkable changes:
Ronald Reagan, George Herbert Walker Bush, and William Clinton. Internationally,
geopolitical tensions rose in the 1980s, when President Reagan confronted the Soviet
Union head-on, ending the détente of the 1970s. Eventually, this conflict between the
superpowers ended in the peaceful demise of the Soviet empire, signaled by the felling of
the Berlin Wall November 9, 1989, during the early months of President Bush’s term.
Within a year, however, President Bush would lead an international coalition into the
Persian Gulf War, which began on August 2, 1990, and would last through February 28,
1991.
Economy, Technology, and Demographics
President Reagan entered office on January 20, 1981, amidst some of the worst
economic conditions the United States had experienced since the Great Depression. Two
major forces contributed to two recessions that struck the U.S. economy in short order, a
condition popularly called a double dip recession (BLS, 2010). The Federal Reserve had
implemented strict monetary supply policies in the late 1970s that were followed by the
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Iranian revolution in 1979. The revolution led to large increases in the price of oil and
produced the energy crises of the early 1980s. Constrictive monetary policies tamed
inflation, which began to decline from a peak of 13.52% in 1980 to between 3% and 4%
percent after 1983, lasting through the end of the decade (Williamson and Johnston,
2010). Correspondingly, due to tight money supplies resulting from actions by the
Federal Reserve, businesses curtailed expansion. Unemployment rose rapidly from 7.1%
in 1980 to a peak of 9.7% in 1982 and would remain above 7.0% through 1986 before
reaching a low of 5.3% in 1989 (U.S. Bureau of Labor and Statics, 2010; Williamson &
Johnston, 2010).
Political leaders turned to revamping the tax code to broaden the tax base, which
they hoped would increase tax revenues overall, while protecting the wealth of U.S.
citizens. In 1986, the administration signed into law in the Tax Reform Act, which
proved to be a major shift in federal tax priorities, and demonstrated unprecedented
interest-group pluralism (Brownlee, 2000). The act reflected three main objectives. First,
as Brownlee (2000) explained, “it was more interested in improving economic incentives
for enterprise capitalism than in protecting corporate bureaucracies or the real-estate
industry. Corporations received major tax increases in 1986, and the real-estate industry
was a major loser” (Brownlee, 2000, p. 1057). Second, the act had to have bipartisan
approval and support, which successfully coalesced behind the leadership of senators
Daniel Moynihan (Democrat) and Bill Bradley (Republican). Third, because of the new
economic environment, monetary policies, and administrative priorities, “every reduction
in tax rate or increase in tax preference had to be paid for through a reduction in tax
preference elsewhere in the tax code” (Brownlee, 2000, p. 1058). The act managed to
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both broaden the income base and create a more uniform, “equitable” (p. 1058) system,
which sacrificed progressive rate structures.
There were major winners and losers in the wake of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.
It removed tax expenditures favoring the middle class and eliminated investment tax
credits for corporations, but provided worthwhile benefits for lower- and upper-income
tax payers. It reduced the rates for top brackets, but cut special deductions and credits,
“eliminating tax-based privilege and reaffirming the duties of citizenship” (Brownlee,
2000, p. 1085). The act also “preserved progressivity and ‘ability to pay’ while promoting
efficiency and uniformity” (Brownlee, 2000, p. 1085). In the long run, political leaders
hoped the expected increase in tax revenues, coupled with the “peace dividends” of the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War would reduce deficits and
provide for increased investment in national infrastructures (Brownlee, 2000).
Laissez-faire economics championed by the Reagan administration were
exemplified by the adoption a philosophy held by University of Chicago economists
(Behr, 2009; Vietor, 2000). Prevailing beliefs among these economists was that market
outcomes were preferable to government controls and that regulatory priority should be
focused on protecting competition, instead of competitors, thereby putting consumers’
interests first. Capitalizing on American sentiments of the late 1970s, political
representatives increasingly were willing to allow businesses a wider birth and allow
market discipline and competition regulate business practices (Behr, 2009; Vietor, 2000).
Under the Reagan Administration, even more ambitious attacks on regulation
spread to include environmental protection, nuclear power, consumer product safety,
occupational health and safety, agriculture, broadcasting, cable television, and financial
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services. In the first couple of years of the Reagan administration, regulatory
expenditures decreased by 3% and the number of regulatory personnel dropped from
119,000 to 101,000. Sharp reductions in enforcement budgets were forced upon the EPA
and OSHA. Despite its best efforts, the administration failed to enact a strategic plan to
overhaul federal regulatory policies and momentum was lost. By 1983, amid continued
macroeconomic challenges and dwindling legislative influence in Congress:
…intellectual and policy focus of regulatory reform had drifted away from the
removal of government controls and toward the development of market-oriented
administrative controls that would encourage limited forms of rivalry or emulate
competitive markets with new and elaborate regulatory mechanisms. (Vietor,
2000, p. 1010)
“Regulated competition” (Vietor, 2000, p. 984) backfilled the drastic deregulation
approaches originally intended by the administration and was designed with more
market-sensitive instruments. The result of this competition was an increase in market
efficiency because it exposed industry to competition and business cycles with no
protection on the downside (Vietor, 2000). This lack of protection was the fundamental
asymmetry of regulated competition. Antitrust and regulatory changes introduced
increased market discipline and resulted in consolidation and, in some cases, business
failures. For those businesses that survived, work force reductions were necessary to
allow for adoption of technological innovations in response to domestic and international
competition. Generally, sector efficiencies resulted, increasing competitiveness
(Galambos, 2000).
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Throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s, enterprises sought to increase
competitiveness through various means (Galambos, 2000). Increased focus on core
competencies propelled some corporations to spin off divisions and departments that did
not enhance the organization’s competitive advantage. Acquisitions and mergers
accelerated for firms scaling up to meet new domestic and global competition.
Decentralization, facilitated by expanding technological innovations like computers, the
Internet, and the World Wide Web, eliminated redundancies, hierarchy, and flattened
organizational structures. Plants were closed and relocated closer to customers, cheaper
labor, or critical supply chains. These changes to existing businesses were balanced by
the launch of new businesses at record rates (Galambos, 2000). Capital flowed to high
technological enterprises that were commercializing new products and services with
dizzying pace. The American economy was churning in unprecedented ways and
directions.
Although U.S. corporations had always been active and expansive in international
trade and competition, the nature of this competition began to change fairly incrementally
during the 1980s. The status quo exploded during the 1990s. This new force was called
off-shore outsourcing (Galambos, 2000).
Through much of the 20th century, U.S. policy makers refrained from
protectionist tariffs and championed international open-trade policies (Galambos, 2000).
The United States was the founding police chief of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, initially signed in 1947, which sought to reduce tariffs and other trade barriers
between countries, emphasizing reciprocity and mutually advantageous benefits. Because
the U.S. was the de facto leader of free and fair trade, policy makers tended to not to be
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overly active in erecting barriers or pick sector favorites. Instead, as Lindert (2000)
remarked, “the government of the U.S. has always been defensive and reactive,
intervening only to prevent imports, seldom to promote exports, and almost never with
planned industrial ‘targeting’” (p. 449). Liberalized U.S. policy through omission enabled
two powerful forces—off-shoring and outsourcing—by U.S. corporations to become
business strategies that helped businesses be competitive. These same policies caused
substantial disruption in many sectors of the U.S. economy and workforce.
Off-shoring is the movement of plants and facilities from the United States to a
foreign country (Galambos, 2000). The off-shoring firm would operate largely as it did
when it was located in the United States, producing the same product(s). The difference
was that this plant enjoyed cheaper labor, lower taxes, subsidized energy, and lower
health-care costs (Galambos, 2000).
Outsourcing is the movement of a specific business function such as accounts
receivable, accounts payable, or call centers to an outside firm. That outside firm is paid
to perform the exact same function, but at a lower price, and ideally at equal or higher
quality (Lindert, 2000). Much of the outsourcing during the 1990s was performed by
companies in India, where large numbers of highly educated, English-speaking engineers
and business managers lived. These workers were capable and willing to do the
outsourcing work, at low price points compared to costs in the United States.
Liberalized “free” and “fair”10 trade policies resulted in off-shoring activities
starting in the 1970s (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Off-shoring picked up its pace in the
10

“Free trade is defined as trade unrestricted by tariffs and other regulations. Fair trade brings worker
rights, workforce safety, and environmental regulations into trade negotiation” (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008,
p. 391).

145

1980s before truly manifesting itself broadly upon the U.S. economy during the 1990s.
Outsourcing began in the late 1980s and picked up pace during the 1990s, eventually
exploding at the turn of the 21st Century (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Predicated on the
evolution of economic development in nations along a continuum from dependency11 to
world systems12 theories, the movement and flow of capital, goods, and people resulting
from the comparative advantages of nations encouraged globalization on a scale never
before seen or experienced in world history (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008). Off-shoring and
outsourcing, enabled by technological innovations, allowed corporations to respond to
international competition by shifting capital and relocating work globally.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the effects of outsourcing and off-shoring were
extreme for manufacturers, particularly in the textile, apparel, furniture, consumer
electronics, and electronics semiconductors industries (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
Corporations in these industries searched for cheaper labor, as well as other competitive
advantages elsewhere outside of the United States. As a result of outsourcing and offshoring, companies shut down and relocated plants with an increased pace to countries
such as Mexico, China, Brazil, and Taiwan (Hodson & Sullivan, 2008).
By the late 1980s, the U.S. economy began to recover and, by the end of the
decade, produced some strong economic performance data that indicated the nation was
on a road to recovery from stagflation of the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1981, real GDP
11

“Dependency is the unequal power relationships between industrialize and less industrialized countries,
where the less-industrially developed nations are dependent on the more advanced nations” (Hodson &
Sullivan, 2008, p. 383).
12

“World system theory states that relationship between core and peripheral nations is largely affected by
the on-going and constant changes of trade relationships, leading to an integrated economic system”
(Hodson & Sullivan, 2008, p. 384).
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increased 31.7% and real GDP/capita increased 22.5%. Inflation dropped substantially
and averaged only 3.95% (Williamson & Johnston, 2010). These improved economic
conditions, revamped tax codes, and reduced federal regulations contributed to the
explosion of technological innovation during the final two decades of the 20th Century.
Industries associated with the three GPTs of internal combustion engines, chemicals, and
electrical/electronics each experienced reversals of fortune from the previous decades.
After the near demise of Chrysler Corporation in 1978, saved only through federal
government intervention, the Japanese invasion in the American auto market peaked in
1980-1982. Market penetration of Japanese firms was confirmed when they captured
22% of the U.S. market, attributed primarily to offering products at lower prices and
higher quality than U.S. automakers. By 1989, U.S. auto manufacturers closed the price
gap to within $500-$600 of Japanese manufacturers and lowered rates of defects per car
to within about .3 to -.6, compared to Japanese products (Lindert, 2000). Beginning in the
1980s and lasting through the 1990s, U.S. firms improved productivity, materials
sourcing, and quality systems as they returned to and adopted the best practices first
introduced to U.S. firms during World War II that the Japanese had perfected during the
1950s-1970s (Lindert, 2000).
Key trends that led to the successful turnaround for U.S. auto manufacturers were
restructuring (closing and consolidation of plants), changes in leadership, management,
and new labor pay systems (Lindert, 2000). As U.S firms recovered, Japanese companies
initiated another strategy of first building branch plants, and later even entered into
partnerships with U.S. auto companies to produce their products domestically. Despite
the economic and employment turmoil, U.S. net employment in the sector remained
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constant as the closing and consolidation of U.S. firms were offset by the opening of the
new Japanese plants (Lindert, 2000).
The U.S. aircraft industry also experienced consolidation during the 1980s as
Boeing and the Douglas Aircraft division of McDonnell Douglas became the sole
airframe manufacturers, and Pratt and Whitney and General Electric survived as the only
engine manufacturers (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). This industry was the closest to a
monopoly that U.S. regulators allowed throughout the 20th century (Lindert, 2000).
Several factors saved them from regulatory actions. Mowery and Rosenberg also point
out that barriers to entry such as immense lead times and highly sophisticated design and
manufacturing techniques effectively prevented new firms from entering the field and
competing for contracts. These companies also contributed greatly to the economic
strength of the United States, most notably in their impact on balance of international
trade and their substantial contribution to domestic employment (Mowery & Rosenberg,
2000). Finally, tight integration with the Department of Defense that delivered contracts
for sophisticated military aircraft to theses manufacturers was a key component to
President Reagan’s strategic military build-up during the 1980s, and connection that
ensured the industry would avoid antitrust action (Mowery and Rosenberg, 2000).
The GPT industry in the chemicals sector that demonstrated the most growth and
achievements during the postwar era, particularly during the 1980s, was pharmaceuticals.
As Mowery and Rosenberg (2000) explained, “During the postwar period the U.S.
became and has remained the largest source of new pharmaceutical products as well as
the largest market for such products” (p. 862). Immediately after the war, federal support
for biomedical research grew approximately 18% per year between 1950 and 1965.
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Afterward, this growth declined up to the 1980s. Through the 1980s, national and federal
expenditures for health R&D exploded, from approximately $6 billion in 1980 to more
than $11 billion in 1988 (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Two major discoveries that contributed greatly to pharmaceuticals were the
identification of DNA in 1953 and a technique for gene splicing in 1973 (Mowery &
Rosenberg, 2000). Subsequent to these discoveries, the nature of pharmaceutical research
migrated from the science of chemistry to that of biology. Biotechnology, centering on
the revolution in molecular biology, has benefited from huge federal expenditures on
R&D. President Nixon’s “war on cancer” is one example (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000,
p. 864). Annual federal spending on biotechnological R&D is estimated to have been
approximately $500 million during the 1980s, increasing to more than $3 billion by 1990
(Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
A remarkable feature of the American biotechnology industry in the
commercialization of new products has been the integrated relationship between large,
established firms and small, start-up enterprises (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). The
established firms have developed expertise in the organization and management of
clinical trials, federal regulation, and marketing capabilities. Start-ups bring innovation to
the equation and skill in linking R&D to marketable products worthy of
commercialization. This collaborative effort has introduced a new paradigm in industrial
structure, firm organization, and specialization (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
The electronics GPT during the 1980s enjoyed exceptional growth both in
innovation and productivity, which led to a second major technological paradigm shift—
that of open-networked organizations (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). This new
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performance method by which businesses and individuals performed their work had
modest beginnings but eventually evolved along a continuum as new technologies
emerged, fundamentally changing not only business activities, but also entire economies.
The introduction of the first personal computers in the late 1970s and the early 1980s
enabled the computing power to move out of the centralized departments of large firms
and directly into the hands of the end user. Every company or organization of any size
could have access to the power of a computer. In 1981, IBM offered the first widely
available commercial personal computer, featuring the new Microsoft MSDOS operating
system. Subsequent to this product’s introduction, market acceptance of personal
computers exploded. The result was a plethora of new products by numerous enterprises
in all three sectors: computers, semiconductors, and software programs (Mowery and
Rosenberg, 2000).
In 1982, Commodore introduced the Commodore 64 (C64). The C64 contained
several new features that distinguished it from its peers, including impressive graphics
capabilities. The C64’s popularity also contributed to the release of thousands of software
programs by numerous software development firms designed specifically for this
platform. “By the time the C64 was discontinued in 1993, it had sold more than 22
million units and was recognized by the 2006 Guinness Book of World Records as the
greatest selling single computer model of all time” (Computer History Museum, n.d.,
para. 68). In 1983, Compaq Computer Corporation successfully reverse-engineered the
IBM computer and recorded first-year sales of $111 million, the highest sales ever by an
American business in a single year. Additionally, this new product propelled IBMcompatible computers toward market domination so that, by 1996, the IBM platform
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achieved an 83% share of the personal computer market and became the industry
standard (Computer History Museum, n.d.).
In 1984, Apple introduced the Macintosh, which featured the first mouse-based
personal computer coupled with a graphic user interface and driven by a different
operating system than those used by IBM and IBM-compatible systems (Computer
History Museum, n.d.). The Mac, as it came to be known, also boasted new proprietary
applications such as MacPaint and MacWrite, which introduced to the market for the first
time, “what you see is what you get” (Computer History Museum, n.d., para. 74) word
processing. While this platform outshined all other personal computer systems with a
new and innovative user-friendly interface system, coupled with highly interactive
programs, the Macintosh failed to achieve the same market acceptance and penetration
that the IBM systems enjoyed.
The proliferation of new computer products caused intense competition in the
semiconductor, computer, and computer programming industries (Mowery & Rosenberg,
2000). Competition drove down prices for components and systems, making personal
computers more affordable. Consequently, throughout the 1980s, personal computer use
as a workstation grew exponentially both at home and at work. Computer use by
executives, managers, clerks and, as time went on, nearly all employees in businesses
became the primary business tool and a staple on nearly every desk. Computers allowed
workers to interact with the new technology for a host of purposes, greatly expanding
worker and business productivity (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). However, the real
power of computing was limited because computers were still essentially isolated,
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preventing new technologies from interacting with other new technologies in the same
way people actually work most effectively—through communication (Craiger, 1997).
By the mid 1980s, this limitation began to dissolve. With the help of companies
like 3Com, market adaptation of new networking technologies allowed computers to be
linked together and networked through the use of Ethernet, powered by centralized
servers, into LANs and wide-area networks (Computer History Museum, n.d.). With
these new networks, computer technologies such as programs, printers, and other
peripherals could be shared within enterprises, reducing costs and encouraging
proliferation. Early adopters further spread these technologies horizontally and vertically
throughout their organizations, greatly expanding the effectiveness of business as ideas,
information, and knowledge were more easily shared and distributed. Redundancy,
duplicity, and a host of other inefficiencies were eliminated, increasing the effectiveness
of business transactions and personal work (Craiger, 1997). As time progressed, the cost
of doing business continued to drop and worker productivity increased, which further
propelled acceptance of the technologies and their ubiquitous use deeper into
organizations and wider throughout numerous industry sectors.
Where computing was once limited to simply controlling costs of physical,
financial, and human resources, it now could be integrated into global control of
accounting, payroll, marketing, production, scheduling, management, and personnel
systems. In effect, the isolated business units and their practices of previous generations
were transformed into single enterprises (Craiger, 1997). Even with these advances, the
true power of networking had yet to be realized until the introduction of hypertext
documentation systems in 1980, followed by the development of Web browsers in the
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1990s. These technologies increased the ability for individuals or organizations to upload
and search for information and data worldwide on the Internet (Craiger, 1997).
Throughout much of the 1980s, a young software consultant and programmer
named Tim Berners-Lee worked at the European Particle Physics Laboratory (CERN),
where he experimented with how to track the documents of thousands of researchers,
hundreds of computers, and thousands of software applications and operating systems
from a single workstation (Napier et al., 2003). Eventually, Berners-Lee discovered how
to link text and other objects from multiple computers to a single computer so that
information stored on all the workstations could be shared with anyone, anywhere, at any
time. By 1991, his new innovation was introduced to the world as the World Wide Web
(www). Closely following on the heels of the www, CERN released critical web server
software that retained web pages on servers and allowed visitors to access them (Napier
et al., 2003).
One of the key developments of the Internet was the expansion of
telecommunications infrastructure, including high-speed Internet access, which took off
during the 1990s (Computer History Museum, n.d.). The huge potential economic upside
to investments in electronic commerce encouraged large amounts of investment capital to
flood the market, which propelled network service providers such as WorldCom, Exodus
Communications, Global Crossing Holdings, AT&T, and several other companies to
expand operations in a rush to build national and international communications networks
(Craiger, 1997). These networks included the laying of vast quantities of fiber optic cable
necessary to handle the anticipated huge volumes of electronic data soon to be handled by
the networks.
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The final component that made the Internet and www powerful and user-friendly
was the development of web browsers and search engines. Berners-Lee made the first
web browser, but it took Marc Andreessen and Netscape to create the first commercial
browser in 1994 (Computer History Museum, n.d.). By 1995, David Filo and Jerry Yang
launched Yahoo, and in 1998, Sergey Brin and Larry Page launched Google (Computer
History Museum, n.d.).
The combination of the Ethernet, Internet, www, graphical web browsers, and the
proliferation of fiber optic cable developed worldwide capacities for the next generation
of organizational and worker collaboration into globally cooperative, multidisciplinary
work teams (Craiger, 1997). The power of globalized networking opened the door to the
open-networked organization (Craiger, 1997). Open-networked organizations and
enterprises of all kinds evolved from the expanding telecommunications infrastructures,
communicating more efficiently and effectively with suppliers, customers, affinity
organizations, and even competitors. By the 1990s, this power was unleashed into full
commercialized form, catapulting electronic commerce e-business strategies into play, a
move that fundamentally altered the international economic, political, and social
environments. Pulitzer Prize-winning author Thomas Friedman declared in his book The
World is Flat that the technological revolution of the 1980s and 1990s “will be seen in
time as one of those fundamental shifts or inflection points, like Gutenberg’s invention of
the printing press, the rise of the nation-state, or the Industrial Revolution” (p. 48); these
changes caused the world to change “in profound and unsettling ways” (p. 48).
The cell phone industry followed the same pattern of technological innovation in
the United States during the 20th century as most other technologies had done before it
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(Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000). Successful technological innovations in one sector were
often limited by technological restrictions in another sector. Elimination of technological
bottlenecks often required incremental developments within and between independent
sectors. Eventually, enough barriers were identified and removed that commercialization
began before the delivery of a comprehensive system was realized. Such was the case for
the cellular industry (Mowery & Rosenberg, 2000).
Despite the realization of switching technology, full system deployment of
cellular systems remained blocked for nearly 10 years by federal regulatory requirements.
In 1971, AT&T Bell Labs submitted a request to the Federal Communications
Commission for cellular service. Not until 1982 did the commission finally allocate the
radio frequencies needed for cellular service to become an active system (TechFAQ.com, 2009).
Bell Labs was not the only enterprise experimenting with cellular phone
technologies; its main competitor in the race to deliver portable communication was
Motorola (Marples, 2008). Martin Cooper, a Motorola engineer, helped to design a
practical portable device and made the first successful modern cell phone call in 1973 in
New York City. His first call was to a friend who worked at Bell Labs. This first cell
phone call represented a fundamental technology and communications market shift
toward the person and away from the place (Marples, 2008). Full commercialization of
the technology took ten years and, in 1983, Motorola unveiled to the world the first truly
portable cellular phone called the Motorola DynaTAC 8000X (Tech-FAQ.com, 2009).
The net effect of the technological innovations and advancements of the 1980s
and 1990s on the nature of work and workers’ skills was profound. Modern research has
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resulted in three competing theories about the impact of technology on the nature of work
and worker skills. According to the first theory, advanced technology creates a wider gap
between high- and low-skill jobs, or a “bi-modal” [sic] (Johnson, 1991, p. 7) distribution
of the workforce. This theory recognizes that as new technologies are introduced, there is
a demand for highly trained and educated workers to further develop, expand, and
integrate these new technologies into the workplace. At the same time, the new
technologies make processes more efficient, requiring fewer skills to actually operate the
new systems. Bimodal distribution theorizes that the resulting workforce is
approximately 80% semiskilled or unskilled workers and 20% highly skilled workers
(Johnson, 1991).
According to the second theory, advanced technology creates jobs at both middleand high-skill levels, particularly within high technology sectors. Data from several high
technology sectors indicates that as technologies are introduced to systems and processes,
more technicians and computer specialists are needed to run and maintain these systems
(Johnson, 1991). The net effect is that technological innovations in high technology
sectors increases the demand for higher skilled workers overall. The third theory is based
on the opposite of the second theory; technology decreases the overall skill requirements
of the workforce. This theory tends to acknowledge that while technology initially
increases skill requirements, in the long run, skill requirements tend to decrease as
systems and processes are simplified by the maturation of the technology implementation
and equipment and processes increasingly become more “user friendly” (Johnson, 1991,
p. 10).
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While these three theories seem to contradict each other, the reality is that
technology has resulted in the lessening of skills for some workers while increasing skill
requirements for others. As Johnson (1991) concluded, “it appears as though the overall
effect of technology on the skill requirements is small. On an individual basis, however,
the effect of technology on skill requirements appears to be quite drastic” (p. 11).
Ultimately, the net effect of technology on individual workers and their ability to
adapt to the rapidly changing employment environment is evident and profound. Workers
of the late 20th century and early 21st century must have increasingly transferable, basic
skills such as reading, writing, and computational abilities. Workers must also
demonstrate higher order cognitive processing skills conducive to problem solving,
decision making, and creativity (Johnson, 1991). These are skills that contribute to
flexible behavior, collaboration, and communication, all requisites of open-network
organizations. Finally, workers must demonstrate the willingness and ability to learn.
Employees who demonstrate this ability also have the competence to acquire new skills
as new technological advancements are made and implemented within an organization
(Johnson, 1991).
The technological innovations of the 1980s and 1990s not only introduced many
new products and services, altering forever the nature of work and worker skills, but also
were part of other major forces that contributed profound changes to the U.S. economy.
Among these changes were labor participation rates by gender, wage gaps by labor skills,
and the quality of schooling to support labor skills. Migration patterns also changed
during this time.

157

Labor participation rates for men declined through the 1980s, but the rates for
women of all ages continued to climb, exceeding 50% (Goldin, 2000). The wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers increased substantially during this time, reaching
levels not seen since before World War II. Workers’ loss in relative economic position
led political and institutional leaders, as well as researchers to question the quality of
American schools, the ability of the advanced industrial society (Goldin, 2000) to absorb
less skilled labor, and the roles of international trade and immigration policies. Theories
postulated for the forces contributing to the increased gap were technology, international
comparative advantage, variances in access to and quality of training and education for
workers, and the decline in private-sector unions. Previous gains in wage differentials for
African Americans between 1965 and 1975 were effectively reversed during the 1980s,
even for those with college educations. On a positive note, the wage differential for
women closed during this period, particularly for young, educated women (Goldin,
2000).
Migration trends of the 1970s from urban to rural reversed direction abruptly
during the 1980s as citizens in rural areas moved to urban areas; populations in rural
counties declined from 82% to 61% (Easterlin, 2000). This reversal was predicted to be
an aberration in the coming decades. According to Easterlin (2000):
…the ongoing process of modern economic growth, through its continuing impact
on technology and per capita income, and also via a more pronounced impact on
leisure time, [had] gradually relaxed the pressures for geographic concentration
(in urbanized areas)...Differences in the cost and market advantages of different
locations lessened, although they did not disappear. In addition, the growth of
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income, rise in leisure, and technological changes within the home began to
loosen the ties that had bound consumer residence decision so tightly to place of
work. As a result, consumer preferences and household (location) decision
making began independently, to alter population location more noticeably. (p.
529)
One of the major contributors to the anticipated long-term trend (despite the
reversal of the 1980s) of migration from urban to rural areas and the weakened bonds
between residence and the workplace in the coming decades were technological
innovations and the deployment of infrastructure, particularly in computers and
telecommunications industries. As these sectors merged and improved services, many
firms, particularly those in the service sector, began to permit workers to work from
home. Consultants, salespersons, computer specialists, technical writers, and industrial
artists, for example, who rely heavily on computers and the Internet to communicate with
customers and do their work were able to work from home instead of having to be “colocated” with their home office (Easterlin, 2000, p. 534). Not only was the nature of work
altered, but also the physical location where work took place was changed.
Net U.S. population growth continued its trend upward, growing by more than
22.2 million between 1970 and 1980 and 32.7 million between 1990 and 2000 (Hobbs &
Stoops, 2002). Several factors contributed to this increase. Fertility rates dropped
substantially after the mid 1960s, trending to what many referred to the “baby bust”
(Hobbs & Stoops, 2002, p. 49), and reaching the lowest point of the 20th century by
1980. Life expectancy rates continued to increase but at a slower pace than in the
previous 20 years.
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The drop in fertility rates was based on several theoretical factors. First, the
“relative income” (Easterlin, 2000, p. 509) theory, which postulated that after the 1960s,
relative incomes began to decline and younger populations postponed marriage and
childbearing, aspiring for higher material acquisition. Second, with the increased labor
participation rates of women, the price-in-time theory postulated that the loss of wages
during childbearing years caused women to delay or forgo pregnancy to remain in the
labor force and earn wages. Finally, social attitudes of women, especially those better
educated, career-oriented and financially independent, may have contributed to the
decrease as they opted for a “freer” lifestyle (Easterlin, 2000, p. 508). The drop in fertility
rates would eventually play a role in decreased attendance in postsecondary institutions
during the 1980s and 1990s.
The rise in life expectancy rates, which expanded from the mid 1960s and through
the 1980s, was the result of several factors. Public Medicare and Medicaid programs
continued to open access and extend advanced treatments and medical services to poorer
populations (Easterlin, 2000). The push for improvements in lifestyles triggered
reductions in reduced cigarette smoking, better diets, and increases in exercise. Arguably
the most important change was the impact of technological advancements in the
detection, treatment, and control of communicable and infectious diseases, early
diagnosis and treatment of cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, cancer, and
degenerative diseases, which improved the effectiveness of health care (Easterlin, 2000).
Another force leading to increased population was immigration. Legal
immigration during the 1980s doubled that of the 1950s and accounted for an estimated
one third of the total increase, effectively offsetting the drop in childbearing by the
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domestic population (Easterlin, 2000). President Bush signed the Immigration Act of
1990, which increased legal immigration to the United States by 40%. More than 700,000
new immigrants were admitted annually, up from 500,000 prior to the bill’s passage.
Illegal immigration, estimated at 200,000 per year, also added to the population
(Easterlin, 2000).
Worker Skills, Training, and Policy Response
Arguments against federalism in workforce funding that had dominated political
thinking during the first half of the 20th Century had been resolved by the 1980s. No
longer was the question whether workforce funding would occur. Instead, the question
was how it would be handled. Increasingly, from the introduction of the GI Bill in the
1940s to the ADA and MDTA of the 1960s, political and federal agency leaders wrestled
to balance federal support of human capital development with adequate funding and
programmatic management. Finding balance was a growing challenge.
Within the backdrop of a struggling economy, soaring federal deficits, and high
unemployment rates, congress presented President Reagan with the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) in 1982, which replaced the CETA, as the new president’s job
creation program (Guttman, 1983). CETA had proven to be inefficient, plagued by a
proliferation of programs, power struggles between funding “sponsors” (Guttman, 1983,
p. 4), and unstable funding. Responding to state and local pressures, agency heads and
political leaders introduced the Job Training Partnership Act. The act was designed to
eliminate these problems through precedent setting, and new and improved partnerships
between state and federal agencies, while maintaining the legacy of federally sponsored
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workforce training and education introduced earlier by the MDTA and ADA (Guttman,
1983).
The design of the JTPA reflected lessons learned from CETA and political
leaders’ desire to demonstrate improved responsibility with taxpayers’ money (Guttman,
1983). The act contained permanent authorization, which provided long-term stability,
making programs more effective in the delivery of services to workers over the long run.
The JTPA contained provisions for advanced funding, which also improved program
delivery and increased overall efficiencies. Finally, the JTPA introduced a new focus on
program performance standards, eliminating reliance on process requirements dictated by
federal agencies, which made local program delivery more flexible and effective
(Guttman, 1983). As one website noted:
…[the Job Training Partnership Act] provided block grants to the states for
training and related services for economically disadvantaged people, especially
those receiving cash assistance and food stamps. State and local governments
administered these programs within federal guidelines. The aid was intended to
increase the participants' future employment possibilities and earnings and to
reduce their dependence on welfare. Services provided by this program included
job training, help in finding work, counseling, and other assistance designed to
prepare the participant for a job. (Welfare-to-Work Programs, n.d., para. 11)
Another major piece of legislation introduced during this decade, which
demonstrated continued commitment to an interest in federal sponsorship of human
capital development initiatives by political leaders, was the Montgomery GI Bill (H.R.
1085) by President Reagan in 1987 (Montgomery, 2010). This bill reflected genuine
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maturity of thought about federal involvement in workforce training, particularly as it
relates to servicemen and servicewomen. The bill also stands as a monument to the
visionary leadership of G. V. “Sonny” Montgomery, Mississippi’s congressional
representative from the third district. A 35-year veteran of the U.S. armed services
himself, Representative Montgomery served as chairman for the Committee on Veterans
Affairs, which gave him unique insight into the needs of servicemen and servicewomen
in remaining competitive in a rapidly changing economic environment (Montgomery,
2010).
The primary motivating factor behind the Montgomery GI Bill was the fear of the
unknown consequences that could result from the U.S. military movement toward an allvolunteer force after the draft ended in 1973. The fear was based on the concern that the
military force structure might evolve into a hollow force, devoid of educated, motivated,
high-performance men and women who were capable of operating technologically
advanced equipment. Representative Montgomery believed that “our all-voluntary
military concept would fail if we did not create a quality, post-military service
educational scholarship as an incentive for our youth to serve, and to give them access to
post-secondary education and training, as well” (Montgomery, 2010, p. 15).
Traditionally, federal funding for education and training of military servicemen
and servicewomen had occurred only during or immediately after an armed conflict
(Montgomery, 2010). World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, and Vietnam all
had temporary funding bills for veteran training. In 1977, Congress introduced the
Veteran’s Educational Assistance Program, which proved largely ineffective because
veterans demurred from using it, for numerous reasons (2010). The Montgomery GI Bill
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changed this pattern by introducing the new concept of permanent funding for education
and training for those who served or were military veterans, during war or peacetime.
While the concept was revolutionary, the reasoning behind it proved to be sound. Senator
Alan Cranston outlined this reasoning as follows:
The dividends our country has already reaped from past GI Bills [are] so vast as
to be virtually incalculable. However, it is widely accepted that for every dollar
spent in GI Bill benefits, the nation is returned $3 to $6 in increased revenues…
While there has been a major emphasis on building a 600-ship Navy, for
developing and acquiring the very best and fastest plans for our Air force, and for
purchasing the latest in high technology and weapons for our troops, we must not
overlook the fact that we will always need to recruit the very best young men and
women for positions of leadership and responsibility in our military in order to
guarantee that America’s defense of today and tomorrow will remain strong. A
New GI Bill will help us maintain this strength to defend our shores as well as
those of our allies throughout the free world…
Finally, the young people going to school under the New GI Bill will pay more in
taxes over their lifetimes because more education will increase their income.
Veteran’s Administration statistics show that in 1985, the median income for
veterans with a high school diploma was $19,720. For veterans who were college
graduates, the median income jumped to $35,800. This 83 percent increase in
income associated with additional education results in significantly increased
federal, state, and local income taxes flowing to government coffers.
(Montgomery, 2010, p. 142)
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The Montgomery GI Bill reflected the recognition by U.S. leadership to the
inherent value of federal and state investments in a highly educated and productive
workforce (Montgomery, 2010). Congressman Montgomery further elaborated that:
…current and future veterans, trained under the Montgomery GI Bill, represent
part of our ongoing potential for achieving world leadership in current and
emerging fields such as nanotechnology, robotics, biotechnology,
communications, engineering, health care, logistics, transportation, and
manufacturing...veterans personify economic strength. (Montgomery, 2010, p.
178)
Evolution of the computer, semiconductor, software programming, and
computer/electronic network industries brought enduring changes to the nature of work,
how workers interacted with each other, and how they related to superiors. Increasingly,
white-collar jobs were more autonomous and required self-initiation, creativity, problemsolving abilities, and flexibility. Perhaps most importantly, continuous and lifelong
learning became a way of life for the modern worker, and there were several options for
workers to find financing to pay for postsecondary education to enable them to remain
competitive in rapidly changing work environments.
Junior/Community Colleges
The economic forces and business practices of the 1980s and 1990s, largely
propelled by the increasingly globalized economy, caused great disruption in America’s
business sectors and workforce (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Technology was both a
contributor to and an answer for enterprises starting up or shutting down, and work place
skills becoming more complex or simple for semiskilled or even unskilled work.
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Business cycles, restructuring, and churn contributed to large numbers of workers
searching for assistance from government agencies and educational institutions to
upskills, increase educational attainment, or migrate to find better work and higher
wages.
Business spun out workers not essential to core activities to cut costs. In the early
1980s, many of these employees were blue-collar, semiskilled workers in manufacturing
plants or unskilled laborers throughout all sectors (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). By the late
1980s and 1990s, downsizing in the services sector hit semiprofessionals, professionals,
managers, and technicians, throwing millions of white-collar workers into unemployment
or prolonged underemployment. Economic and business churn, coupled with new
technologies, led to new market opportunities for businesses and workers. New
enterprises in high-tech and low-tech sectors were launched at record rates.
Whether the enterprises were high-tech or low-tech, they searched more and more
for workers with skills that just a few years earlier did not exist. Health care,
biotechnology, telecommunications, computers, networking, retail, restaurants, and
hospitality industries demanded workers with higher literacy, education, business skills,
and interpersonal attributes that would help make their operations competitive and
sustainable. Many workers, displaced by the new economic environment, turned to
institutions of higher learning for help. Most notably, they turned to community colleges
because this institution had the capacity and resources to help workers get back on the
path of employment success (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
Enrollments in community colleges continued to increase from 1,195,000 in 1980
to 1,408,000 in 1990 (Snyder, 1993). At the same time, community colleges began to
166

experience challenges due to changes in student demographics, shifts in programming
use, and declines in institutional financial streams. The educational level of students
dropped and community-education programming demands rose in importance (Cohen &
Brawer, 2008).
Increased participation by minorities in community college programming during
the 1970s continued to rise during the 1980s and 1990s (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). The
number of 18-year-olds in America peaked in 1979. Community colleges made efforts to
attract older, adult populations to enroll, replacing the loss of younger students. As older
students swelled the ranks of community colleges, part-time enrollment increased as
adult’s balanced family, work and education responsibilities. Between 1970 and 1980,
part-time enrollment tripled from just over 1 million to nearly 4 million (Cohen &
Brawer, 2008) and college leaders were compelled to adopt new programming options to
accommodate this shift in how students were using college course offerings.
During this time, the overall level and mixture of community college financial
resources declined and shifted (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Funds from tuition rose from
15% to 18%. Federal funding remained steady from the previous decade of 5%, but state
funding decreased from a high of 60% in 1980 to 48% in 1990. Local funding increased
slightly from 13% to 18% (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Community college leaders found
themselves hard-pressed to accommodate increased enrollments with declining revenues.
Creative and innovative management practices were needed to maintain the traditions of
open enrollment for many colleges.
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Community colleges also bore the brunt of poor secondary educational attainment
in the 1970s, as more and more students enrolling demonstrated woefully inadequate
literacy abilities (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). As Cohen and Brawer (2008) explained:
…the available evidence suggest that the academic achievement of students in
schools and colleges registered a gradual improvement between 1900 and the
mid-1950s, an accelerated improvement between the mid-1950s and the mid1960s, a precipitous, widespread decline between then and the late 1970s, before
stabilizing in the early 1980s. (Cohen & Brawer, 2008, p. 283)
As a result of entering students’ underwhelming academic aptitude, colleges had
to increase development education departments and programs to assist students to meet
college standards and to keep dropout rates from rising drastically.
Community college developmental education programs were designed and
implemented to teach literacy—the essentials of reading, writing, and arithmetic. Courses
and training for broader skills were found to be necessary to help students contend with
basic living skills and to find work. Time management, study habits, personal financial
management, and other life skills as well as resume writing, interview techniques, and
interpersonal and communication skills all became necessary elements of community
college developmental education initiatives to help students find success during and after
college (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
Developmental education instructors tended to be leaders in the adoption of new
technologies to improve instructional effectiveness (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). Computerassisted instruction for math, reading, and writing became ever more important in helping
students rapidly improve their literacy skills and move into the mainstream. These
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instructors also used technology to manage and improve student flow and expand the
provision of academic support services to academic and vocational areas, improving
student outcomes (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). These activities helped move developmental
education instruction from the periphery into the mainstream and gain general acceptance
as a critical piece of the comprehensive nature of the community college (Cohen &
Brawer, 2008).
The community education role of community colleges continued to be important.
Short-term, not-for-credit industry training programs and contract training for industry
gained importance as new markets and enduring funding streams (Cohen & Brawer,
2008). During the 1980s, international competition and consolidation within many
industry sectors led to increased numbers of plant closings and relocations overseas.
Headcounts of noncredit students grew from 90% of the credit student headcount in 1995
to exceed that of credit students by more than 8% in 1999 (Van Noy, Jacobs, Korey,
Bailey, & Hughes, 2008). Competition among and within communities to backfill lost
plants became even more intense, and community college involvement in economic
development incentive packages increased even more. The demand to train displaced
workers unemployed due to plant closing or for new industry propelled the colleges to
innovate with program delivery (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
Community colleges were uniquely positioned for this role because the
investments in vocational training over the years had already equipped them with the
resources and know-how to train industry skills. Even so, restructuring of the delivery
method needed to change to better accommodate customized training for specific
businesses and industry. Courses had to be adjusted to reflect short training cycles. Most
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courses were delivered as not-for-credit, but some visionary colleges devised curricula
that facilitated articulation of short-term training courses into for-credit coursework.
Convenience and accessibility to training were essential. Evening and weekend courses
accommodating work schedules became common. Training classes were also held at the
business site. For the truly entrepreneurial states and colleges, portable training facilities
were used to increase flexibility of deliver and reduce costs through redundancy of
training equipment (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
Entrepreneurship training and development became another community
development role for community colleges. In 1980, Congress enacted legislation that
created small business development centers and some community colleges took
advantage of this opportunity to open centers of their own (Cohen & Brawer, 2008).
While entrepreneurship training—helping those interested in starting a business to do
so—was important in its own right, some colleges also provided it as an elective for
vocational students in such trades as construction, electricity, plumbing, and heating and
air-conditioning. These courses offered those who aspired to be self-employed the
knowledge on how to start and operate a business.
Several theories might explain the evolutionary path that has delivered the
contemporary community college, but the one that seems to support the Mississippi
model is the theory of the relative autonomy of the state (Dougherty, 2001). As
Dougherty (2001) explained:
The theory of the relative autonomy of the state argues that government officials
promoted community college expansion beyond the point needed to meet the
demands of private interest groups because this met their own values and
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interests. Even when students were silent, government officials supported the
community college out of their own belief in the value of higher educational
opportunity. Even when business was mute, they supported postsecondary
education in the name of the credo that government has a responsibility to meet
the economy’s needs. (Dougherty, 2001, p. 184)
Dougherty (2001) continued:
State and federal elected officials are aware that good economic conditions
greatly aid their chances for reelection by providing jobs and rising incomes for
citizens and rising tax revenues for new government programs. They know also
that to get a healthy economy one needs to provide incentives to attract business
investment. One of the major incentives that government has provided business in
order to get it to invest capital and thus spur economic growth has been to provide
it with publicly subsidized employee training through the vocationally oriented
community college. Elected officials are quite clear that they are doing business a
favor. But they find it acceptable for two reasons: they believe in business’s
centrality to our economy; and they view favors to business as the necessary price
to securing access to investment capital that can fuel politically popular economic
growth. (Dougherty, 2001, p. 185)
The Theory of Human Capital
Introduction
The theory of human capital development attempts to explain the contribution of
human capital; one component of a much larger heterogeneous pool of capital, and its
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impact on economic growth. The theory evolved from the recognition that traditional
economic models did not account for all the factors contributing to modern economic
growth, as measured by productivity (Schultz, 1971). Acceptance of the theory led to its
use in shaping federal, state, and local government policies aimed at increasing economic
development, creating wealth, and reducing the incidence of poverty. As with most
economic theories, while it is helpful in quantifying and classifying factors of production,
it has its limitations when used to explain, predict, or otherwise rationalize human
behavior (1971).
Traditional economic theories focused on measuring the aggregate quantities of
production; land, capital, and labor in a nation. The common belief was that economic
growth could be measured by and modeled on the abundance or deficiency in these
factors; the more abundant these factors were in a country, the more likely that country
could grow economically (Field, 2008). By the mid-20th century, economists were
questioning the validity of this theory—important factors of production were missing
(Schultz, 1971). Numerous countries worldwide were increasing productivity,13 despite
deficiencies in factors of production. Traditional economic models could not explain
accurately the large growth in productivity in the latter 19th and early 20th centuries in
the modernizing economies of Western Europe and the United States. Economists were
turning to the notion of investment in capital as a way to more fully capture, measure, and

13

The growth of productivity—output per unit of input—is the fundamental determinant of the growth of a
country’s material standard of living. The most commonly cited measures are output per worker and output
per hour—measures of labor productivity. One cannot have sustained growth in output per person—the
most general measure of a country’s material standard of living—without sustained growth in output per
worker (Field, 2008).
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model economic inputs and outputs. Nobel Prize laureate Theodore Schultz (1971)
opined:
An investment approach, I am convinced, is required in thinking about economic
growth. In this approach the stock of capital is augmented by investment, and the
productive services of the additional capital increase income, which is the essence
of economic growth. It is a major step toward a general theory when all
investment resources are encompassed and allocated in accordance with the
meaningful economic standard established by the relative rates of return to
alternative investment opportunities. Thus, in theory, this approach is grounded
on an all-inclusive concept of investment and an accounting of all additional
investments gives a complete and consistent explanation of the marginal changes
in the stock of capital, of the marginal changes in productive services from
capital, and of the marginal changes in income and, accordingly, of growth.
(Schultz, 1971, p. 4)
Schultz (1971) endeavored to broaden the economist’s definition of capital and
began the discussion on how to include and allocate technical change, including research,
as a component of capital and thus subject it to measurement and analysis. Schultz
recommended to “treat much of scientific research, and also a large part of education and
other skill-producing activities, as ‘industries’ producing new forms of capital that are
more efficient than particular old forms of capital” (Schultz, 1971, p. 20). From this point
forward, measuring the investment in the input of education and research against the
output of productivity (and thus economic growth) freed modern economists from “the
wrong road” (Schultz, 1971, p. 24) of classical economic treatment of capital..
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Schultz’s work was followed quickly by contemporaries Becker (1975) and
Mincer (1962), who measured the impact of workers’ stock against improvements in
productivity and the purported link to increased earnings and wages. The theory of
human capital development states that individuals invest in themselves, in their
“stock”14,15 or capital:
To most people, capital means a bank account, a hundred shares of IBM stock,
assembly lines, or steel plants in the Chicago area. These are all forms of capital
in the sense that they are assets that yield income and other useful outputs over
long periods of time.
But such tangible forms of capital are not the only type of capital. Schooling, a
computer training course, expenditures on medical care, and lectures on the
virtues of punctuality and honesty are also capital. That is because they raise
earnings, improve health, or add to a person’s good habits over much of his
lifetime. Therefore, economists regard expenditures on education, training,
medical care, and so on as investments in human capital. They are called human
capital because people cannot be separated from their knowledge, skills, health, or
values in the way they can be separated from their financial and physical assets.
(Becker, 2002, paras. 1-2)

14

Stock includes cognitive, technical, and interpersonal skills, leadership, knowledge, wisdom, and
experiences that one possesses. Also, in early eras of developed countries and in current under-developed
nations, strength and tenacity are important human capital when related to physical work (Becker, 2002).
15

As Flora and Flora (2003a) anecdotally pointed out with Thad’s skill at bird calling (Chapter 4), human
capital is far more than simply educational attainment; it “consists of the assets that each person possesses:
health, formal education, skills, knowledge, leadership and talents” (emphasis added; p. 80).
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Individual investment in human capital is a function of discounted earnings
(Schultz, 1971). Individuals earn less in the short term while gaining education or
training, increasing their capital, expecting higher earnings later. The more capital one
has, then the higher one’s productivity. Because earnings have a strong correlation to
productivity, it is believed that one will be paid higher earnings (than someone without
productivity) because they will have higher productivity and thus contribute more to
enterprise earnings (Beaulieu & Mulkey, 1995). The resulting increase in worker
earnings is the yield on their education, training, and workplace investment (Schultz,
1971).16
Quantifying the Theory
In calculating the internal rate of return (IRR), one must account for all the costs
inherent in gaining training or education—both direct and indirect costs (Henderson,
2008). Direct costs include tuition, fees, books, supplies, and travel (particularly for rural
areas).17 Indirect costs include opportunity costs, which are the value of the next highest
valued alternative use of that resource (Henderson, 2008). In the case of education
economics, it is the foregone earnings of not entering the labor market immediately.
Aside from just looking at the individual, the social costs and benefits must be
taken into account as well. Increased education benefits the society as a whole because
educated workers tend to have lower unemployment rates, receive higher wages, are less
16

Gorman contends that there is growing evidence that current government subsidies for education
encourage lower-ability students to incur debt in order to attend a college that do not increase their
marketable skills nor their wages, harming both students and taxpayers (2008).
17

While the cost of room and board incurred attending school typically are not considered a true cost
(Henderson, 2008), the cost of travel could be because it is incurred not in the normal course of living, but
is an additional expense to receive the education or training.
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apt to be radicalized socially or politically, do not resort to crime, and do not depend on
social services over the long term. Society benefits because higher educated workers tend
to pay more taxes and rely less on governmental services (Henderson, 2008).
As with other types of investments, the law of diminishing marginal returns
applies to human capital development (Henderson, 2008). Individuals have a limited time
available to them—time spent in education is time spent away from the workforce. The
longer an individual is in school and away from the workforce earning income, the higher
the return must be after completion of education to justify the time spent getting an
education (Henderson, 2008). This logic also may apply to older workers; if older
workers wait too long to gain further education, they may not be able to recoup the
investment due to their limited remaining time to work, and thus forego the educational
opportunity.
Generally, there are two types of training: general and specific (Becker, 1975).
General training develops skills that are ubiquitous and can be used in many different
ways and in many different settings across jobs and tasks. Specific training delivers skills
that are specific to a job or task, and are generally not transferrable to other jobs or tasks.
Training is delivered in many different ways but in the contemporary setting, individuals
can receive training through secondary schooling, vocational technical training, OJT, or
personal, self-guided study using a host of resources including libraries and the Internet
(Becker, 1975). Training is paid for mainly through three sources: the individual
benefitting from the training, the individual’s employer, or the government.
The theory of human capital development assumes that individuals making the
investment decision are rational beings and are self-actualized; that is, they understand
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the investment decisions they are making and are self-motivated to act upon those
decisions (Becker, 1975). The theory also assumes that the marketplace is open,
homogeneous, and equally accessible to everyone, and that there is no bias in the
marketplace; in other words, gender and racial equity exists (Becker, 1975).
The assumption of an open, homogeneous market place then leads to the
conclusion that the skills and talents an individual brings to the marketplace are rewarded
by competitive financial returns (Becker, 1975). Another assumption is that individuals
who invest in education are mobile and can relocate to where jobs are available. The final
assumption is that there is labor market information symmetry—the individuals know
what economic trends are, what jobs are coming open, and what skills are required to
secure these jobs. According to Becker (1975):
…on-the-job and school training are not the only activities that raise real income
primarily by increasing the knowledge at a person’s command. Information about
the prices charge by different sellers would enable a person to buy from the
cheapest, thereby raising his command over resources; information about the
wages offered by different firms would enable him to work for the firm paying the
highest. In both examples, information about the economic system and about
consumption and production possibilities is increased, as distinct from knowledge
of a particular skill. Information about the political or social system—the effect of
different parties or social arrangements—could also significantly raise real
incomes. (p. 39)
There are two main arguments against the accuracy of the theory of human capital
development, based on two sides of the equation: labor supply and labor demand. On the
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supply side, criticisms are that the theory is insensitive to the forces acting upon an
individual that are out of the individual’s control (Schulz, 1970). The socioeconomic
status of an individual has an impact on his or her ability to be successful in school and
occupational choice. Familial attributes of financial, human, and social capital, along
with community attributes of structure and social capital, all are argued to contribute to
an individual’s ability, motivation, and efficacy in selecting educational advancements
and career choices (Schulz, 1970).
On the demand side, criticisms of the theory of human capital development center
on the job screening, dual economy, and dual labor markets perspectives (Schulz, 1970).
Job screening arguments are that employer hiring and compensation are based more on a
signal, presumably a certificate demonstrating achievement, rather than an individual’s
demonstrable skill. Dual-economy critics state that the wages an individual earns are less
a result of the human capital gained than whether the worker is in a core sector industry
or secondary sector industry; core sector industries pay higher wages than do secondary
sector industries (Schulz, 1970). Similarly, dual-labor market critics state that the wages
an individual earns are less a result of the human capital gained than whether the worker
is in a primary or secondary labor market; jobs in one market have a distinct set of
characteristics relative to the other market (Schulz, 1970). Primary labor market jobs are
stable, wages tend to be higher, working conditions are good, investment in worker
training is evident, and worker turnover is low. Secondary labor markets are unstable and
jobs insecure, wages are low, working conditions are poor, there is little training,
employee commitment is low, and advancement is unlikely (Schulz, 1970).
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Rural Issues
Defining Rurality: Describing and Measuring
Practitioners, researchers, policy makers, and even residents to describe and
measure what constitutes “rurality” in different ways. These differences are due, in part,
to people’s tendency to describe what is rural in comparison to and distinguished from
what is urban; the exercise is dichotomous. Compounding this conundrum is the reality of
“rural and urban are multi-dimensional concepts makes clear-cut distinctions between the
two difficult” (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, para. 1). This confusion is particularly true
given the contemporary forces acting on rural places. Urban-rural migration patterns,
economic globalization, digital communications, and other forces all add up to the
blurring of the rural-urban divide, contributing to the notion that “the idea of rurality as
an isolated island of cultural specificity and traditionalism has become anachronistic”
(Cloke, 2006, p. 19). Some would venture further and argue that technological
advancements, migration, social interactions, and other forces have eliminated the
dichotomy of rural and urban environments, and therefore the definition of rural is moot
(Cloke, 2006).
Nevertheless, popular notions of what defines the places, spaces, and the societal
construction of rurality remain firmly etched in the minds of those who populate or visit
rural places. As Cloke (2006) remarked:
The rural stands both as a significant imaginative space, connected with all kinds
of cultural meanings, ranging from the idyllic to the oppressive, and as a material
object of lifestyle desire for some people—a place to move to, farm in, visit for a
vacation, encounter different forms of nature, and general practice alternative to
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the city...Rurality is characterized by a multiplicity of social spaces overlapping
the same geographical areas, so while the geographic spaces of the city and the
countryside have become blurred it is in the social distinction of rurality that
significant differences between the rural and urban remain. (pp. 18-19)
Despite an obvious blurring of the lines between urban and rural in some places,
there is, as Marini and Mooney (2006) explain, “still, in the fundamental demographic
fact of low population density, both a material as well as a socially constructed and
meaningful difference associated with the rural in general and with rural economies
specifically” (p. 92).
If rural is different from urban, then rurality can be described and defined
sufficiently to be meaningful. There are three theoretical frameworks that rurality can be
defined within: functional, political-economic, and social constructions (Cloke, 2006).
The functional framework defines rural places in terms of areas that:
1. Are dominated by extensive land uses, notably agriculture and forestry;
2. Contain small, lower order settlements that demonstrate a strong relationship
between building and extensive landscape, and which are thought of as rural
by most of their residents;
3. Engender a way of life that is characterized by a cohesive identity based on
respect for the environmental and behavioral qualities of living as part of an
extensive landscape. (Cloke, 2006, p. 20)
The political-economic framework defines the “social production of existence”
(Cloke, 2006, p. 20) of rural areas. Through this framework, it has been argued that the
national and international dynamics of the political economy have acted deeply on rural
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areas, effecting the blurring of the rural/urban divide. However, structural problems
common to urban and rural areas are often manifest differently in rural areas—that there
is a “rural dimension” co-constituted by three basic characteristics:
1. A pleasant environment that will attract the willing or unwilling
unemployed;
2. A spaced-out geographical structure that leads to accessibility
problems and costly public services;
3. A distinctive local political ideology that favours the market, the
volunteer and the self-helper rather than public sector intervention.
(Cloke, 2006, p. 21)
Social constructions of rural places are the third theoretical framing of rurality.
This framework attempts to distinguish between rural places and urban environments by
identifying and describing the social, cultural, and moral values that are often identified
with rurality, rural spaces, and rural life.
Measuring Rural
According to Cromartie and Bucholtz (2008), measuring rural first requires the
decision of what is urban. What remains is then defined as rural. The act of defining the
boundaries of what is urban is the challenge. Cromartie and Bucholtz outlined two main
challenges. First is the choice of an appropriate urban boundary, and second is the choice
of population threshold. When choosing a boundary, there are three concepts to be
considered: administrative, land use, and economic. The administrative concept:
…defines urban along municipal or other jurisdictional boundaries...land-use...
identifies urban areas based on how densely settled an area is...The economic
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concept...recognizes the influence of cities on labor, trade, and media markets that
extend well beyond densely settled cores to include broader commuting areas.
(Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008, para. 7)
Because measuring what is rural or urban is complex, policy makers and
researchers use several systems. The three main systems of defining rural, urban,
metropolitan, and nonmetropolitan areas are the U.S. Census Bureau, the OMB, and the
U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service (USDA ERS).
The U.S. Census Bureau (1995) defines an urbanized areas (UA) and urbanized
clusters (UC) by population density. According to this definition, each UA includes a
central city and the surrounding densely settled territory that together have a population
of 50,000 or more and a population density generally exceeding 1,000 people per square
mile. A county is a political distinction and is not incorporated in the classification
scheme, so one UA may cover parts of several counties. Under this definition, all persons
living in UAs and in places (e.g., cities, towns, villages) with a population of 2,500 or
more outside of UAs are considered the urban population. All others are considered rural.
Likewise, UCs are defined similarly to UAs but are smaller. UCs contain a population of
at least 2,500 but less than 50,000 persons (Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008).
The most widely used rural definition based on the economic concept is the OMB.
The OMB defines areas as metro on the basis of standards released in January 1980.
According to this definition, each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) must include at
least:
one city with 50,000 or more inhabitants; or
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an urbanized area (defined by the Bureau of the Census) with at least 50,000
inhabitants and a total MSA population of at least 100,000 (75,000 in New
England; Cromartie & Bucholtz, 2008).
These definitions provide that each MSA must include the county in which the central
city is located (the central county) and additional contiguous counties (fringe counties), if
they are determined to be economically and socially integrated with the central county.
Any county not included in an MSA is considered to be a nonmetro county (Cromartie &
Bucholtz, 2008).
The final way in which rural areas are defined is by the USDA ERS, which uses
rural-urban continuum codes. In many cases, counties are too large to accurately
represent labor market areas, and thus metro and micro areas may and usually do include
land that is rural both from a land-use and an economic perspective. To distinguish metro
counties by size and nonmetro counties by their degree of urbanization or proximity to
metro areas, the USDA defines codes 0 to 3 as metro and 4 to 9 as nonmetro. Using this
coding scheme, 4 = urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area; and 9 =
completely rural or urban population of fewer than 2,500, not adjacent to a metro area.
(Parker, 2010; Reynnells & John, 2008).
Main Challenges of Contemporary Rural America
Unique and substantial formative changes affect rural America. Among these
changes are demographic shifts; racial and ethnic diversification; economic shifts from
agriculture, extraction, and manufacturing to tourism and service sectors; challenges of
human capital development (e.g., education, migration, healthcare) compounded by
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“rural friction”18; governmental decentralization; and land-use debates (Brown &
Swanson, 2003). Despite disagreement on the hierarchy of many of these challenges,
there is general agreement that rural areas “will not succeed if they employ ‘go it alone’
strategies. Only through cooperation between communities, among interests within
communities, and between local governments, NGOs, and the private sector will rural
areas be able to prosper in the new millennium” (p. 14). Policy makers, institutional
heads, business leaders, and community leaders must be creative, innovative, visionary,
and, willing participants in a collaborative effort to overcome the challenges awaiting
rural areas in the 21st century.
Rural American Population
Adapting to unpredictable fluctuations in population changes and the resulting
demographic and social trends that are transforming the ethnic composition of rural
America into an increasingly multicultural rural population presents unique challenges
for rural leaders. Demographic changes in rural America over the past 20 years have
shown a net growth, reversing early 20th-century migration patterns from rural to urban
areas (Johnson, 2003). Although the reasons for this trend are still being assessed, the
“means were decisive: the improvement in infrastructures and telecommunication
technology reduced the space in which transactions take place. Electronic information
and financial exchanges have practically abolished the obstacle of distance” (Grimes, as
cited in Marini & Mooney, 2006, p. 95). This new outmigration represents those who
18

Rural friction is roughly defined as the complications that arise in rural places due to limited resources
and competing service providers. Space further contributes to friction where time delays for program and
project implementation, transportation issues, and decreased communication contribute to challenges faced
in rural areas (Glasgow, 2003).
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have left the urban for the rural to raise families or enjoy the amenities of rural living
while telecommuting to work (Johnson, 2003).
Changes in rural America’s racial and ethnic composition and the continuing
impoverishment of a disproportionate share of rural African Americans, Native
Americans, and Hispanics are a concern if equal access to wealth generation and
prosperity opportunities are to be realized. Ninety-five percent (95%) of rural African
Americans continue to live in the South, and the current situation is a legacy of past
racial, class, and political inequalities (Harris & Worthen, 2003). Global and national
economic restructuring in tandem with the restructuring of the welfare state have exposed
rural African Americans to high levels of economic and social insecurity (2003).
Compounding ethnic tensions and societal challenges is the growth of the Hispanic
population; they are the fastest growing rural minority and their migration from the
Southwest to the Midwest and deep South is growing (Saenz & Torres, 2003). Native
Americans are the most rural of all minorities and their turn to gaming as an economic
development strategy may have had unintended negative social consequences and remain
far behind all other minorities in social and economic gains (Gonzales, 2003).
Rural and urban families are changing in many of the same or similar ways and
are facing similar challenges unique to the American experience. The changing structure
of rural families and vulnerabilities faced by different types of families and family
members, given emerging structural and economic changes, is particularly daunting for
those in rural areas. The separation of home and work has fragmented rural, urban, and
suburban families alike. The demand of commuting to nonlocal jobs has strained
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intergenerational and other relationships, posing critical challenges for socialization and
child rearing in rural communities (MacTavish & Slamon, 2003).
Three segments of the rural population—elderly, youth, and women—are
particularly at risk of being disadvantaged by economic restructuring, policy changes,
and social reengineering (Glasgow, 2003). Population aging is a society-wide
phenomenon; however in rural areas, elderly may be particularly exposed because,
second only to spouses, children are the most likely to provide care-giving activities and
services to their elderly parents. Rural friction may prevent the elderly from receiving the
type of care they need from their children (2003). Children raised in rural settings are
more likely than are their urban counterparts to be left behind in the rapidly changing
economy and society, contributing to higher rates of poverty, welfare dependency,
delinquency, drug use, adolescent sexuality, pregnancy, childbearing, lower educational
achievement, and decreased access to preventative healthcare (Lichter, Roscigno, &
Condron, 2003).
Women in rural settings are particularly stressed because they often are single
mothers fulfilling two roles: primary provider and family caregiver. Employment
opportunities in rural settings for single or married women have not enabled them to
increase wealth and prosperity, further contributing stress and uncertainty (Tickamyer &
Henderson, 2003). People who reside in rural areas, too, are at a higher risk of being poor
than are their urban counterparts, but their poverty is often hidden and unrecognized.
Rural persons who follow society’s prescriptions to work and stay married obtain less
protection from poverty than is the case in urban America (Jensen, McLaughlin, & Slack,
2003).
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Rural Economy
Attracting and retaining an adequate supply of high-quality jobs is one of the
foremost challenges of rural America. Particularly difficult for those in rural America is
obtaining well-paying, secure jobs in more remote areas, including areas that previously
depended on family farming. Agriculture and natural resource-based employment has
declined in rural areas but continues to dominate economic life in some regions of the
country. Manufacturing, too, has declined as a share of rural employment due, in large
part, to globalization but it still accounts for one fifth of rural jobs, a higher level than in
urban areas. Dependence on services is much lower in rural areas than in urban ones, and
rural services are more likely to involve low-wage, low-skill, seasonal, and/or involuntary
part-time employment (McGranahan, 2003).
Global, national, and regional economic restructuring has contributed to
polarization within rural America. Rural areas close to metropolitan centers are able to
benefit from the expansion of urban influence, while more remote rural places are not
able to keep up economically through recruitment of industry (Falk & Labao, 2003).
Increasingly, entrepreneurship development is being recognized as an additional
economic development strategy to recruit and retain industry. Rural societal and cultural
biases, technical resource limitations, scant access to debt/equity capital and/or strategic
marketing information, and insufficient entrepreneur education, training, mentoring, and
coaching all contribute to the unique challenges rural areas face in implementing this
strategy as a real economic development option (Center for Rural Entrepreneurship,
2010).
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Commuting is an important aspect of urban/rural interdependence and it also
facilitates urban deconcentration. Commuting to nonlocal jobs has strained
intergenerational and other relationships, posing critical challenges for socialization and
child rearing. On a positive note, commuting permits individuals to have a wider access
to economic opportunities, and may serve as a substitute for rural/urban migration. On
the accompanying negative note, communities that experience high out commuting rates
commonly face higher levels of economic and social risk (Tigges & Fuguitt, 2003).
Farming is being increasingly abandoned as a household livelihood strategy
(Buttel, 2003). While farming is on the decline, employment in tourism is on the increase.
Tourism is not an option for all rural areas; not all rural places have natural features or
other amenities that attract tourists. Tourism can have both positive and negative
consequences for the people and places concerned (Krannich & Petrzelka, 2003).
Rural Community
Given the increased decentralized and privatized environment within which rural
communities now function, local governments and institutions must develop and evolve
new roles, particularly facilitation and networking, rather than merely technical assistance
and general services provisioning. Rural communities must also attend to and build social
capital, acting on common and collective goals to meet the economic, social, and
demographic challenges ahead. The ability of communities to act locally, solving
problems and taking advantage of local assets, is based on the capacity for collective
action called “community agency” (Luloff & Bridger, 2003, p. 203). Another approach to
community development is called entrepreneurial social infrastructure, which
incorporates bonding, connections between homogeneous individuals, and bridging,
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which links heterogeneous groups to each other outside of the community (Flora & Flora,
2003b). Community agency is particularly important, given the global forces at work in
rural settings, the transitory and inconsistent extent of government intervention, and
responses to rural challenges.
Political, social, economic, and cultural globalization are exerting greater impact
on local activities and decision making, compromising the quality of life for rural
communities and people. Transnational corporations, multinational trade agreements such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement, and global economic regulatory
organizations like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization, all
have an impact on localities, perhaps to a greater degree than do nation-based policies. As
Bonnao and Constance (2003) remarked, “Local, regional, and national public policymakers [sic] must take into consideration this new context in order to optimize the chance
of creating and implementing effective initiatives designed to better the lives of rural
peoples” (p. 241).
Warner (2003) contends that government decentralization and privatization are
reducing local governments’ ability to produce and deliver services, administer municipal
functions, and plan and execute strategies for future development. Local governments are
being forced to scale back or cease service delivery altogether. Accordingly, local
governments, NGOs, and the private sector must collaborate and coordinate managerial,
functional, and administrative capacities for rural communities to remain viable and
competitive (Warner, 2003).
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A specific area of concern is that educational attainment levels in rural areas lags
behind those of urban areas. Certainly, on average, rural areas have been making strides.
According to Beaulieu, Israel, and Wimberley (2003), in nonmetropolitan areas:
…schools, as the prime engine for improving educational performance of
students...have only modest impacts on test scores...Family social
capital...prove[s] to be vital in shaping test score outcomes for students...The
family is the most important conduit for realizing educational success, while the
broader community in which they are embedded plays a secondary role. (p. 287)
Indeed, leaders of institutions, businesses, and communities must become versed in the
results of this research. They must find new and creative ways to contribute to the
bridging and bonding necessary for young people to value education, remain in school,
and learn to be life-long learners as a meaningful pathway to wealth creation and longterm prosperity (Beaulieu et al., 2003).
Access to quality and affordable health care is another area of concern. Rural
residents have poorer health than do their urban counterparts and access to health care
services disproportionately favors metropolitan/urban residents. Policies of cost
containment diverge from national health goals and have a negative impact on the
nation’s human capital investment strategies (Morton, 2003). Unique, inventive, and
creative social capital development to help build resource sharing and effective
networking will help remedy these challenges in rural places.
The Changing Interface
As the urban/rural interface widens and becomes less distinct, the competition for
use of and access to the resources and landscapes of rural areas intensifies between long190

term inhabitants, new migrants, and visitors. Policy makers, community leaders, and
business interests increasingly must find ways to manage and mediate the competing
interests so that future generations of both rural inhabitants and visitors may enjoy the
richness and diversity of America’s rural places and natural environment (Jackson-Smith,
2003).
At the forefront of the competing interests generated from the expanding urban
sprawl and further out, the rural sprawl, is the issue of land use (Jackson-Smith, 2003).
Rural localities rarely have land-use policies in place; as commercial development
expands into rural areas from the urban fringe, there is virtually no planning or regulatory
guidance. Strains on local resources grow from rapid, unplanned development, and often
contribute to traffic congestion. Conflicts often ensue between existing long-term
inhabitants and new migrants from suburbia or urban areas. One common source of
conflict stems from residents desiring to profit from land sales to developers and newer
urban-to-rural migrants trying to introduce land-use regulations, blocking these land sales
in an attempt to maintain the rural idyllic lifestyle that motivated them to move there in
the first place. Land use change in rural places is chaotic, haphazard, and increasingly
complex as the demographics shift as a result of urban to rural migration (Jackson-Smith,
2003).
Another arena challenging rural places is the impact of modern agricultural and
extraction industries on rural communities and the environment. Agriculture-based
communities tend to have a longer term vision for resource use, environmental
considerations, and conservation practices. Extraction-based communities, particularly
those dominated by multinational corporations or governmental regulations, are more
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vulnerable to economic boom/bust cycles, social structure decline, and paralyzing and
polarizing conflicts over environmental and conservation issues. Social networking
leading to effective local control over resources and land-use in these localities is
particularly important for community long-term viability (England & Brown, 2003).
Finally, the relationship between man and beast—that is the relationship between
citizens and wildlife in rural areas—is becoming increasingly complex. As urban sprawl
and rural sprawl bring more migrants into rural areas, contact with wild animals is
increasing. Conflicts arise between the rights of landowners and those of wildlife. Laws
such as the Endangered Species Act highlight the conflict between the ideals of
environmentalists and those with a more utilitarian view of wild spaces, such as ranchers,
woodsmen, hunters, and farmers. Equity between the competing views of locals, new
migrants, and visitors must be weighed by policy makers if rural lifestyles and economies
are to remain sustainable over the long term (Daniels & Brehm, 2003).
Summary
Policy driven investments in human capital by the United States—principally for
workforce development initiatives—were driven by several major forces during the 20th
Century: (a) globalization of national economy, (b) explosion and proliferation of
technology, (c) demographic migration from rural to urban, and (d) employment shifts
from agriculture to manufacturing and later into the service sector. Throughout these
changes junior/community colleges served to help workers meet these forces and adapt to
the accelerating demands of the workplace. While the effectiveness of community
colleges within post-secondary education circles continues to be a source of debate, it is
192

nonetheless clear that their role within and contribution to workforce development has
been and continues to be critical to the future of America’s global competitiveness.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the rural-urban gap
in workforce outcomes is reduced by skill development conducted by community
colleges. Specifically, the study examined three important research questions.
1. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings equally able to secure
employment after receiving specialized and advanced training?
2. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings engaging in specialized and
advanced skill development equally able to retain employment over time?
3. Do Mississippians in rural and urban settings experience the same wage
increase after receiving specialized and advanced training?
The hypothesis was that skill development reduces the gap between rural and
urban workforce outcomes, controlling for individual and local factors. Specifically, it
was hypothesized that there are no differences between rural and urban workforce
members in their ability to secure employment after training. A second hypothesis was
that there are no differences between rural and urban workforce members in their ability
to retain employment after training. Finally, this study hypothesized that rural and urban
workforce members experience the same level of wage gain after training.
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Approval to conduct the study was obtained from Mississippi State University’s
Institution Review Board for the protection of human subjects in research (see Appendix
A). The researcher’s committee approved the project in December 2011.
Research Design
The study used a quantitative research design. McMillian and Schumacher (2006)
stated that quantitative research utilizes experimental methods and quantitative measures
to test hypotheses and generalizations are the outcomes of this test. The meaning of
quantitative research was explained by Golafashani (2003) as:
Charts and graphs illustrate the results of the research, and commentators
employ words such as ‘variables’, ‘populations’ and ‘result’ as part of their daily
vocabulary…even if we do not always know just what all of the terms
mean…[but] we know that this is part of the process of doing research.
Research, then as it comes to be known publicly, is a synonym for quantitative
research. (p. 4)
In order to address the validity of this study, the total population that received
noncredit training from the fifteen Mississippi community colleges in 2010 was obtained
from the State of Mississippi state integrated workforce management system. A
quantitative analysis was performed using SPSS version 14, and the data were presented
using tables from two statistical methods, logistic regression and ordinary least squares
analysis. Each research question and hypothesis was addressed in detail.
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Data Source
The data for this study were sourced from the State of Mississippi’s state
integrated workforce performance management system. This system was created by the
Mississippi State Workforce Investment Board to track and identify best practices in
education and workforce outcomes. All 15 community colleges in the state participate in
the system by providing data on credit and noncredit activities. For the purpose of this
study, only data accounting for noncredit hours in fiscal year 2010 were used. The data
represented a total of 91,000 individuals who received training services from these 15
community colleges. All counties in the state were served. Approval to use the data is
provided in Appendix B.
Variables
Dependent Variables
This study used three dependent variables. The first dependent variable was
attainment of employment after training. This variable was measured as a dummy
variable where 1 = employed and 0 = otherwise. The second dependent variable was
employment retention, which was measured as a dummy variable where 1 = ability to
retain employment after three quarters of exiting a training program and 0 = otherwise.
The third dependent variable was wage gain, which was measured on a ratio scale (see
Table 1).
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Table 1. Description of Variables
Variables

Description
Dependent variables

Employment
Employment retention
Wage change

Attainment of Employment After Training
Retention of employment 9 months after exit
Annualized wage change before and after training
Independent variables

Metro/nonmetro
Metro
Nonmetro
Type of training
Manufacturing
Healthcare/medical
Other
Gender
Female
Male
Age
Race
White
Black
Others
Education
High school or less
Some college without a degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
Income: Wage before training
Training
On-site
Off-site
County-level control variables
% < age 19
% > age 65
% Black
Median household income
% high school degree or higher
% in labor force

Metropolitan location = 1; Else = 0
Nonmetropolitan location = 1; Else = 0
Training in manufacturing = 1; Else = 0
Training in medical/healthcare = 1; Else = 0
Other training = 1; Else = 0
Female = 1; Else = 0
Male = 1; Else = 0
Age of trainee (in years)
White = 1; Else = 0
Black = 1; Else = 0
Other race = 1; Else = 0
High school or less = 1; Else = 0
Some college, no degree = 1; Else = 0
Associate’s degree = 1; Else = 0
Bachelor’s degree = 1; Else = 0
Graduate/professional degree = 1; Else = 0
Annual wage before enrolling in training ($)
On-site training = 1; Else = 0
Off-site training = 1; Else = 0
Percent of county population under 19 years old
Percent of county population over 65 years old
Percent of county population Black
Median county household income
Percent of county population with high school degree
or higher
Percent of county population in the labor force
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Independent Variables
The independent variables included several individual and local characteristics. At
the individual level, the analysis included demographic characteristics such as race,
gender, age, education, and income. Race was measured with three dummy variables for
Black, White, and other. Specifically, one dummy variable indicated if a person is back
by coding as 1 for Black and as 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable coded for White as
1 and as 0 otherwise. Similarly, for the third dummy variable, other groups were coded as
1 and the remaining groups as 0. Gender was also measured as a dummy variable where
female was coded as 1 and male was coded as 0. Age and income were measured on a
ratio scale. Education was measured using five dummy variables to capture groups with
high school or less, some college without a degree, an associate’s degree, a bachelor’s
degree, and a graduate or professional degree.
At the individual level, two other variables were included in the analysis. First,
there was a variable that captured the type of employment. This variable was measured
with three dummy variables for those who were employed in manufacturing, medical, or
other industry. The other variable measured the type of training, using a dummy variable
where 1 indicated on-site training and 0 indicated off-site training.
At the local level, several county-level indicators were used to capture
metro/nonmetro differences in socioeconomic characteristics. The first variable was
metro status, measured with a dummy variable by coding 1 for metro and as 0 otherwise.
All the other county-level variables were measured on a ratio scale. These variables
included percentage of the county population under age 19 and percentage of the county
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population older than 65. Other variables included percent Black, median household
income, percent with high school degree or higher, and percent in the labor force.
Statistical Methods
This study used two statistical methods. The study used logistic regression for the
first two dependent variables (employment and employment retention). The logistic
regression is the most appropriate tool when the dependent variable in the analysis is a
dummy variable (Agresti, Alan, & Finlay, 1986). In contrast, when the dependent
variable is measured on the ratio scale, the most appropriate method is ordinary least
square (OLS) regression (1986). In this study, OLS was used to examine wage gain.
Logistic Regression Model
The general logistic regression model is shown in Equation 1:

log

pi

1 pi

0

1

X1

2

X 2 .... k X k

(3.1)

where
Pi = the estimated expected probability of gaining or retaining employment
(1);
1 - Pi = the estimated expected probability not gaining or retaining
employment (0);
α 0 = the regression constant - the estimated log odds of the probability of
gaining or retaining employment when all independent variables equal 0; and
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β k to β k = the estimated expected change in log-odds of the probability of
gaining or retaining employment for each unit change in the corresponding
independent variable.
Here, the log-odds of the probability f gaining or retaining employment was an
linear additive function of the independent variables. However, because log-odds make
little intuitive sense, this model can be transformed into the multiplicative probability
model shown in Equation 2:

pi

exp

1 pi

0

1

X1

2

X 2 .... k X k

(3.2)

This exponential relationship implies that, for every unit increase in the
independent variable, there is a multiplicative effect on the odds of gaining or retaining
employment. Following this model, two logistic regression analyses were conducted. The
first analysis investigated the relationships between each independent variable and
employment gain. The second analysis was conducted to determine if the relationship
between training and employment retention holds when controlling for the other
variables.
OLS Regression Model
The general OLS regression model is shown in Equation 3:
Υ = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + … + βκXκ + ε
where
Υ = the expected value of the average wage gain after training;
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(3.3)

α = the constant/intercept or the expected value of Υ when all the independent
variables equal 0;
β = the partial slope coefficient or more commonly referred to as the regression
coefficient. β represents the change in the dependent variable Υ associated with
a 1-unit increase in the independent variable X when all other independent
variables in the model are held constant;
X = the independent variable;
ε = error terms (1) the effects on Υ (the dependent variable) of variables not
included in the equation, and (2) a residual random element in the dependent
variable.
Typically, seven assumptions must be met to estimate population parameters and
conduct appropriate tests of significance. They are as follows:
1. All variables must be measured without error at least at the interval level.
2. The mean value of the error term is 0.
3. The variance of the error term is constant (if not, one is faced with
heteroscedasticity).
4. The error terms are uncorrelated; there is no autocorrelation.
5. Each independent variable is uncorrelated with the error term (if not, the result
is specification error).
6. There is no perfect collinearity of any of the independent variables (if not, one
will encounter the problem of multicollinearity).
7. The error must be normally distributed. This is a need for tests of statistical
significance.
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For each dependent variable, four models were estimated (see Table 2). The first
model included only the urban/rural status variable. The rationale was to first establish a
baseline of the relationship between urban/rural status and workforce outcomes. The
second model added the type of training received. The rationale was to determine
whether the type of training affects the relationship between urban/rural status and
workforce outcomes. The third model added all the individual characteristics. The
rationale was to see if, after controlling for type of training, the relationship between
urban/rural status and workforce outcomes continued to hold. The fourth model added
local characteristics. The objective was to see if all the previous factors continued to hold
their relationships, controlling for local characteristics.
Table 2. Regression Models
Model 1
Metro = 1
Nonmetro = 0

Model 2
Metro = 1
Nonmetro = 0
Manufacturing
Medical
Others

Model 3
Model 4
Metro = 1
Metro = 1
Nonmetro = 0
Nonmetro = 0
Training categories
Manufacturing
Manufacturing
Medical
Medical
Others
Others
Individual characteristics
Gender
Gender
Age
Age
Race
Race
Education
Education
Training location
Training location
Local characteristics
% population < 19 yrs.
% population > 65 yrs.
% Black
Median household income
% high school or less
% in labor in force
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Summary
In sum, the analytical and methodological approach presented in this chapter is
innovative in three important ways. First, the study uses—for the first time—
administrative data from the state longitudinal data system. This system is designed not
only to assess how present performance is a product of the past but how past and present
performance can be linked to the future. This study is an example of how a system like
this can be used for research purposes. Second, the research design includes measures
that gauge the ability of an individual to gain, retain, and improve wages after receiving
training. In doing so, the study allows one to paint a full picture of workforce outcomes.
Finally, this study uses a block regression approach. This approach allows for the
identification of differential impacts of different groups of factors on workforce
outcomes.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
This chapter presents the results of three sets of analyses. The first analysis
estimated models examining the extent to which urban/rural differences influence the
odds of gaining employment, controlling for individual and local characteristics. The
second analysis estimated models examining the extent to which urban and rural
differences influence the odds of retaining employment. The third analysis examined the
extent to which urban and rural differences influence the average wage gain, controlling
for individual and local factors. This chapter begins with a description of all the variables,
followed by a description of the multivariate analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
Included in Table 3 are the descriptive statistics for all of the variables used in the
study. These statistics show that 80% of those who received training were able to gain
employment and, of those, 50% were able to retain their jobs at least three quarters of a
year after exiting a training program. The statistics also show that, on average,
individuals gained an additional $4,633 per year after receiving training.
Of all those who received training, 57.4% resided in nonmetro counties and
42.6% resided in metro counties. Approximately half of the participants received some
form of training in manufacturing or medical skill development. Specifically, 16.7%
received training in manufacturing skill development, and 29.8% received training in
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medical skill development. The remaining 53.5% received other forms of training in the
service industry and other sectors. More than half (68.2%) of the training was conducted
on-site and the remaining 31.8% was conducted off-site. Before training, the average
wage was $33,056.
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (N = 49,213)
Variables
Wage change before and after training
Employment after training (Yes = 1)
Employment retention (Yes = 1)

Mean
SD
Dependent variables
$4,633
$3,616
0.808
0.393
0.540
0.498
Independent variables

Metro/Nonmetro
Metro
0.426
Nonmetro
0.574
Employed industries
Manufacturing
0.167
Medical
0.298
Others
0.535
Individual characteristics
Female (= 1)
0.579
Male
0.421
Age (yrs.)
38.932
Race
White
0.608
Black
0.371
Others
0.021
Education
High school or less
0.367
Some college without a degree
0.298
Associate’s degree
0.142
Bachelor’s degree
0.130
Graduate or professional degree
0.064
Income: Wage before training (in $1,000s)
33.056
Training
On-site (= 1)
0.682
Off-site
0.318
County-level control variables
% < age 19
29.102
% > age 65
12.967
% Black
32.506
Median household income
$45,828
% high school degree or higher
46.845
% in labor force
59.272

Min.

Max.

$500
0
0

$15,000
1
1

0.494
0.494

0
0

1
1

0.373
0.457
0.499

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.494
0.494
12.662

0
0
16

1
1
65

0.488
0.483
0.144

0
0
0

1
1
1

0.482
0.457
0.349
0.336
0.245
23.434

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
327

0.466
0.466

0
0

1
1

1.654
1.795
16.716
9.366
8.313
4.543

24
9
3
$24,000
26
41

35
18
87
$71,000
67
71

More than half (58%) of the population were women. The average age was 39.
Whites were the predominant group seeking training and represented 60.8% of the total
population. Blacks accounted for 37.1% of the total population, and the remaining
percentage included other minority groups including Hispanics and Asians. Participants
covered the entire spectrum of education. Those with a high school diploma or less
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accounted for 36.7% of the population, and some college with a degree accounted for
29.8%. Those with associate’s or bachelor’s degrees accounted for 14.2% and 13%,
respectively. The remaining 6.4% held a graduate or professional degree.
The participants were from counties where approximately one-third of the
population was younger than 19 and 13% of a county’s population was over 65, on
average. Not surprisingly, 32.5% of a county’s population was Black, on average. The
median household income, on average, was $45,828, and a little more than half of a
county’s population had more than a high school degree.
Explaining the Relationship between Urban and Rural Status and Employment
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 4. Model 1 reveals that the
relationship between metro/nonmetro status and employment after training was positive
and statistically significant. Specifically, it indicated that metro residents were 32% more
likely than were their nonmetro counterparts to gain employment after training. Model 2
adds the type of training that individuals received. The results show that the type of
training influenced the odds of gaining employment for metro and nonmetro residents.
After controlling for type of training, the odds changed from 1.32 to 1.4, which means
that, after controlling for type of training, metro residents were 40% more likely than
their nonmetro counterparts to gain employment. Model 2 also shows that those who
received training in manufacturing were 8% more likely to gain employment than those
who received training in health care or other sectors.

207

Table 4. Logistic Regression: Effects of Variables on Employment After Training
Independent variables
Metro/nonmetro
Metro(= 1)
Training categories (Ref = Med./health care)
Manufacturing

Model 1

Employment after training (Yes = 1)
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4

0.28***
(0.02)

Others
Individual characteristics
Female (= 1)

0.34***
(0.03)

0.34***
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.05)

0.08*
(0.04)
-0.06
(0.03)

0.12**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)

0.13**
(0.04)
0.02
(0.04)

-0.01
(0.03)
0.003**
(0.001)

-0.01
(0.03)
0.003**
(0.001)

0.39***
(0.03)

0.40***
(0.03)

0.10**
(0.03)
-0.18*
(0.08)

0.13***
(0.03)
-0.18*
(0.08)

-0.007
(0.03)
0.22***
(0.05)
0.01
(0.05)
0.04
(0.06)

-0.01
(0.03)
0.22***
(0.05)
-0.001
(0.05)
0.03
(0.06)

Age
Training location
On-site (= 1)
Race (White as reference)
Black
Others
Education (high school or less as
reference)
Some college without a degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
County-level control variables
% < age 19
% > age 65
% Black
Median household income (in $1,000)
% high school degree or higher
% in labor force
Constant
Observations
Wald chi square

1.32***
(0.01)
49,213
143.24

1.42***
(0.02)
45,101
186.77

0.99***
(0.06)
36,457
398.37

0.01
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.01)
-0.005***
(0.001)
-0.004
(0.004)
0.009**
(0.003)
0.008
(0.005)
0.08
(0.49)
36,457
441.24

Note. Standard errors in parentheses; *p .05, **p < .01, ***p .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Model 3 adds individual characteristics. These characteristics do not influence the
odds of gaining employment between metro and nonmetro residents. The model also
shows that there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between age and
the odds of gaining employment. The coefficient indicates that the odds of gaining
employment were 3% higher for every year increase in age. There was also a positive and
statistically significant relationship between race and gaining employment. Specifically,
Blacks were 11% more likely than Whites and other races to gain employment after
training. Similarly, education had a positive and statistically significant relationship with
employment. However, only those who had an associate’s degree were statistically
different from those who had a high school diploma or less. Individuals with associate’s
degrees were 25% more likely to gain employment after training than those with a high
school diploma or less. Having a bachelor’s degree or a graduate/professional degree did
not improve the odds of gaining employment compared to having a high school diploma
or less. This finding is an indication that available jobs in the state were primarily those
that required an associate’s degree.
Model 4 includes all the local characteristics. Adding local characteristics reduced
the effect of urban and rural status on the odds of gaining employment. However, the
effects of the other variables remained the same. The implication is clear: urban and rural
status is not the only factor that might explain differential odds of gaining employment
after training, but the very nature of the place and its local conditions contribute to
explain the differential impact of the odds of gaining employment. Specifically, the
higher the presence of minorities in the local area, the lower the odds of gaining
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employment. In contrast, the higher the household median income in a place, the higher
the odds of gaining employment. The other local factors had no impact on the odds of
gaining employment.
Explaining the Relationship between Urban and Rural Status
and Employment Retention
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 5. Model 1 reveals that metro
residents were 30% less likely to retain employment than nonmetro residents. This
relationship remained the same after controlling for individual and local factors. This
finding means that the relationship between urban and rural status and employment
retention did not depend on other individual or local conditions. The negative statistically
significant relationship implies that urban areas might have more unstable and volatile
economies. In contrast, rural places might have fewer economic opportunities, but
provide more stable job tenure. The differential impact on job retention is truly due to the
different natures of urban and rural labor markets.
Model 2 shows that training in health care results in more long-term job tenure.
Those who trained in manufacturing were 16% less likely to retain employment than
those in healthcare, and those who trained in other areas were 20% less likely to retain
employment than those in health care. The implication is clear: Health care is a growing
sector and provides employment opportunities with longer job tenure.
Model 3 shows that there was a positive and statistically significant relationship
between gender and employment retention. Specifically, women were 17% more likely to
retain employment than men. Similarly, older individuals were more likely to retain their
jobs than younger individuals. Also, those who were trained on-site were 32% more
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likely to retain employment than those who were trained off-site. Most importantly,
education has the most significant impact on employment retention. The higher the level
of education, the higher the odds of retaining employment. Those with graduate or
professional degrees were 52% more likely to retain employment than those with a high
school degree or less. Those with an associate’s and bachelor’s degrees were 43% and
26% more likely, respectively, to retain employment than those with a high school
diploma or less. Those with some college were 20% more likely to retain employment
than those with high school or less. Finally, Blacks were 3% less likely to retain
employment than Whites.
Model 4 shows that at the local level, the higher the percentage of people in the
labor force, the higher the odds of retaining employment. In contrast, the higher the
percent of Blacks in a place, the lower the odds of retaining employment. The results also
show that places with high percentages of older individuals were less likely to provide
stable employment.
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Table 5. Logistic Regression Coefficients: Effects of Variables on Employment
Retention
Independent variables
Metro/nonmetro
Metro (= 1)
Training categories (Ref = Med./health care)
Manufacturing

Retention of employment after training (Yes = 1)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-0.34***
(0.02)

Others
Individual characteristics
Female (= 1)

-0.30***
(0.02)

-0.35***
(0.02)

-0.39***
(0.04)

-0.17***
(0.03)
-0.23***
(0.03)

-0.03
(0.04)
0.02
(0.03)

-0.12***
(0.04)
-0.04
(0.04)

0.16***
(0.03)
0.01***
(0.001)

0.17***
(0.03)
0.01***
(0.001)

0.28***
(0.03)

0.22***
(0.03)

-0.03
(0.03)
-0.27***
(0.07)

0.10***
(0.03)
-0.30***
(0.07)

0.18***
(0.03)
0.36***
(0.04)
0.23***
(0.04)
0.42***
(0.05)

0.19***
(0.03)
0.38***
(0.04)
0.28***
(0.04)
0.45***
(0.05)

-0.54***
(0.05)
30,266
771.03

0.01
(0.01)
-0.04**
(0.01)
-0.02***
(0.001)
-0.03***
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.03***
(0.004)
-0.63
(0.45)
30,266
1170.31

Age
Training location
Onsite (=1)
Race (White as reference)
Black
Others
Education (high school or less as ref)
Some college without a degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
County-level control variables
% < age 19
% > age 65
% Black
Median household income (in $1,000)
% with high school diploma or higher
% in labor force
Constant
Observations
Wald chi square

0.32***
(0.01)
39,798
284.87

0.43***
(0.02)
37,235
354.99

Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p .05, ** p <.01, ***p .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Explaining the Relationship between Urban and Rural Status and Wage Gain
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6. Model 1 reveals there is a
positive relationship between metro and nonmetro status and wage gain after training. On
average, urban residents experienced a wage increase of $495.97, which was higher than
the wage increase experienced by rural residents. The impact of urban and rural status is
dependent upon individual and local factors. When these factors were included in
subsequent models, the difference between metro and nonmetro status disappeared. The
difference clearly indicated that the extent to which people might experience an increase
in wages was a function of individual attributes and local conditions.
Model 2 reveals that training in manufacturing produced the highest return on
investment. On average, training in manufacturing produced a wage increase of
$1,114.34 higher than the wage increase produced by training in health care and other
sectors. This effect remained equally strong controlling for individual and local
conditions.
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Table 6. OLS Regression of Individual and County Characteristics on Impact of
Training and Wages
Independent variables
Metro/Nonmetro
Metro (= 1)
Training categories (Ref. = Med./Healthcare)
Manufacturing
Others
Individual Characteristics
Female (= 1)

Model 1
495.97***
(70.46)

Model 2

Model 3

381.76***
(77.59)

249.01**
(88.74)

1114.34***
(110.84)
445.38***
(87.83)

1118.05***
(130.11)
544.49***
(99.30)

1110.00***
(131.60)
550.48***
(100.09)

-562.86***
(87.31)
-39.72***
(3.40)

-556.30***
(87.38)
-39.14***
(3.41)

-25.44
(87.44)
-20.14
(281.27)

27.37
(91.23)
-27.77
(281.07)

126.51
(99.74)
412.34**
(130.85)
86.84
(136.65)
152.30
(177.57)
5.14*
(2.08)
380.41***
(85.80)

123.41
(99.75)
414.10**
(131.12)
82.33
(137.01)
155.73
(178.18)
4.33*
(2.09)
405.80***
(87.40)

5408.02***
(186.88)
10,726
0.041

-33.97
(37.04)
-25.14
(41.97)
-1.15
(3.97)
23.84*
(10.44)
2.22
(9.17)
-29.64*
(14.54)
5434.18***
(190.46)
10,726
0.042

Age
Race (Ref. = White)
Black
Others
Education (Ref.=High School or less)
Some college without degree
Associate’s degree
Bachelor’s degree
Graduate or professional degree
Wage before training (in $1,000s)
On-site training (= 1)
County-level control variables (centralized)
% < age 19
% > age 65
% Black
Median household income (in $1,000s)
% high school diploma or higher
% in labor force
Constant
Observations
Adjust R2

Model 4

4421.86*** 4054.75***
(45.96)
(67.49)
10,726
10,726
0.005
0.014

67.09
(134.95)

Note. Standard errors in parentheses; * p .05, ** p < .01, *** p .001 (two-tailed tests).
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Model 3 shows that women were less likely to experience a wage gain than men,
with an average difference of $562.86 in wage gain. Similarly, Model 3 revealed there
was a negative and statistically significant relationship between age and wage gain. That
is, for every year in age, wage gain declined by approximately $40. This model also
shows that those with associate’s degrees experienced the highest wage gains as
compared to all other groups. Most importantly, this model shows there was no
differential wage gain between Whites and Blacks.
Interestingly, Model 4 shows that the higher the labor force participation rate in
an area, the lower the wage gain. This finding is consistent with labor market theory,
which indicates that tight markets provide much more competition for wages. Finally,
places with higher median household incomes, on average, were slightly more likely to
provide a greater average wage increase than places with lower median household
incomes.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter consists of a summary of the study’s findings, implications regarding
the role of community colleges in the current knowledge-based economy, and
recommendations based upon the results of the study for practice and future research. The
chapter communicates the overall goal of the study and provides the answers to the
research questions based upon the findings of the study and the important role of
community colleges in workforce development.
Summary
The overall goal of this study was to assess urban and rural differences in
workforce outcomes after receiving training from community colleges. The study was
guided by three fundamental questions.
1. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings equally able to secure
employment after receiving specialized and advanced training?
2. Are Mississippians in rural and urban settings engaging in specialized and
advanced skill development equally able to retain employment over time?
3. Do Mississippians in rural and urban settings experience the same wage
increase after receiving specialized and advanced training?
The first hypothesis was that investment in skill development reduces the rural
and urban gap in workforce outcomes, controlling for individual and local factors.
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Specifically, the hypothesis was that there are no differences between rural and urban
workforce members in their ability to secure employment after training. The second
hypothesis was that there are no differences between rural and urban workforce members
in their ability to retain employment after training. Finally, this study hypothesized that
rural and urban workforce members experience the same level of wage gain after
training.
Central to addressing these questions was the determination of the role that
community colleges play in workforce development. To this end, an extensive literature
review was conducted to examine the establishment and evolution of community colleges
since the turn of the 20th Century. The review indicated that community colleges played
a role in several phases of the economic history of the United States. As the economy
moved from labor-intensive to more technology-driven, community colleges have played
a critical role in preparing the workforce with the appropriate technical skills needed at
the time. Another important aspect of this literature was that community colleges are
critical components of local economic development and, as such, they are agents of
economic change in local areas. In their role as economic change agents, community
colleges are very close to the business community and better positioned to align
workforce needs with skill development. Community colleges originated to serve and
reach out to populations in the most rural areas in the country. Community colleges
continue to serve rural populations and play a role in reducing the gap between urban and
rural workforce outcomes.
From an analytical perspective, this study used an innovative approach to address
its central questions. The study used administrative data collected for the purpose of
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meeting state reporting requirements. These data were used to estimate several logistic
and OLS regression models. The models were designed specifically to address the three
central questions concerning urban/rural differences in workforce outcomes after training
at community colleges.
The result of this study presents several important implications. First, training is a
critical component to gaining and retaining employment. On average, 80% of those who
received training from community colleges were able to gain employment. Of those, 54%
were able to retain their jobs for the remainder of the year. Most importantly, training
generated an increase of $4,633 in wage gain per year, on average.
Second, the results show that there were differences in workforce outcomes
between urban and rural settings. However, individual and local conditions might have
influenced the magnitude of these differences. This influence is especially true for
employment and wage gain.
Third, individual characteristics matter. Specifically, education is a critical factor
in differential workforce outcomes, controlling for individual characteristics. In all cases,
those who benefited the most from training were those with two-year degrees, confirming
that community colleges play a fundamental role in providing the knowledge and skills
for our workforce.
Fourth, local conditions cannot be dismissed in addressing differential workforce
outcomes. Critical factors in determining return on investment were workforce
participation rates, presence of minorities, and poor economic conditions. Communities
with low workforce participation rates were those with tight labor markets, and therefore,
showed a smaller return on investment on training provided by community colleges.
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Implications for Practice
In the literature, there are two key elements that have driven the design of this
research. First, the literature clearly indicates that community colleges play and will
continue to play an important role in preparing people to acquire the necessary skills
required in a dynamic workforce environment. As indicated in the literature presented in
Chapter 2, the role of community colleges has been especially relevant in the
development of skills that are normally not acquired in a traditional classroom. The noncredit role of community colleges has been shown to be very relevant from the
progressive era to the present. Second, the literature clearly indicates that there is a
difference between urban and rural workforce. Specifically, rural individuals are at a
greater disadvantage because they tend to be less educated, and their local environments
tend to have fewer economic opportunities. The findings of this study clearly show that
community colleges have and will continue to play a role in workforce development, and
they will play a significant role in reducing the urban and rural gap. The latter finding is
very much in line with the human capital development literature.
This study contributes three facets of information to our understanding of the
importance of community colleges. First, the study highlights the role that community
colleges play in the current knowledge-based economy. There is a great deal of
discussion in the academic and political realms on how to overcome the gaps in education
and skill requirements for the jobs of the future. At this time, little is known about how
educational institutions should contribute to meeting the challenges posed by the 21st
Century economy. To be sure, community colleges are the intermediary organizations
that link K-12 to higher education and link graduates to the workforce. Most importantly,
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community colleges provide programs specifically tailored to address skill development.
This study clearly demonstrates how community colleges have adapted and evolved to
address workforce challenges throughout the last century. Specifically, the study provides
a conceptual framework to examine how community colleges can respond to the
workforce needs of any given time.
Second, this study introduces an innovative approach in the use of administrative
data. Typically, these data are collected for accountability and reporting requirements.
This study shows how such data can be used for research purposes and therefore for
knowledge creation.
Third, this study addresses the issue of the rural/urban gap in workforce
outcomes. In the policy arena, programs are often designed with an urban bias. This study
outlines how urban and rural differences in demographic, economic, and social
conditions might result in differences in workforce outcomes. The study shows that a
critical role of community colleges is to reach out to diverse populations with different
needs. In doing so, community colleges help minimize disparity in urban/rural workforce
outcomes.
Recommendations
Practice
The most important practical application of this study is informing policymakers
about the role community colleges play in meeting workforce demands as well as
reducing the gap between urban and rural. In the current political environment, there is a
lot of emphasis on finding best practices to meet the demands of the growing knowledgebased economy and to do so in accountable ways. Often, the focus is on return on
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investment. Within this general framework, the potential is to invest too much in urban
settings, as they tend to produce a much higher return on investment, according to state
and federal performance measures. One implication of this study is that even though rural
areas have a lower return on investment, such an investment is critical to reducing the gap
between urban and rural. Reducing the gap now rather than later is more cost-effective.
This point is often overlooked due to the urban bias in decisions about policy. In the final
analysis, the most important practical implication of this study is to increase awareness of
the role that community colleges can play as social equalizers
Future Research
Future research should consider expanding this study to other states. Another
possible option would be to include data that provide information about career technical
programs across community colleges. This study is a starting point rather than a
definitive answer to the questions related to the role that community colleges should play
in the growing knowledge-based economy.
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